Narrative:

We had just been given holding instructions. We verified the hold in the FMS and executed the changes. We were still a little ways from the fix when we received a triple chime; aural warning and red bleed duct warning message. I immediately knew this meant the plane would soon lose pressurization. I told the first officer to descend to 10;000; checked the TCAS and it appeared to be clear below. Note: I am nonstandard with my TCAS selection. I do not use the TCAS normal selection. I instead use above/below like most captains at our airline do. I do that for such a situation as this. Meanwhile I told center we had lost our pressurization. At this point we were actually ahead of the curve because it took about 45 seconds (or so) for the aircraft to lose bleeds and start depressurizing and we had already lost thousands of feet and descending rapidly. We completed the appropriate checklist; donning our masks. We did get some of the expected pressurization messages going through 18;000 feet or so. We did not depressurize enough to make the masks drop. But soon we were below 12;000 feet. ATC was excellent. Gave us our space to do what we needed to do. During the descent I realized that the cabin temperature would be a problem. Holding was not a good option. I messaged the dispatcher via ACARS for diversion planning. By the time we leveled off at 10;000 ft we had a response.I began to finish up all of the non-emergency checklist; communicate to ATC; get the FMS set up; get weather; weights; and charts up on my efb. Plus talk to the passengers and flight attendants. When you are in an emergency situation like that you have a lot to think about; a lot to do and it all needs to be done correctly. So I was a little disappointed that during all of this I am hearing SELCAL and a message from flight ops wanting to know if the masks dropped. I identified that as a threat and not something that needed to be done in the air. And honestly it was just another message I had to click through to get to the ATIS and landing weights. Then a little while later they sent that message again. Honestly; the best that I can tell; this is clearly not a critical part of what needs to be done right now. I am not sure why they were asking it; but if it was to determine if they needed to re-stow masks or something when I get to the gate then someone needs to be reprimanded. That would be a huge compromise of safety and not; from my point of view; critical information to the safety of our flight. In a situation like that when you have so much going on; it is easy to miss something. A distraction such as that could be the straw that causes an accident. There are captains that would have begun conversing with flight ops and became distracted with the task at hand. Soon I landed and was thinking of my next hurdle - heat on the plane. It was 33 degrees C in the back and climbing. We had called ops twice to be sure they understood the condition of the plane and our need for air as soon as we got to the gate. Upon landing fire trucks were on the taxiway. They wanted me to stop to check the plane. One was even on my taxiway ahead of me. I told the tower I would not stop. I explained the situation with the heat on the plane and taxied past the trucks (the truck ahead of me moved). Ops was great as I anticipated. The air was hooked up quickly and very soon people were getting off the plane.flight ops asking non critical information at a critical time: that is insane and dangerous and they have been reprimanded for that before. This message in particular: I have done a lot of safety work in the past so maybe I am more in tune with what happened after this message occurs. I know my first officer said he did not know all of that would happen. I don't really believe that is not a specific issue with the first officer. And we had a long talk about it; and obviously he knows now exactly what will happen when you see a bleed duct warning. I think there are quite a few pilots not as familiar as theyshould be with this message. I say this is not specific to him because a flight standards pilot came to pick up the airplane and he told me that message should not have cause pressurization issues. So I asked him what happened when you get a bleed duct warning message. He seemed rather confused by the question. Finally after a long conversation where I realized that this guy just wasn't going to get it. Here is what happens. You get the warning message. It begins to shut down the bleeds. The warning message is then replaced by a similar caution message and then that message disappears. So if you are not familiar with this message you might think that everything is ok about a minute after your original message because you no longer had a message at all.here is the skinny on the above paragraph. What if I was not familiar with that message? Let's say we had not started a descent right away and we kept on flying towards where they were holding (I would never do that; this is only to make a point). About a minute goes by and I think the problem is solved because there are no messages. My ears are popping a little and I start investigating. As we enter the hold I realize we are losing pressure fast. Now I am in the area where they are holding and there are several airplanes below me flying in a circle. That is not the time to do an emergency descent. But that is what I was set up for. I am not trying to give myself pats on the back; I am more wanting this to be a training scenario. Because had the pilot who took the plane from me had been the captain I fear things would had been a whole lot worse. And I assume that it is a training issue since the guy is a line check airman.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-700 flight crew reported a loss of cabin pressure resulted when they received a bleed duct warning message.

