Narrative:

Upon receiving our departure clearance on the ground at allegheny county (agc) I verified that our initial altitude restriction of 3;000 ft was both 'set' and 'selected' in the autopilot. The pilot flying was trying to teach as much as possible when time permitted which must have been somewhat of a distraction. On the initial climbout; passing through roughly 2000 ft MSL; the pilot flying 'armed' the autopilot and asked for a climb checklist. Just as we finished the climb checklist and I verbalized 'climb checklist complete' pittsburgh departure asked us what our altitude was. My heart sank as I realized I had been head-down for far too long after being consumed with trying to keep up with understanding the duties that the pilot flying was performing in response to checklist cues. I verbalized that we were passing through 5;000 ft and were leveling; as the pilot flying instinctively pushed forward on the yoke to stop the climb as he heard the same radio call. Departure warned us that if we had made that mistake earlier in the evening it could have been a real problem. I was dumbfounded. I knew beyond a shadow-of-a-doubt that I verified the altitude pre-select was both 'set' and 'selected'.after a few minutes of silence I worked up the courage to ask the pilot flying how that was possible. Out of embarrassment the pilot flying said that the mu-300 autopilot will pass through an altitude pre-select if the pilot moves the 'pitch-trim-wheel' during the transition of catching an altitude. He said it was completely his fault as he was moving the 'pitch-trim wheel' during the transition from climb to cruise. I felt better for a moment; knowing that the incident wasn't my fault; but that quickly escaped me as I realized that mid-air collisions don't just affect those directly at fault.safety is of utmost importance to me during the daily struggle to fight complacency as flight experience continues to develop. While it was not my direct actions that led to the altitude violation; my complacency that had developed over the years in trusting glass automation was exposed. I should have known not to be heads down for so long and to verify the automation did as it was instructed as we approached our altitude clearance. After not sleeping much that night when I got home I was humbly reminded that 'it can happen to me' is always a healthy mindset; to always query the pilot flying if something doesn't look right; and not to stay heads-down too long during work-intensive flight phases. In summary; my presence in the cockpit was most certainly a distraction for the pilot flying that night but my intimate knowledge of automation management should have been utilized that night to 'trust and verify'.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MU-300/BE-40 First Officer reported overshooting the assigned altitude of 3000 feet as the pilot monitoring. The MU-300 autopilot will not capture a programed altitude if the pitch trim is activated during altitude capture and the pilot flying admitted that that had occurred.

Narrative: Upon receiving our departure clearance on the ground at Allegheny County (AGC) I verified that our initial altitude restriction of 3;000 ft was both 'SET' and 'Selected' in the autopilot. The Pilot Flying was trying to teach as much as possible when time permitted which must have been somewhat of a distraction. On the initial climbout; passing through roughly 2000 ft MSL; the Pilot Flying 'armed' the autopilot and asked for a climb checklist. Just as we finished the climb checklist and I verbalized 'Climb Checklist Complete' Pittsburgh Departure asked us what our altitude was. My heart sank as I realized I had been head-down for far too long after being consumed with trying to keep up with understanding the duties that the Pilot Flying was performing in response to checklist cues. I verbalized that we were passing through 5;000 ft and were leveling; as the Pilot Flying instinctively pushed forward on the yoke to stop the climb as he heard the same radio call. Departure warned us that if we had made that mistake earlier in the evening it could have been a real problem. I was dumbfounded. I knew beyond a shadow-of-a-doubt that I verified the altitude pre-select was both 'set' and 'selected'.After a few minutes of silence I worked up the courage to ask the Pilot Flying how that was possible. Out of embarrassment the Pilot Flying said that the MU-300 autopilot will pass through an altitude pre-select if the Pilot moves the 'pitch-trim-wheel' during the transition of catching an altitude. He said it was completely his fault as he was moving the 'pitch-trim wheel' during the transition from climb to cruise. I felt better for a moment; knowing that the incident wasn't my fault; but that quickly escaped me as I realized that mid-air collisions don't just affect those directly at fault.Safety is of utmost importance to me during the daily struggle to fight complacency as flight experience continues to develop. While it was not my direct actions that led to the altitude violation; my complacency that had developed over the years in trusting glass automation was exposed. I should have known not to be heads down for so long and to verify the automation did as it was instructed as we approached our altitude clearance. After not sleeping much that night when I got home I was humbly reminded that 'it can happen to me' is always a healthy mindset; to always query the Pilot Flying if something doesn't look right; and not to stay heads-down too long during work-intensive flight phases. In summary; my presence in the cockpit was most certainly a distraction for the Pilot Flying that night but my intimate knowledge of automation management should have been utilized that night to 'trust and verify'.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.