Narrative:

Rush hour at ZZZ after reposition from ZZZ1. We were set up for xy with vectors then changed to a visual xx.after advising field in sight the visual to xx was given. Shortly after; we were switched to tower who then advised of parallel traffic to maintain separation with. Only problem with that was that there were two targets; one already established inbound and another wing up in turn that wasn't immediately apparent. While trying to differentiate we were also given a landing/land and hold short operation (lahso) clearance on xx hold short xwr. Due to multiple tasks occurring and frequency congestion; I just parroted the clearance realizing immediately (we) the mistake I just made. Given the current situation (frequency congestion) I quickly assessed that my error could be performed safely with current numbers (in retrospect; I was wrong given this aircraft's brake history).what really piqued our attention was when we were rolling out ATC said (paraphrasing) 'ok; well; now expedite down to xwr left turn another left turn to north contact ground....' we were not admonished nor given a phone number but the tone of the clearance insinuated she expected us to hold short of xwl on roll out. When time finally permitted; both of us agreed again that xwr was stated on the clearance and also lahso depicted short of xwr on the 10-9. Last leg of day; last day of tour; new avionics upgrade could have been minor contributing factors as well.although trying to help out expeditiously in a congested environment with a subsequent mistake; a go around might have been a viable option.......or created more problems. Studying a 10-9 closer and noticing a lahso box short of a crossing runway could have been a heads up to the potential clearance. At very busy airports with multiple crossing runways; it would behoove ATC to know if their regular operators had a lahso prohibition. Not parroting an expected clearance would have been the best option.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-505 flight crew reported landing and not holding short of a crossing runway as instructed by ATC.

Narrative: Rush hour at ZZZ after reposition from ZZZ1. We were set up for XY with vectors then changed to a visual XX.After advising field in sight the visual to XX was given. Shortly after; we were switched to tower who then advised of parallel traffic to maintain separation with. Only problem with that was that there were two targets; one already established inbound and another wing up in turn that wasn't immediately apparent. While trying to differentiate we were also given a landing/Land and Hold Short Operation (LAHSO) clearance on XX hold short XWR. Due to multiple tasks occurring and frequency congestion; I just parroted the clearance realizing immediately (we) the mistake I just made. Given the current situation (frequency congestion) I quickly assessed that my error could be performed safely with current numbers (in retrospect; I was wrong given this aircraft's brake history).What really piqued our attention was when we were rolling out ATC said (paraphrasing) 'ok; well; now expedite down to XWR left turn another left turn to N contact ground....' We were not admonished nor given a phone number but the tone of the clearance insinuated she expected us to hold short of XWL on roll out. When time finally permitted; both of us agreed again that XWR was stated on the clearance and also LAHSO depicted short of XWR on the 10-9. Last leg of day; last day of tour; new avionics upgrade could have been minor contributing factors as well.Although trying to help out expeditiously in a congested environment with a subsequent mistake; a go around might have been a viable option.......or created more problems. Studying a 10-9 closer and noticing a LAHSO box short of a crossing runway could have been a heads up to the potential clearance. At very busy airports with multiple crossing runways; it would behoove ATC to know if their regular operators had a LAHSO prohibition. Not parroting an expected clearance would have been the best option.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.