Narrative:

Level at 9000 ft; established on localizer; cleared for the approach. A/P (autopilot) on; first officer (first officer) flying; I was assisting with setting MCP altitude. I considered posting 8800 ft then 8200 ft then 7100 ft in MCP for the various step downs but didn't want to risk multiple altitude capture's and since we were visual I elected to post 7100 ft and said 'cleared for the approach; you're good to 7100 ft'; assuming first officer would simply intercept the glideslope and descend accordingly. I had the terrain in sight throughout the approach from 9000 ft on down and was 'outside' monitoring approach visually. All the while the first officer was 'inside' following about half dot below glide slope thinking he was ok to descend to 7100 ft to intercept. Around 8200 ft I'm looking at the hill looming ahead and mentioned; a little too casually it turns out; 'better just level off here and intercept'; not realizing he was completely inside on the gauges. Not wanting to be too assertive and not realizing he wasn't looking at what I was; I delayed too long in taking control and just as I was about to; the taws (terrain awareness and warning system) gave us a terrain warning to which I responded with an immediate escape climb maneuver to safe altitude. At this time we were still approximately 10-12 miles out or perhaps more and clear of terrain. I considered giving first officer back control but to limit confusion and with the airport in sight; I elected to keep control; continue the visual and land. This was 100% my fault for several reasons. 1st; for saying to the first officer 'you're good to 7100' when what I meant was 'you're good to 7100 on the G/south'. 2nd; making the assumption that the first officer would intercept the GS at 9000 ft or soon after when cleared for the approach and starting to descend. 3rd; seeing the terrain ahead clearly and waiting too long to intervene so that we incurred a taws warning. This was a training event where the first officer was unclear what to do owing to my unclear communication. As it turns out my delayed reaction was ill timed. However; by way of explanation; not excuse; this was due to the fact that I had the terrain in clear view and was reluctant to take control initially. But when the sink rate continued unabated it was time to react; and that's when the taws warning triggered. This approach was preceded by several vectors across the localizer and back to the VOR etc.; for spacing presumably; which contributed to our communication mix up as well.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A check airman and his First Officer described the circumstances leading up to a terrain warning during the ILS DME 1 to Runway 1 at MMGL in VMC.

Narrative: Level at 9000 ft; established on LOC; cleared for the approach. A/P (Autopilot) on; FO (First Officer) flying; I was assisting with setting MCP ALT. I considered posting 8800 ft then 8200 ft then 7100 ft in MCP for the various step downs but didn't want to risk multiple ALT capture's and since we were visual I elected to post 7100 ft and said 'cleared for the approach; you're good to 7100 ft'; assuming FO would simply intercept the glideslope and descend accordingly. I had the terrain in sight throughout the approach from 9000 ft on down and was 'outside' monitoring approach visually. All the while the FO was 'inside' following about half dot below glide slope thinking he was ok to descend to 7100 ft to intercept. Around 8200 ft I'm looking at the hill looming ahead and mentioned; a little too casually it turns out; 'better just level off here and intercept'; not realizing he was completely inside on the gauges. Not wanting to be too assertive and not realizing he wasn't looking at what I was; I delayed too long in taking control and just as I was about to; the TAWS (Terrain Awareness and Warning System) gave us a terrain warning to which I responded with an immediate escape climb maneuver to safe altitude. At this time we were still approximately 10-12 miles out or perhaps more and clear of terrain. I considered giving FO back control but to limit confusion and with the airport in sight; I elected to keep control; continue the visual and land. This was 100% my fault for several reasons. 1st; for saying to the FO 'you're good to 7100' when what I meant was 'you're good to 7100 on the G/S'. 2nd; making the assumption that the FO would intercept the GS at 9000 ft or soon after when cleared for the approach and starting to descend. 3rd; seeing the terrain ahead clearly and waiting too long to intervene so that we incurred a TAWS warning. This was a training event where the FO was unclear what to do owing to my unclear communication. As it turns out my delayed reaction was ill timed. However; by way of explanation; not excuse; this was due to the fact that I had the terrain in clear view and was reluctant to take control initially. But when the sink rate continued unabated it was time to react; and that's when the TAWS warning triggered. This approach was preceded by several vectors across the LOC and back to the VOR etc.; for spacing presumably; which contributed to our communication mix up as well.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.