Narrative:

While en route; we were instructed to slow and to be vectored off course for spacing on two occasions. Also; we were instructed to descend approximately 150 miles prior to top of descent. The flight was dispatched to land with 6;100 pounds of fuel; but we found ourselves approaching [our destination] for landing with a predicted touchdown fuel load of only 4;900 pounds. At 11;000'; approximately 10 minutes from landing; while on vectors with the airport in sight; we were told to expect holding instructions. We advised ATC we did not have the fuel to hold and we were subsequently given a heading to the east. We had no advance warning of this. We had no landing alternate and none was required. Options were limited and were quickly reviewed and discussed between crew members.moments later when ATC came back and offered us holding again; we declined and asked for a heading to [our alternate]. I was the pilot flying and took responsibility for the radios as well. I tasked my first officer (first officer) with communicating via ACARS with our dispatcher. Most of this ACARS communication I was not privy to; as I was dealing with storms; ATC congestion; and a very turbulent ride. After the storms; checklists; a passenger PA; keeping our flight attendants (flight attendant) in the loop; and leveling off at cruise; we double checked the divert checklist and worked on arrival chores for landing. After programming the [flight computer] it predicted 2;400 pounds of fuel for our landing. We confirmed with ATC there would be no delays; doubled checked the weather and made sure all runways were open. We asked for direct to the airport which was approved.at that point we were approximately 120 NM from [the alternate]. We then received a message from our dispatcher saying that '[another airport] was accepting diverts.' by the time we had familiarized ourselves with [the alternate] and its weather; and discussed this as a crew we were 70 NM past [the alternate]; 100 NM from [the destination] and only four minutes from top of descent. Plus we had a straight shot looking ahead with good weather. [The second alternate] was behind us with a head wind to get there. It only has one runway and we were not certain of the position of any storms between us and that airport. At that point in time I figured the penalty compared to [the second alternate] was about 300-400 pounds of fuel and would still allow for two approaches in [the first alternate] if that became necessary. We landed with 2300 pounds of fuel. Later in the day it was brought to my attention by my first officer that our dispatcher had mentioned [that the second alternate] as a possibility during our climb out; but that information was not passed on to me as it came during a very busy time in the cockpit. From my perspective the second ACARS message from dispatch regarding [that the second alternate] was actually the first time I heard our dispatcher suggest a different option for us.I should have asked for more fuel from the dispatcher prior to leaving. Although the math on the release is good; 6;100 pounds for a 4.5 hour flight is questionable. I feel our new dispatching software is cutting fuel margins too close; by forcing different segment altitudes based on forecast winds. Early on in the divert I should have given the flying; and radio to the first officer; thus allowing me the time to focus on communicating with dispatch. Furthermore; a verbal link with dispatch; rather that ACARS; would have saved a lot of time and allowed for better communication.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Captain reported about an unplanned weather diversion after enroute vectoring reduced his available fuel below holding fuel. The flight landed with about 2;400 pounds.

Narrative: While en route; we were instructed to slow and to be vectored off course for spacing on two occasions. Also; we were instructed to descend approximately 150 miles prior to Top of Descent. The flight was dispatched to land with 6;100 pounds of fuel; but we found ourselves approaching [our destination] for landing with a predicted touchdown fuel load of only 4;900 pounds. At 11;000'; approximately 10 minutes from landing; while on vectors with the airport in sight; we were told to expect holding instructions. We advised ATC we did not have the fuel to hold and we were subsequently given a heading to the east. We had no advance warning of this. We had no landing alternate and none was required. Options were limited and were quickly reviewed and discussed between Crew Members.Moments later when ATC came back and offered us holding again; we declined and asked for a heading to [our alternate]. I was the Pilot Flying and took responsibility for the radios as well. I tasked my First Officer (FO) with communicating via ACARS with our Dispatcher. Most of this ACARS communication I was not privy to; as I was dealing with storms; ATC congestion; and a very turbulent ride. After the storms; checklists; a Passenger PA; keeping our Flight Attendants (FA) in the loop; and leveling off at cruise; we double checked the Divert Checklist and worked on arrival chores for landing. After programming the [flight computer] it predicted 2;400 pounds of fuel for our landing. We confirmed with ATC there would be no delays; doubled checked the weather and made sure all runways were open. We asked for direct to the airport which was approved.At that point we were approximately 120 NM from [the alternate]. We then received a message from our Dispatcher saying that '[Another airport] was accepting diverts.' By the time we had familiarized ourselves with [the alternate] and its weather; and discussed this as a Crew we were 70 NM past [the alternate]; 100 NM from [the destination] and only four minutes from Top of Descent. Plus we had a straight shot looking ahead with good weather. [The second alternate] was behind us with a head wind to get there. It only has one runway and we were not certain of the position of any storms between us and that airport. At that point in time I figured the penalty compared to [the second alternate] was about 300-400 pounds of fuel and would still allow for two approaches in [the first alternate] if that became necessary. We landed with 2300 pounds of fuel. Later in the day it was brought to my attention by my FO that our Dispatcher had mentioned [that the second alternate] as a possibility during our climb out; but that information was not passed on to me as it came during a very busy time in the cockpit. From my perspective the second ACARS message from Dispatch regarding [that the second alternate] was actually the first time I heard our Dispatcher suggest a different option for us.I should have asked for more fuel from the Dispatcher prior to leaving. Although the math on the release is good; 6;100 pounds for a 4.5 hour flight is questionable. I feel our new Dispatching Software is cutting fuel margins too close; by forcing different segment altitudes based on forecast winds. Early on in the divert I should have given the flying; and radio to the FO; thus allowing me the time to focus on communicating with Dispatch. Furthermore; a verbal link with Dispatch; rather that ACARS; would have saved a lot of time and allowed for better communication.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.