Narrative: We had just been given holding instructions. We verified the hold in the FMS and executed the changes. We were still a little ways from the fix when we received a triple chime; aural warning and red BLEED DUCT warning message. I immediately knew this meant the plane would soon lose pressurization. I told the FO to descend to 10;000; checked the TCAS and it appeared to be clear below. Note: I am nonstandard with my TCAS selection. I do not use the TCAS normal selection. I instead use above/below like most Captains at our airline do. I do that for such a situation as this. Meanwhile I told Center we had lost our pressurization. At this point we were actually ahead of the curve because it took about 45 seconds (or so) for the aircraft to lose bleeds and start depressurizing and we had already lost thousands of feet and descending rapidly. We completed the appropriate checklist; donning our masks. We did get some of the expected pressurization messages going through 18;000 feet or so. We did not depressurize enough to make the masks drop. But soon we were below 12;000 feet. ATC was excellent. Gave us our space to do what we needed to do. During the descent I realized that the cabin temperature would be a problem. Holding was not a good option. I messaged the Dispatcher via ACARS for diversion planning. By the time we leveled off at 10;000 ft we had a response.I began to finish up all of the non-emergency checklist; communicate to ATC; get the FMS set up; get weather; weights; and charts up on my EFB. Plus talk to the passengers and flight attendants. When you are in an emergency situation like that you have a lot to think about; a lot to do and it all needs to be done correctly. So I was a little disappointed that during all of this I am hearing SELCAL and a message from flight ops wanting to know if the masks dropped. I identified that as a threat and not something that needed to be done in the air. And honestly it was just another message I had to click through to get to the ATIS and landing weights. Then a little while later they sent that message again. Honestly; the best that I can tell; this is clearly not a critical part of what needs to be done right now. I am not sure why they were asking it; but if it was to determine if they needed to re-stow masks or something when I get to the gate then someone needs to be reprimanded. That would be a huge compromise of safety and not; from my point of view; critical information to the safety of our flight. In a situation like that when you have so much going on; it is easy to miss something. A distraction such as that could be the straw that causes an accident. There are Captains that would have begun conversing with flight ops and became distracted with the task at hand. Soon I landed and was thinking of my next hurdle - heat on the plane. It was 33 degrees C in the back and climbing. We had called ops twice to be sure they understood the condition of the plane and our need for air as soon as we got to the gate. Upon landing fire trucks were on the taxiway. They wanted me to stop to check the plane. One was even on my taxiway ahead of me. I told the tower I would not stop. I explained the situation with the heat on the plane and taxied past the trucks (the truck ahead of me moved). Ops was great as I anticipated. The air was hooked up quickly and very soon people were getting off the plane.Flight ops asking non critical information at a critical time: That is insane and dangerous and they have been reprimanded for that before. This message in particular: I have done a lot of safety work in the past so maybe I am more in tune with what happened after this message occurs. I know my FO said he did not know all of that would happen. I don't really believe that is not a specific issue with the FO. And we had a long talk about it; and obviously he knows now exactly what will happen when you see a bleed duct warning. I think there are quite a few pilots not as familiar as theyshould be with this message. I say this is not specific to him because a flight standards pilot came to pick up the airplane and he told me that message should not have cause pressurization issues. So I asked him what happened when you get a BLEED DUCT warning message. He seemed rather confused by the question. Finally after a long conversation where I realized that this guy just wasn't going to get it. Here is what happens. You get the warning message. It begins to shut down the bleeds. The warning message is then replaced by a similar caution message and then that message disappears. So if you are not familiar with this message you might think that everything is ok about a minute after your original message because you no longer had a message at all.Here is the skinny on the above paragraph. What if I was not familiar with that message? Let's say we had not started a descent right away and we kept on flying towards where they were holding (I would never do that; this is only to make a point). About a minute goes by and I think the problem is solved because there are no messages. My ears are popping a little and I start investigating. As we enter the hold I realize we are losing pressure fast. Now I am in the area where they are holding and there are several airplanes below me flying in a circle. That is not the time to do an emergency descent. But that is what I was set up for. I am not trying to give myself pats on the back; I am more wanting this to be a training scenario. Because had the pilot who took the plane from me had been the Captain I fear things would had been a whole lot worse. And I assume that it is a training issue since the guy is a line check airman.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.