Narrative:

About 15-20 miles east of sju radar contact was lost. The R1/R5 controller notified the operations manager in charge (omic). I caught the tail end of the conversation; which was in spanish. I was the controller in charge (controller in charge) and unsure how to proceed. I looked on the spare radar scope and noticed that there was no primary or secondary radar for the aircraft. I switched to the mosaic mode on the spare scope and there was an intermittent target (occasionally primary radar only; occasionally secondary; occasionally coast/suspend; and then nothing). The data block displayed the shorthand for direct [to] the outer marker for the ILS and the aircraft was at 7;000 feet climbing. I don't know if aircraft X was told that radar contact was lost. Radar services obviously could not be provided. No action was done to put the aircraft on a route and provide non-radar separation. No one is trained on non-radar procedures. Somehow an 'automated handoff' was effected. The R7 controller 'took radar' on a coasting track that the R5 controller had already lost radar contact on. I don't believe separation was lost given that there was no other IFR traffic anywhere near the vicinity; but certainly no separation was insured or service provided. I tried calling the san juan radar sensor out of service given the circumstances. I was told that since it only happened to a couple aircraft (I suppose there were others I didn't know about) and in one particular area that I should wait and see if it happens with more aircraft. The operation was dubious at best. The san juan radar has had repeated failures that go unreported. There is a mindset that the aircraft involved are equipped with faulty transponders. This is hardly the case; or at most a very small part of the problem. Losing the mode C or losing the beacon on an aircraft is one thing; but the san juan radar sensor not returning primary radar on aircraft at 7;000 feet over the water is another. This is happening in approach airspace for IFR aircraft climbing/descending on radar vectors or direct a fix and off-route. No one has been trained for non-radar procedures. I recommend once again that the san juan radar sensor be fixed; and that in the meantime approach controllers be trained on non-radar operations. Also; when radar contact is lost on just one aircraft where radar coverage should exist (considering line-of-sight and distance from the antenna) that radar should be called out of service and the controller should go to the backup (in this case mosaic mode). One should not wait to try to confirm the unreliability of the radar with other aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: The Center Controller in Charge (CIC) noticed radar contact was lost with an aircraft that should have been within radar coverage. The CIC attempted to call the Radar out of service but was told not to.

Narrative: About 15-20 miles east of SJU radar contact was lost. The R1/R5 controller notified the Operations Manager In Charge (OMIC). I caught the tail end of the conversation; which was in Spanish. I was the Controller In Charge (CIC) and unsure how to proceed. I looked on the spare radar scope and noticed that there was no primary or secondary radar for the aircraft. I switched to the Mosaic mode on the spare scope and there was an intermittent target (occasionally primary radar only; occasionally secondary; occasionally coast/suspend; and then nothing). The data block displayed the shorthand for direct [to] the outer marker for the ILS and the aircraft was at 7;000 feet climbing. I don't know if Aircraft X was told that radar contact was lost. Radar services obviously could not be provided. No action was done to put the aircraft on a route and provide non-radar separation. No one is trained on non-radar procedures. Somehow an 'automated handoff' was effected. The R7 controller 'took radar' on a coasting track that the R5 controller had already lost radar contact on. I don't believe separation was lost given that there was no other IFR traffic anywhere near the vicinity; but certainly no separation was insured or service provided. I tried calling the San Juan radar sensor out of service given the circumstances. I was told that since it only happened to a couple aircraft (I suppose there were others I didn't know about) and in one particular area that I should wait and see if it happens with more aircraft. The operation was dubious at best. The San Juan Radar has had repeated failures that go unreported. There is a mindset that the aircraft involved are equipped with faulty transponders. This is hardly the case; or at most a very small part of the problem. Losing the Mode C or losing the beacon on an aircraft is one thing; but the San Juan radar sensor not returning primary radar on aircraft at 7;000 feet over the water is another. This is happening in approach airspace for IFR aircraft climbing/descending on radar vectors or direct a fix and off-route. No one has been trained for non-radar procedures. I recommend once again that the San Juan Radar sensor be fixed; and that in the meantime approach controllers be trained on non-radar operations. Also; when radar contact is lost on just one aircraft where radar coverage should exist (considering line-of-sight and distance from the antenna) that radar should be called out of service and the controller should go to the backup (in this case Mosaic mode). One should not wait to try to confirm the unreliability of the radar with other aircraft.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.