Narrative:

The TRACON controller called the center controller on the landline and said they wanted the aircraft at 250 knots and needed the 20 mit (miles in trail). The center controller I was relieving replied the aircraft were at 250 knots. The TRACON controller told him that the aircraft were doing 392 knots across the ground and she was slowing her aircraft to 180 knots and they needed to be at 250 knots. I started to vector all my lga arrivals and slowed them all to 250 knots. I handed off the next lga arrival which was on vectors to provide 20 mit. The TRACON controller again called and reiterated they needed the 20 mit. I told them that their airspace did not start until rbv VOR and I would give them the 20 mit. TRACON then slowed the front aircraft to 180 knots and turned the aircraft to the north and back to the southeast. My aircraft were 20 mit and 250 knots. The TRACON controller was not taking the handoff so I gave holding instructions to the first aircraft with the assumption she would eventually take the handoff. I took the rest off the lga traffic and amended the altitudes so the aircraft were separated in the event I had to issue holding to the remaining aircraft. TRACON never took the first handoff and I did not give holding instruction to aircraft X. I told the supervisor that I wanted the sectors split. The first aircraft made a turn in the hold and the TRACON controller accepted the hand off so I gave the first aircraft an airport clearance. I had the ewr arrival flow in sector 18 and gave a few descend via clearances. I reverted my attention to the lga aircraft and issued holding to a couple of aircraft. On the sector 18 side an aircraft said he would try to make the published restrictions. I told the aircraft to expedite down to 8;000 feet. I made the appropriate point outs to adjacent facilities and handed off the aircraft to TRACON ewr sector. This is when I realized that aircraft X did not have holding instructions and issued a vector to return to my airspace. I pointed out the TRACON sectors the aircraft and the instructions given. On the ewr side; sector 18; ny TRACON was not taking the handoff and several verbal attempt were made before ewr controller picked up and the controller said the aircraft was not in his airspace and I informed him the lga controller was watching the aircraft. The ewr controller said he was not taking the aircraft. I had to vector the aircraft back to my airspace and issue altitude amendment and holding to the rest of the aircraft. The lga controller then took a handoff on aircraft X and I cleared the aircraft to lga and issued a frequency change. Through all the chaos I did not realize the aircraft did not read back his airport clearance. I then issued another aircraft airport clearance which was holding at the holey pattern. Now is when a radar assist was assigned to my sector. Aircraft X when over rbv VOR started to turn right and the assist said the aircraft was turning right and I told the assist the TRACON was talking to the aircraft and probably giving him a 360 degree turn. When aircraft X appeared to be making a standard holding pattern I turned both aircraft using the word immediately to both. I also climbed another aircraft to 11000. On the ewr side I was vectoring aircraft to a holding pattern and I noticed an aircraft altitude still showed descending to 8000 feet and tried to amend his altitude to 13000 feet. I was using the wrong call sign and corrected it and told the aircraft to climb to 13000 feet. I also had to hold a life guard aircraft but gave priority when they came out of the hold.I believe the TRACON was spiteful and trying to prove a point leaving me vulnerable when I was providing everything required. The approach control should have to monitor and observe an arrival push from the centers perspective and understand what we do. Staffing is a major issue and help should be available when needed. The sectors should have been split with the holiday traffic being heavy. Overtime should be used to supply the staffing required. Letter of agreements need to be looked at and negotiated to be more current and alleviate the vulnerabilities of the center controller. The TRACON persons need to understand indicated speeds and ground speeds and when they shut off traffic how much effect there is.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZDC Center Controller reported the unexpected need to provide extra miles in trail to N90. The TRACON was refusing to accept handoffs from the Center Controller.

Narrative: The TRACON Controller called the Center Controller on the landline and said they wanted the aircraft at 250 knots and needed the 20 MIT (miles in trail). The Center controller I was relieving replied the aircraft were at 250 knots. The TRACON Controller told him that the aircraft were doing 392 knots across the ground and she was slowing her aircraft to 180 knots and they needed to be at 250 knots. I started to vector all my LGA arrivals and slowed them all to 250 knots. I handed off the next LGA arrival which was on vectors to provide 20 MIT. The TRACON Controller again called and reiterated they needed the 20 MIT. I told them that their airspace did not start until RBV VOR and I would give them the 20 MIT. TRACON then slowed the front aircraft to 180 knots and turned the aircraft to the north and back to the southeast. My aircraft were 20 MIT and 250 knots. The TRACON controller was not taking the handoff so I gave holding instructions to the first aircraft with the assumption she would eventually take the handoff. I took the rest off the LGA traffic and amended the altitudes so the aircraft were separated in the event I had to issue holding to the remaining aircraft. TRACON never took the first handoff and I did not give holding instruction to Aircraft X. I told the supervisor that I wanted the sectors split. The first aircraft made a turn in the hold and the TRACON controller accepted the hand off so I gave the first aircraft an airport clearance. I had the EWR arrival flow in Sector 18 and gave a few Descend Via clearances. I reverted my attention to the LGA aircraft and issued holding to a couple of aircraft. On the sector 18 side an aircraft said he would try to make the published restrictions. I told the aircraft to expedite down to 8;000 feet. I made the appropriate point outs to adjacent facilities and handed off the aircraft to TRACON EWR sector. This is when I realized that Aircraft X did not have holding instructions and issued a vector to return to my airspace. I pointed out the TRACON sectors the aircraft and the instructions given. On the EWR side; sector 18; NY TRACON was not taking the handoff and several verbal attempt were made before EWR controller picked up and the controller said the aircraft was not in his airspace and I informed him the LGA controller was watching the aircraft. The EWR controller said he was not taking the aircraft. I had to vector the aircraft back to my airspace and issue altitude amendment and holding to the rest of the aircraft. The LGA controller then took a handoff on Aircraft X and I cleared the aircraft to LGA and issued a frequency change. Through all the chaos I did not realize the aircraft did not read back his airport clearance. I then issued another aircraft airport clearance which was holding at the HOLEY pattern. Now is when a radar assist was assigned to my sector. Aircraft X when over RBV VOR started to turn right and the Assist said the aircraft was turning right and I told the Assist the TRACON was talking to the aircraft and probably giving him a 360 degree turn. When Aircraft X appeared to be making a standard holding pattern I turned both aircraft using the word immediately to both. I also climbed another aircraft to 11000. On the EWR side I was vectoring aircraft to a holding pattern and I noticed an aircraft altitude still showed descending to 8000 feet and tried to amend his altitude to 13000 feet. I was using the wrong call sign and corrected it and told the aircraft to climb to 13000 feet. I also had to hold a Life Guard aircraft but gave priority when they came out of the hold.I believe the TRACON was spiteful and trying to prove a point leaving me vulnerable when I was providing everything required. The approach control should have to monitor and observe an arrival push from the Centers perspective and understand what we do. Staffing is a major issue and help should be available when needed. The sectors should have been split with the holiday traffic being heavy. Overtime should be used to supply the staffing required. Letter of Agreements need to be looked at and negotiated to be more current and alleviate the vulnerabilities of the Center controller. The TRACON persons need to understand indicated speeds and ground speeds and when they shut off traffic how much effect there is.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.