Narrative:

Non-tower operations at our destination. Weather obtained from company and ASOS deteriorated at our destination from broken 400 with 4sm vis at takeoff to ovc 200 with 1/2 SM vis with fog and mist at time of first approach. NOTAM at our destination stated coupled approaches to runway xx na discussed preflight and in flight. We as a crew; after looking at the ILS to runway xx; concluded that the NOTAM applied to the lower than normal published CAT 1 mins. We concluded to use autopilot to begin the approach and disconnect while descending on glidepath. Center provided approach services on first two approaches. Center had little situational awareness of weather conditions at and asked if we would like the visual approach to runway xx. We requested and received vectors for the ILS xx. With autopilot engaged on the approach; shortly after intercepting glideslope; we received an EICAS glideslope msg and lost vertical flight director information with GS lined out on our fmas. We still had raw ILS glideslope info. Initiated go-around at approximately 2;600ft MSL. We elected; with ASOS weather still reporting at CAT1 minimums and plenty of fuel remaining; to re-attempt the ILS runway xx. On second approach with autopilot on; received same EICAS msg and lined-out GS fmas (as described on first approach). After go around; we discussed NOTAM again and queried center on the specifics of said NOTAM. Center attempted to contact approach (still not open) and read the NOTAM back to us. As a crew we concluded that the entire approach had to be hand flown. A couple minutes later; approach control opened. Approach control confirmed that the entire approach must be hand-flown and also was able to provide accurate timely weather information. Third approach was hand flown to minimums with a go-around executed due to no approach lights in sight at CAT 1 minimums. On go-around; flaps 20 maximum airspeed was exceeded by 5 knots due to first officer (myself-pilot monitoring) task saturation and not hearing call for flaps 5. Discrepancy was recorded in aml. Following this go-around; approach was able to provide timely information that weather was improving slightly; specifically toward runway xx approach end. With plenty of fuel remaining for approaches and divert to alternate; we executed hand-flown ILS to runway xx breaking out approach lights at minimums; continuing; and observing the runway environment at 100 ft AGL to a full stop landing.a multitude of factors contributed to this series of events including:1) we as a flight crew misunderstanding the specifics of runway xx ILS NOTAM 2) deteriorating weather conditions and low visibility and ceilings at uncontrolled field.3) both pilots were hub turning into this flight event and operating at end of duty day during circadian low hours4) poor procedures and crew coordination on the third go-around resulting in overspeed of flaps5) center as the controlling agency had little situational awareness of rapidly changing weather conditions at and ILS NOTAM specifics.suggestions:1) we as a flight crew should have confirmed specifics with operations/ATC prior to flight of any NOTAM that could affect approach. 2) a note on the flight plan release specifying that all portions of ILS runway xx at that airport must be 'hand-flown.'3) flight schedule being adjusted 15-20 minutes later to allow our flight to arrive when destination approach and tower are open; as center had little situational awareness of ILS operation and changing weather conditions at that airport.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 flight crew reported being dispatched to an airport before the Tower opened with weather near CAT I minima and automated approaches NOTAMed not applicable. After Tower opened; weather improved and the flight landed following the fourth approach. With poor weather; the flight should have been dispatched to arrive after the Tower opened.

Narrative: Non-tower operations at our destination. Weather obtained from Company and ASOS deteriorated at our destination from BKN 400 with 4sm vis at takeoff to OVC 200 with 1/2 SM vis with fog and mist at time of first approach. NOTAM at our destination stated coupled approaches to RWY XX NA discussed preflight and in flight. We as a crew; after looking at the ILS to RWY XX; concluded that the NOTAM applied to the lower than normal published CAT 1 mins. We concluded to use autopilot to begin the approach and disconnect while descending on glidepath. Center provided approach services on first two approaches. Center had little situational awareness of weather conditions at and asked if we would like the visual approach to runway XX. We requested and received vectors for the ILS XX. With autopilot engaged on the approach; shortly after intercepting glideslope; we received an EICAS glideslope msg and lost vertical flight director information with GS lined out on our FMAs. We still had raw ILS glideslope info. Initiated go-around at approximately 2;600ft MSL. We elected; with ASOS weather still reporting at CAT1 minimums and plenty of fuel remaining; to re-attempt the ILS RWY XX. On second approach with autopilot on; received same EICAS msg and lined-out GS FMAs (as described on first approach). After go around; we discussed NOTAM again and queried Center on the specifics of said NOTAM. Center attempted to contact approach (still not open) and read the NOTAM back to us. As a crew we concluded that the entire approach had to be hand flown. A couple minutes later; Approach control opened. Approach control confirmed that the entire approach must be hand-flown and also was able to provide accurate timely weather information. Third approach was hand flown to minimums with a go-around executed due to no approach lights in sight at CAT 1 minimums. On go-around; flaps 20 maximum airspeed was exceeded by 5 knots due to FO (myself-pilot monitoring) task saturation and not hearing call for flaps 5. Discrepancy was recorded in AML. Following this go-around; approach was able to provide timely information that weather was improving slightly; specifically toward RWY XX approach end. With plenty of fuel remaining for approaches and divert to alternate; we executed hand-flown ILS to RWY XX breaking out approach lights at minimums; continuing; and observing the runway environment at 100 ft AGL to a full stop landing.A multitude of factors contributed to this series of events including:1) We as a Flight Crew misunderstanding the specifics of RWY XX ILS NOTAM 2) Deteriorating weather conditions and low visibility and ceilings at uncontrolled field.3) Both pilots were hub turning into this flight event and operating at end of duty day during circadian low hours4) Poor procedures and crew coordination on the third go-around resulting in overspeed of flaps5) Center as the controlling agency had little situational awareness of rapidly changing weather conditions at and ILS NOTAM specifics.Suggestions:1) We as a flight crew should have confirmed specifics with Operations/ATC prior to flight of any NOTAM that could affect approach. 2) A note on the flight plan release specifying that all portions of ILS RWY XX at that airport must be 'hand-flown.'3) Flight schedule being adjusted 15-20 minutes later to allow our flight to arrive when destination approach and tower are open; as Center had little situational awareness of ILS operation and changing weather conditions at that airport.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.