Narrative:

On saturday we reported at XA15 for day two of our three day trip. Everything about the start of the day was normal. We checked in and received the release. We printed our daily reports and proceeded to the aircraft to begin our preflight duties. The only thing that may have been a bit abnormal about this flight was the fact that we had no passengers. The weather at our departure airport was VFR; the weather at our destination was VFR but required an alternate do to the forecast calling for some lower ceilings later that morning. We completed all of our preflight duties and the first officer and I completed all of the appropriate checklists and prepared to go to our destination. We departed the gate on time and had a very short taxi. We were cleared for takeoff while taxing and had a normal takeoff. Everything seemed to be normal until completion of the after takeoff checklist by the first officer; he brought to question our fuel. I looked down at our fuel gauges and was in disbelief to see only about 3;000 pounds onboard. Our min fuel for takeoff according to the release was 3;537 pounds. My first reaction was the fuel gauges were not working properly. I tested the gauges and they seemed to be normal; then I thought maybe we are having some type of fuel loss or abnormal fuel burn. Everything seemed to be normal. We were both shocked to realize we had departed with the wrong fuel load. The first officer and I accessed the situation and reviewed all of our options. We examined the release to see if we had proper fuel to continue to our destination or if we needed to return to our departure airport. After looking over the numbers we subtracted our holding fuel from the min fuel and determined we needed 3;014 pounds at takeoff (if we had approval from dispatch to use the holding fuel). This gave us the fuel to fly to the destination; to our alternate and our reserve of 45 min (which we were given 52 min on the release). Given our fuel on board at that time of around 3;000 pounds plus the fuel that we burned on climb (150-200lbs) we decided we departed with 3.1-3.2lbs. We used the kns to factor in the current winds and have the most accurate time enroute. Given our fuel flow and the ETA we both agreed we had adequate fuel. It was safe to continue to the destination given the weather at the time was VFR; and we did not anticipate any holding. Also; having our alternate along our route and not having passengers were factored into the decision. The first officer tried to call departure station operations to call the times and correct the fuel but they did not answer after several attempts. I thought about using the SELCAL but since we were below 10;000 ft I had very little confidence we would reach him. Looking back I should have tried to contact him after reaching our cruise altitude. We landed with no further incident and parked at the gate with 1;800 pounds of fuel. We continued on and tried to put this incident behind us until we finished the other two legs of our day. We did not want this to distract us from completing the rest of our legs safely. It was determined that we did not have the proper fuel on-board when the first officer was going to call the times into operations. He told me to look at the fuel and we reviewed the release. I believe the failure of myself to identify the proper fuel load was a caused by a few different factors. First; I was transitioning from pm trips to am trips and was having a hard time adjusting to the early to bed and early wake-ups. I feel this is why when running the checklist I failed to see the actual fuel and saw what I knew should be on-board. Second; I think that human factors played a roll in the ease of determining the fuel that is on-board. The separate gauges do not have a digital readout and there is no single gauge that shows the total fuel on-board. The gauges also are very ambiguously marked. The line that is used to identify the 1.5 mark is identical to the rest of the marks unless youare eye level with the instrument. Lastly; I realize now that I have gotten complacent when running the checklist. It is one thing to point to the gauge and say the number but to really see and dissect what you are looking at is completely different and needs to be the normal practice. Despite all of these factors I still take full responsibility. I have read this gauge for over five years and I am not using its design as an excuse. Looking back at the situation we should have contacted our dispatcher during cruise and included him into the decision. He needed to approve of the use of the holding fuel and would have been able to provide us with a better idea of the current weather at destination. The dispatcher needed to be included in the decision of weather to return to or continue. This event could have been avoided had I taken the attitude that I now have about reading all of the gauges; not just the fuel. I have always been very serious about doing all of the checklists and making sure sops are followed. I always thought that being standard would keep me safe and out of trouble. But going through the motions like a robot and not focusing completely on what you are looking at is not acceptable. I have always used the practice of not signing the release and placing it on my clipboard until we have the proper fuel. In this case I honestly thought I saw our preferred fuel so that practice will not prevent this from happening again. I will continue to not sign the release until we have our fuel but will also add pushing the fuel quantity test button. This will force me to really dissect the gauge and accurately determine the fuel quantity. Another idea I thought about was putting bugs that we would be able to set. We could set the min fuel with these bugs as we do with V1. This would give us a concrete mark on the gauges and would be very easy to identify. I also think that the design of this fuel gauge needs to be considered. Had there been a digital readout of the total fuel on-board the ambiguity would be eliminated. Lastly I do feel that fatigue played a roll for me. Had I adjusted from the late to the early shows I most certainly would have been more focused and alert. My mental alertness was not 100% and I am much more aware of how switching from late to early trips can affect my performance. Again I am accepting full responsibility for this and I am not making any excuses. This job demands our complete focus at all times. It is my responsibility to make sure I am focused and ready for work every day.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DHC8 Captain described the circumstances and causes leading up an early morning departure with less than dispatch fuel onboard.

