Narrative:

I completed 3 flights as the PIC; performed the post-flight inspection; and separated from my co-captain sic for last day travel home. My partner was assigned as the replacement PIC and joined by a fresh sic to continue with the aircraft for the remainder of his tour. During my partner's pre-flight inspection; two electrical box covers were discovered detached; neatly stacked and inverted; and laying atop the flight control cables and aft pulley on the bottom of the aft accessory compartment. There were slight rub marks on the surface of the bottom cover indicating prolonged contact with the flight control cables had occurred. He invited my return to the aircraft to view the discovery. I took photos; and met with a ramp maintenance representative while he reported the aircraft on ground (aog) discovery to the maintenance controller.the ramp maintenance representative did not know where the covers had originated from and agreed to coordinate with maintenance for guidance prior to attempting resolution. We informed him that we had picked up the aircraft two days prior and one of the discrepancies cleared there was a repeat write-up for the right environmental control system (ecs) fault tripped in the aft accessory compartment equipment bay. The detailed inspection performed by my partner during his first pre-flight inspection of the compartment is to be applauded; commended; and embraced as a fine example of the methodology to be emulated in the future. Upon reaching the airline terminal I phoned the chief pilot; shared the photos with him; and entered into a discussion of the event to assist him in pursuit of the issue originating at maintenance; as well as to further my personal growth and learning from this oversight. The aircraft was operated in this condition for nine flights over the course of two days. I had inspected the compartment five times during the course of my pre-flight and post-flight duties during these two days and there was one additional compartment inspection performed by the tsa as part of a presidential tfr pre-clear process. All items in the tail-cone compartment section of the expanded normal procedures checklist-exterior preflight flow were correctly checked on all of these inspections. The chain of events likely originated at the maintenance facility as a function of incomplete performance of repair work prior to declaring the aircraft worthy of return to service. My initial and all subsequent pre-flight and post-flight inspections of the aft accessory compartment were inadequate in capturing this oversight. Though the neatly stacked nature of the electrical box covers helped to mask the discovery; the area that they were placed upon is one of critical importance and an area that I should be checking with greater attention and focus possibly to include a tactile evaluation.this case had an element of significant threat to margins of flight safety. That fact has significantly raised my level of awareness for the importance of always performing very thorough and complete inspections as part of every pre-flight and post-flight activity especially when accepting an aircraft out of maintenance. Receiving an aircraft out of maintenance with the mind set of expecting to find something amiss rather than expecting not to might better arm me for discovery and afford me a greater capacity to capture these types of errors. Adoption of the perspective that the pre-flight and post-flight checklist items represent a minimum level of the items to be observed will better prepare me to be extra vigilant and encourage me to step outside of the box in search of unexpected conditions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Citation Captain (who had been the SIC of the inbound flight) reported that during the preflight inspection he discovered two electrical box covers laying on top of the flight control cables and aft pulley on the bottom of the aft accessory compartment. The aircraft had been flown for nine flights by this crew after picking up the aircraft two days earlier. One of the discrepancies cleared had been a repeat write-up for the right Environmental Control System (ECS) fault tripped in that equipment bay.

Narrative: I completed 3 flights as the PIC; performed the post-flight inspection; and separated from my co-Captain SIC for last day travel home. My partner was assigned as the replacement PIC and joined by a fresh SIC to continue with the aircraft for the remainder of his tour. During my partner's pre-flight inspection; two electrical box covers were discovered detached; neatly stacked and inverted; and laying atop the flight control cables and aft pulley on the bottom of the aft accessory compartment. There were slight rub marks on the surface of the bottom cover indicating prolonged contact with the flight control cables had occurred. He invited my return to the aircraft to view the discovery. I took photos; and met with a ramp maintenance representative while he reported the Aircraft on Ground (AOG) discovery to the maintenance controller.The ramp maintenance representative did not know where the covers had originated from and agreed to coordinate with maintenance for guidance prior to attempting resolution. We informed him that we had picked up the aircraft two days prior and one of the discrepancies cleared there was a repeat write-up for the right Environmental Control System (ECS) fault tripped in the aft accessory compartment equipment bay. The detailed inspection performed by my partner during his first pre-flight inspection of the compartment is to be applauded; commended; and embraced as a fine example of the methodology to be emulated in the future. Upon reaching the airline terminal I phoned the Chief Pilot; shared the photos with him; and entered into a discussion of the event to assist him in pursuit of the issue originating at maintenance; as well as to further my personal growth and learning from this oversight. The aircraft was operated in this condition for nine flights over the course of two days. I had inspected the compartment five times during the course of my pre-flight and post-flight duties during these two days and there was one additional compartment inspection performed by the TSA as part of a presidential TFR pre-clear process. All items in the tail-cone compartment section of the expanded normal procedures checklist-exterior preflight flow were correctly checked on all of these inspections. The chain of events likely originated at the maintenance facility as a function of incomplete performance of repair work prior to declaring the aircraft worthy of return to service. My initial and all subsequent pre-flight and post-flight inspections of the aft accessory compartment were inadequate in capturing this oversight. Though the neatly stacked nature of the electrical box covers helped to mask the discovery; the area that they were placed upon is one of critical importance and an area that I should be checking with greater attention and focus possibly to include a tactile evaluation.This case had an element of significant threat to margins of flight safety. That fact has significantly raised my level of awareness for the importance of always performing very thorough and complete inspections as part of every pre-flight and post-flight activity especially when accepting an aircraft out of maintenance. Receiving an aircraft out of maintenance with the mind set of expecting to find something amiss rather than expecting not to might better arm me for discovery and afford me a greater capacity to capture these types of errors. Adoption of the perspective that the pre-flight and post-flight checklist items represent a minimum level of the items to be observed will better prepare me to be extra vigilant and encourage me to step outside of the box in search of unexpected conditions.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.