Narrative:

While on the milton 5 arrival into lga, we were given descent to cross lizzi at 11000'. We were 2 mi late in arriving at lizzi and this late initiation of descent was coordinated with ZNY. The controllers were involved in an transfer of frequencys and there was some confusion. Factors causing this altitude deviation included unfamiliar non-standard cockpit instrumentation of aircraft acquired as result of merger. DME's radios are in different location on these aircraft, requiring rechking displayed navigation data to check on descent initiation point. I was flying with copilot from the acquired airline who uses different descent points that used at my airline. Those factors created the situation where we were at the point where I, as the non-flying captain, would have started down. It took more time for me to x-chk this due to the unfamiliar cockpit setup. Copilot was used to initiating dscnts at a later point than was standard procedure at our airline. I mistakenly let him go too long before starting down, and missed our crossing restriction. Additionally, I felt like I didn't want to be too overbearing on the copilot in asking him to start his descent, as there is still some friction between pilot groups at both airlines and we are trying to smooth the transition. I should have commanded the descent initiation earlier when I was comfortable and now realize how the above factors can affect your judgement.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG ON ARR INTO LGA MISSES CROSSING RESTRICTION DUE LATE DESCENT BY FO, THE PF. THE PF, FO, WAS USED TO A DIFFERENT DESCENT PROC THAN CAPT BECAUSE THEY WERE FROM 2 COMPANIES THAT HAVE RECENTLY MERGED.

Narrative: WHILE ON THE MILTON 5 ARR INTO LGA, WE WERE GIVEN DSCNT TO CROSS LIZZI AT 11000'. WE WERE 2 MI LATE IN ARRIVING AT LIZZI AND THIS LATE INITIATION OF DSCNT WAS COORDINATED WITH ZNY. THE CTLRS WERE INVOLVED IN AN TRANSFER OF FREQS AND THERE WAS SOME CONFUSION. FACTORS CAUSING THIS ALT DEVIATION INCLUDED UNFAMILIAR NON-STANDARD COCKPIT INSTRUMENTATION OF ACFT ACQUIRED AS RESULT OF MERGER. DME'S RADIOS ARE IN DIFFERENT LOCATION ON THESE ACFT, REQUIRING RECHKING DISPLAYED NAV DATA TO CHK ON DSCNT INITIATION POINT. I WAS FLYING WITH COPLT FROM THE ACQUIRED AIRLINE WHO USES DIFFERENT DSCNT POINTS THAT USED AT MY AIRLINE. THOSE FACTORS CREATED THE SITUATION WHERE WE WERE AT THE POINT WHERE I, AS THE NON-FLYING CAPT, WOULD HAVE STARTED DOWN. IT TOOK MORE TIME FOR ME TO X-CHK THIS DUE TO THE UNFAMILIAR COCKPIT SETUP. COPLT WAS USED TO INITIATING DSCNTS AT A LATER POINT THAN WAS STANDARD PROC AT OUR AIRLINE. I MISTAKENLY LET HIM GO TOO LONG BEFORE STARTING DOWN, AND MISSED OUR XING RESTRICTION. ADDITIONALLY, I FELT LIKE I DIDN'T WANT TO BE TOO OVERBEARING ON THE COPLT IN ASKING HIM TO START HIS DSCNT, AS THERE IS STILL SOME FRICTION BTWN PLT GROUPS AT BOTH AIRLINES AND WE ARE TRYING TO SMOOTH THE TRANSITION. I SHOULD HAVE COMMANDED THE DSCNT INITIATION EARLIER WHEN I WAS COMFORTABLE AND NOW REALIZE HOW THE ABOVE FACTORS CAN AFFECT YOUR JUDGEMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.