Narrative: On Saturday we reported at XA15 for day two of our three day trip. Everything about the start of the day was normal. We checked in and received the release. We printed our daily reports and proceeded to the aircraft to begin our preflight duties. The only thing that may have been a bit abnormal about this flight was the fact that we had no passengers. The weather at our departure airport was VFR; the weather at our destination was VFR but required an alternate do to the forecast calling for some lower ceilings later that morning. We completed all of our preflight duties and the First Officer and I completed all of the appropriate checklists and prepared to go to our destination. We departed the gate on time and had a very short taxi. We were cleared for takeoff while taxing and had a normal takeoff. Everything seemed to be normal until completion of the after takeoff checklist by the First Officer; he brought to question our fuel. I looked down at our fuel gauges and was in disbelief to see only about 3;000 LBS onboard. Our min fuel for takeoff according to the release was 3;537 LBS. My first reaction was the fuel gauges were not working properly. I tested the gauges and they seemed to be normal; then I thought maybe we are having some type of fuel loss or abnormal fuel burn. Everything seemed to be normal. We were both shocked to realize we had departed with the wrong fuel load. The First Officer and I accessed the situation and reviewed all of our options. We examined the release to see if we had proper fuel to continue to our destination or if we needed to return to our departure airport. After looking over the numbers we subtracted our holding fuel from the min fuel and determined we needed 3;014 LBS at takeoff (if we had approval from Dispatch to use the holding fuel). This gave us the fuel to fly to the destination; to our alternate and our reserve of 45 min (which we were given 52 min on the release). Given our fuel on board at that time of around 3;000 LBS plus the fuel that we burned on climb (150-200lbs) we decided we departed with 3.1-3.2lbs. We used the KNS to factor in the current winds and have the most accurate time enroute. Given our fuel flow and the ETA we both agreed we had adequate fuel. It was safe to continue to the destination given the weather at the time was VFR; and we did not anticipate any holding. Also; having our alternate along our route and not having passengers were factored into the decision. The First Officer tried to call departure station operations to call the times and correct the fuel but they did not answer after several attempts. I thought about using the SELCAL but since we were below 10;000 FT I had very little confidence we would reach him. Looking back I should have tried to contact him after reaching our cruise altitude. We landed with no further incident and parked at the gate with 1;800 LBS of fuel. We continued on and tried to put this incident behind us until we finished the other two legs of our day. We did not want this to distract us from completing the rest of our legs safely. It was determined that we did not have the proper fuel on-board when the First Officer was going to call the times into operations. He told me to look at the fuel and we reviewed the release. I believe the failure of myself to identify the proper fuel load was a caused by a few different factors. First; I was transitioning from PM trips to AM trips and was having a hard time adjusting to the early to bed and early wake-ups. I feel this is why when running the checklist I failed to see the actual fuel and saw what I knew should be on-board. Second; I think that human factors played a roll in the ease of determining the fuel that is on-board. The separate gauges do not have a digital readout and there is no single gauge that shows the total fuel on-board. The gauges also are very ambiguously marked. The line that is used to identify the 1.5 mark is identical to the rest of the marks unless youare eye level with the instrument. Lastly; I realize now that I have gotten complacent when running the checklist. It is one thing to point to the gauge and say the number but to really see and dissect what you are looking at is completely different and needs to be the normal practice. Despite all of these factors I still take full responsibility. I have read this gauge for over five years and I am not using its design as an excuse. Looking back at the situation we should have contacted our Dispatcher during cruise and included him into the decision. He needed to approve of the use of the holding fuel and would have been able to provide us with a better idea of the current weather at destination. The Dispatcher needed to be included in the decision of weather to return to or continue. This event could have been avoided had I taken the attitude that I now have about reading all of the gauges; not just the fuel. I have always been very serious about doing all of the checklists and making sure SOPs are followed. I always thought that being standard would keep me safe and out of trouble. But going through the motions like a robot and not focusing completely on what you are looking at is not acceptable. I have always used the practice of not signing the release and placing it on my clipboard until we have the proper fuel. In this case I honestly thought I saw our preferred fuel so that practice will not prevent this from happening again. I will continue to not sign the release until we have our fuel but will also add pushing the fuel quantity test button. This will force me to really dissect the gauge and accurately determine the fuel quantity. Another idea I thought about was putting bugs that we would be able to set. We could set the min fuel with these bugs as we do with V1. This would give us a concrete mark on the gauges and would be very easy to identify. I also think that the design of this fuel gauge needs to be considered. Had there been a digital readout of the total fuel on-board the ambiguity would be eliminated. Lastly I do feel that fatigue played a roll for me. Had I adjusted from the late to the early shows I most certainly would have been more focused and alert. My mental alertness was not 100% and I am much more aware of how switching from late to early trips can affect my performance. Again I am accepting full responsibility for this and I am not making any excuses. This job demands our complete focus at all times. It is my responsibility to make sure I am focused and ready for work every day.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.