Narrative:

During cockpit setup and preflight brief first officer (first officer) and I had discussed the relative probability of taking off on rwy 15L vs rwy 15R. We were prepared for either. Taxi out had been a runway change drill. We had set up for a 15L/wv departure; but got assigned rwy 15R on initial taxi. At spot 2 we got a late change back to rwy 15L/wv from ground and were told to contact tower. Tower cleared us for takeoff while still halfway down taxiway wa. We both heard; 'turn right to 340; runway 15L wv cleared for takeoff.' first officer read back 'turn right to 340.' first officer was rushed; and I had slowed our taxi speed to give him time. He handled it all very well; and showed no performance degrade or task saturation. With correct rwy takeoff data installed and verified; checklists complete; we took the runway and took off. At 400 feet AGL I initiated a right turn to 340. Tower radioed; 'confirm left turn to 340.' I immediately reversed turn to the left. About that time we got a TCAS RA to 'monitor vertical speed.' I didn't need to maneuver; because the aircraft attitude already had us perfectly aligned with the RA guidance. First officer and I both knew what had happened. We have no idea how close we were to the aircraft off of rwy 15R. The RA was momentary; no more than a couple of seconds. I kept the left turn in while first officer reset the heading bug to command left to 340. When clear of conflict; first officer radioed something to the effect of 'we're sorry but we heard and read back clearance right to 340.' tower replied something to the effect of 'no problem; no big deal.' we were both pretty alarmed by the event.we continued to climb out uneventfully; but the cockpit was tense. We weren't sure how that had happened. Once we reached cruise; I used the CRM/threat error management skills card to debrief the incident. We assessed that the threat was ATC radio communications and a hearing/read back issue. We were both fairly certain of what we had heard; and we were very certain of what first officer had read back. It did not seem unusual to us to turn right while taking off from rwy 15L-- just the day before we had made a right hand turn to heading 340 while taking off on rwy 15L/wv. Clearly there had been an error. We were not sure whether the error was ours; or tower's; or both. We discussed the possibility that one or both of us had had an expectation bias based on our initial turn out heading clearance on the day before. Regardless; we had repaired that error. The TCAS RA had also presented us with an un-commanded aircraft state (uas); however brief. We had correctly recovered per procedure. The aircraft was quickly returned to a safe operations state. We assessed that safety margins had been eroded but not compromised. Tower made a timely and correct radio call to alert us to a mistake. Our recovery procedure had worked perfectly. Threats and errors had been repaired. We had indeed prepared during our preflight briefing (which; incidentally; included a comment about avoiding the threat of complacency). We hadn't violated any sops; but for reasons that were not clear to us; we had turned opposite to the clearance intended by the tower controller. Based on our radio calls after the fact; we were pretty sure that tower was not going to initiate action against us. But we were still not sure where the radio communications had broken down; and that remains an unanswered question.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier flight crew departing IAH Runway 15L reported turning the wrong direction on departure; received a correction call from the Tower Controller and an RA soon thereafter. Crew reported reversing the turn. Crew reported runway assignment was changed before departure.

Narrative: During cockpit setup and preflight brief First Officer (FO) and I had discussed the relative probability of taking off on Rwy 15L vs Rwy 15R. We were prepared for either. Taxi out had been a runway change drill. We had set up for a 15L/WV departure; but got assigned Rwy 15R on initial taxi. At Spot 2 we got a late change back to Rwy 15L/WV from Ground and were told to contact Tower. Tower cleared us for takeoff while still halfway down Taxiway WA. We both heard; 'Turn Right to 340; runway 15L WV cleared for takeoff.' FO read back 'Turn Right to 340.' FO was rushed; and I had slowed our taxi speed to give him time. He handled it all very well; and showed no performance degrade or task saturation. With correct Rwy takeoff data installed and verified; checklists complete; we took the runway and took off. At 400 feet AGL I initiated a Right turn to 340. Tower radioed; 'Confirm LEFT turn to 340.' I immediately reversed turn to the Left. About that time we got a TCAS RA to 'Monitor Vertical Speed.' I didn't need to maneuver; because the aircraft attitude already had us perfectly aligned with the RA guidance. FO and I both knew what had happened. We have no idea how close we were to the aircraft off of Rwy 15R. The RA was momentary; no more than a couple of seconds. I kept the left turn in while FO reset the heading bug to command Left to 340. When clear of conflict; FO radioed something to the effect of 'We're sorry but we heard and read back clearance Right to 340.' Tower replied something to the effect of 'No problem; no big deal.' We were both pretty alarmed by the event.We continued to climb out uneventfully; but the cockpit was tense. We weren't sure how that had happened. Once we reached cruise; I used the CRM/Threat Error Management Skills Card to debrief the incident. We assessed that the Threat was ATC radio communications and a hearing/read back issue. We were both fairly certain of what we had heard; and we were very certain of what FO had read back. It did not seem unusual to us to turn right while taking off from Rwy 15L-- just the day before we had made a right hand turn to heading 340 while taking off on Rwy 15L/WV. Clearly there had been an Error. We were not sure whether the error was ours; or Tower's; or both. We discussed the possibility that one or both of us had had an expectation bias based on our initial turn out heading clearance on the day before. Regardless; we had repaired that Error. The TCAS RA had also presented us with an Un-commanded Aircraft State (UAS); however brief. We had correctly recovered per procedure. The aircraft was quickly returned to a Safe Operations state. We assessed that safety margins had been eroded but not compromised. Tower made a timely and correct radio call to alert us to a mistake. Our recovery procedure had worked perfectly. Threats and Errors had been repaired. We had indeed prepared during our preflight briefing (which; incidentally; included a comment about avoiding the threat of complacency). We hadn't violated any SOPs; but for reasons that were not clear to us; we had turned opposite to the clearance intended by the Tower controller. Based on our radio calls after the fact; we were pretty sure that Tower was not going to initiate action against us. But we were still not sure where the radio communications had broken down; and that remains an Unanswered Question.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.