Narrative:

I was flying chase support for an unmanned aerial vehicle (uav). These operations are the operations necessary to provide see and avoid support to uavs. Our mission is 'the safety of non-participating aircraft flying in the area.' 'a formation with approximately 100 yards between the aircraft; slightly higher or lower and 20-45 degrees left or right of center is the safest. Other aircraft are more likely to see at least one of the two aircraft; which in turn provides an 'umbrella' for the other.'I; (along with copilot); were chasing a uav capable of very slow flight. In order to stay in position; our airspeed; with full flaps and low power; was staying at the stall speed of the aircraft. As a result; the stall warning horn was frequently and sometimes continuously sounding. It made communication with the ground-based pilots of the uav and ATC difficult.I made the decision; without seeking input from the copilot; to pull the circuit breaker to silence the stall warning horn. It seems that at the same time I inadvertently also pulled the gear relay circuit. This was forbidden by written company policy and sound judgement. The results have seared the reasons for this into my mind.when our mission was complete; we returned to our home base. Post chase and during our return; I failed to remember to reset the circuit breaker(s). Because of this; the gear would be unable to extend. I completed the pre-landing checks; including verbal callouts for the gear. I selected gear down and checked for the green cross-hatching on the floor of the mooney. I saw; or evidently thought I saw a safe indicator. In hindsight; I believe I saw what I expected to see. I continued in the pattern and final approach; checking and verbalizing gear down twice more; once on base and once on short final. For these last two checks; I improperly relied on the gear position switch for confirmation. As a result; I made a gear-up landing.the landing was made without injury. The primary damage was caused to the propeller and possibly the engine.although the gear up landing was the result; the issue of this report is my poor judgment; and to an equal degree an inadequate pre-landing checklist. I foolishly broke policy and procedure; as well as good flight judgment.I was healthy; well rested; well fed; unstressed; and the only medication I had taken that morning was aspirin. I had consumed no alcohol for two weeks or more. The blame for this lies wholly on my relaxed view of the value of policies and procedures. Although I am generally a rule oriented person; I had lapsed into a less conscientious state. I know intellectually; and now experientially; that such an attitude is never appropriate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Mooney 201 pilot reported electing; per mission needs; to disable by circuit breaker the landing gear system. Later; upon approach and landing; the breaker was not reset and the aircraft landed gear up.

Narrative: I was flying chase support for an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). These operations are the operations necessary to provide see and avoid support to UAVs. Our mission is 'the safety of non-participating aircraft flying in the area.' 'A formation with approximately 100 yards between the aircraft; slightly higher or lower and 20-45 degrees left or right of center is the safest. Other aircraft are more likely to see at least one of the two aircraft; which in turn provides an 'umbrella' for the other.'I; (along with copilot); were chasing a UAV capable of very slow flight. In order to stay in position; our airspeed; with full flaps and low power; was staying at the stall speed of the aircraft. As a result; the stall warning horn was frequently and sometimes continuously sounding. It made communication with the ground-based pilots of the UAV and ATC difficult.I made the decision; without seeking input from the copilot; to pull the circuit breaker to silence the stall warning horn. It seems that at the same time I inadvertently also pulled the gear relay circuit. This was forbidden by written company policy and sound judgement. The results have seared the reasons for this into my mind.When our mission was complete; we returned to our home base. Post chase and during our return; I failed to remember to reset the circuit breaker(s). Because of this; the gear would be unable to extend. I completed the pre-landing checks; including verbal callouts for the gear. I selected gear down and checked for the green cross-hatching on the floor of the Mooney. I saw; or evidently thought I saw a safe indicator. In hindsight; I believe I saw what I expected to see. I continued in the pattern and final approach; checking and verbalizing gear down twice more; once on base and once on short final. For these last two checks; I improperly relied on the gear position switch for confirmation. As a result; I made a gear-up landing.The landing was made without injury. The primary damage was caused to the propeller and possibly the engine.Although the gear up landing was the result; the issue of this report is my poor judgment; and to an equal degree an inadequate pre-landing checklist. I foolishly broke policy and procedure; as well as good flight judgment.I was healthy; well rested; well fed; unstressed; and the only medication I had taken that morning was aspirin. I had consumed no alcohol for two weeks or more. The blame for this lies wholly on my relaxed view of the value of policies and procedures. Although I am generally a rule oriented person; I had lapsed into a less conscientious state. I know intellectually; and now experientially; that such an attitude is never appropriate.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.