Narrative:

At start up during an FAA line check the captain was called out of the aircraft to check something. He told me to stand by on the checklist and left the cockpit of the light transport. Since we had passenger on board I, a new first officer to the company and the light transport, stayed with the plane while the captain and the FAA checked what the ground crew had seen. The captain came back after 10 mins, said that the hydraulic reservoir was over-serviced (filled too full) and was purging the excess hydraulic fluid (a normal situation on the light transport). After starting the engines I looked back and saw that the FAA was not on board. I asked the captain and he filled me in on the details when we got to cruise. It seems the FAA had not been satisfied with the captain's view that the hydraulic purge was not a 'no go' item on the light transport. The captain said that if he was not satisfied, the captain would call maintenance control and get authorization. The captain did so and got the chapter and page # which showed this to be normal in our approved maintenance procedures. The FAA airman said he was still 'not happy' with the situation and would not board the aircraft for its trip from sna to lax. The captain said he was happy with the situation and the response from maintenance control. That is when he boarded the aircraft and we started the engines. This was our first leg of the day and the previous crew, which had flown the plane in this same condition several legs since its service that morning, had brought the plane to us late. As I did my preflight (which showed no sign of any leaks) the FAA airman said several times that he was afraid that he would be too late to catch his flight back to sna and would be stuck in lax. His comments while he accompanied me on my preflight led me to feel that the reason he would not line check us that day was his fear of not having a convenient connection in lax, and not the approved condition of the hydraulic system. This situation caused us a delay in some of the busiest airspace in the country and may have caused some crews to rush to make up time. This rushing could in some cases lead to less safe operations of the aircraft, though I do not feel it did with us on this day.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF LTT COMMUTER IS CHALLENGED BY FA CHECK AIRMAN REGARDING HYDRAULIC FLUID OVERFLOW DISCOVERED DURING PREFLT. FAA CHECK AIRMAN REFUSES TO MAKE FLT EVEN THOUGH FLT CREW VERIFIED THAT OVERFLOW CONDITION WAS NORMAL ACCORDING TO COMPANY MAINTENANCE PROCS.

Narrative: AT START UP DURING AN FAA LINE CHK THE CAPT WAS CALLED OUT OF THE ACFT TO CHK SOMETHING. HE TOLD ME TO STAND BY ON THE CHKLIST AND LEFT THE COCKPIT OF THE LTT. SINCE WE HAD PAX ON BOARD I, A NEW F/O TO THE COMPANY AND THE LTT, STAYED WITH THE PLANE WHILE THE CAPT AND THE FAA CHKED WHAT THE GND CREW HAD SEEN. THE CAPT CAME BACK AFTER 10 MINS, SAID THAT THE HYD RESERVOIR WAS OVER-SERVICED (FILLED TOO FULL) AND WAS PURGING THE EXCESS HYD FLUID (A NORMAL SITUATION ON THE LTT). AFTER STARTING THE ENGS I LOOKED BACK AND SAW THAT THE FAA WAS NOT ON BOARD. I ASKED THE CAPT AND HE FILLED ME IN ON THE DETAILS WHEN WE GOT TO CRUISE. IT SEEMS THE FAA HAD NOT BEEN SATISFIED WITH THE CAPT'S VIEW THAT THE HYD PURGE WAS NOT A 'NO GO' ITEM ON THE LTT. THE CAPT SAID THAT IF HE WAS NOT SATISFIED, THE CAPT WOULD CALL MAINT CONTROL AND GET AUTHORIZATION. THE CAPT DID SO AND GOT THE CHAPTER AND PAGE # WHICH SHOWED THIS TO BE NORMAL IN OUR APPROVED MAINT PROCS. THE FAA AIRMAN SAID HE WAS STILL 'NOT HAPPY' WITH THE SITUATION AND WOULD NOT BOARD THE ACFT FOR ITS TRIP FROM SNA TO LAX. THE CAPT SAID HE WAS HAPPY WITH THE SITUATION AND THE RESPONSE FROM MAINT CTL. THAT IS WHEN HE BOARDED THE ACFT AND WE STARTED THE ENGS. THIS WAS OUR FIRST LEG OF THE DAY AND THE PREVIOUS CREW, WHICH HAD FLOWN THE PLANE IN THIS SAME CONDITION SEVERAL LEGS SINCE ITS SERVICE THAT MORNING, HAD BROUGHT THE PLANE TO US LATE. AS I DID MY PREFLT (WHICH SHOWED NO SIGN OF ANY LEAKS) THE FAA AIRMAN SAID SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE WAS AFRAID THAT HE WOULD BE TOO LATE TO CATCH HIS FLT BACK TO SNA AND WOULD BE STUCK IN LAX. HIS COMMENTS WHILE HE ACCOMPANIED ME ON MY PREFLT LED ME TO FEEL THAT THE REASON HE WOULD NOT LINE CHK US THAT DAY WAS HIS FEAR OF NOT HAVING A CONVENIENT CONNECTION IN LAX, AND NOT THE APPROVED CONDITION OF THE HYD SYS. THIS SITUATION CAUSED US A DELAY IN SOME OF THE BUSIEST AIRSPACE IN THE COUNTRY AND MAY HAVE CAUSED SOME CREWS TO RUSH TO MAKE UP TIME. THIS RUSHING COULD IN SOME CASES LEAD TO LESS SAFE OPS OF THE ACFT, THOUGH I DO NOT FEEL IT DID WITH US ON THIS DAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.