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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 138762 |
Time | |
Date | 199003 |
Day | Tue |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : udd |
State Reference | CA |
Altitude | agl bound lower : 0 agl bound upper : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Dusk |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air taxi |
Make Model Name | Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear |
Flight Phase | landing other |
Flight Plan | VFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air taxi |
Function | flight crew : single pilot |
Qualification | pilot : cfi pilot : commercial |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 250 flight time total : 1800 flight time type : 250 |
ASRS Report | 138762 |
Person 2 | |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 250 flight time total : 1800 flight time type : 250 |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : far other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
This accident/incident is a result of my failure to place the landing gear down prior to landing. While I take full responsibility for my error, I feel that there were several factors which contributed to this incident. They are listed as follows: 1) the organization for which I was employed put constant pressure on its employees/pilots to arrive depart airports at specified times which were predicated on being able to operate an aircraft under unrealistic/ideal circumstances. (VFR WX conditions, flying direct routes under 'no wind' and ideal aircraft performance conditions). 2) having received training from this organization which placed minimal importance on the use of a checklist in order to save time and expedite operations. (According to the training I received from this company, a checklist was not a document which should be read item by item after each function was performed, but rather a 'review list' which should only be referred to to confirm that each item had already been completed. 3) allowing myself to become distracted from making sure the 'before landing' checklist had been completed, as opposed to merely looking at it and believing each item had been completed.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CARGO CARRYING ATX SMA LANDS GEAR UP AT UDD.
Narrative: THIS ACCIDENT/INCIDENT IS A RESULT OF MY FAILURE TO PLACE THE LNDG GEAR DOWN PRIOR TO LNDG. WHILE I TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR MY ERROR, I FEEL THAT THERE WERE SEVERAL FACTORS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT. THEY ARE LISTED AS FOLLOWS: 1) THE ORGANIZATION FOR WHICH I WAS EMPLOYED PUT CONSTANT PRESSURE ON ITS EMPLOYEES/PLTS TO ARRIVE DEPART ARPTS AT SPECIFIED TIMES WHICH WERE PREDICATED ON BEING ABLE TO OPERATE AN ACFT UNDER UNREALISTIC/IDEAL CIRCUMSTANCES. (VFR WX CONDITIONS, FLYING DIRECT ROUTES UNDER 'NO WIND' AND IDEAL ACFT PERFORMANCE CONDITIONS). 2) HAVING RECEIVED TRAINING FROM THIS ORGANIZATION WHICH PLACED MINIMAL IMPORTANCE ON THE USE OF A CHECKLIST IN ORDER TO SAVE TIME AND EXPEDITE OPERATIONS. (ACCORDING TO THE TRAINING I RECEIVED FROM THIS COMPANY, A CHECKLIST WAS NOT A DOCUMENT WHICH SHOULD BE READ ITEM BY ITEM AFTER EACH FUNCTION WAS PERFORMED, BUT RATHER A 'REVIEW LIST' WHICH SHOULD ONLY BE REFERRED TO TO CONFIRM THAT EACH ITEM HAD ALREADY BEEN COMPLETED. 3) ALLOWING MYSELF TO BECOME DISTRACTED FROM MAKING SURE THE 'BEFORE LNDG' CHECKLIST HAD BEEN COMPLETED, AS OPPOSED TO MERELY LOOKING AT IT AND BELIEVING EACH ITEM HAD BEEN COMPLETED.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.