Narrative:

We had been cleared to land. The visibility was good with the airport in sight. Above 1000 feet on short final I called for flaps 30 to complete the final aircraft landing configuration. The landing check was also called for at this time. During the landing checklist we did not get the 'green light' for the flaps. We discovered that the #6 leading edge slat transit light was illuminated. However; a visual check of the leading edge flaps confirmed to us that all the slats appeared to be extended to the full position. The autopilot was not engaged and the aircraft showed no rolling tendency. I increased the airspeed slightly. The aircraft felt stable. We talked briefly about our situation and felt that it was safe to land. We continued to a normal landing.first; after thinking about the event and reviewing the QRH; I now believe that we should have abandoned the landing and gone missed approach. We could have then reviewed the procedures more thoroughly and perhaps considered a flaps 15 landing. This would have been the most prudent way to go. It would have been a better decision and the right way to address the situation.second; I think that since the aircraft appeared to be functioning properly; continuing to a landing just felt right at the time. Everything outside appeared normal and the runway was just right there. There was definitely some expectation bias that took place.other elements that may have had a part in this scenario are:- we didn't have much time to make a decision. By the time we figured out our situation we were very close to the runway. - We received the aircraft two hours late; so we already were well behind schedule. - We were flying the all-nighter and although I had slept for over 5 hours that evening and felt well rested before heading for the airport shuttle; it is not a part of my normal biorhythms to be awake during those hours of the day. At the time of the event; even though I felt alert; I may not have been at my best. Each of these additional conditions were not at the forefront of my thoughts; but may have subconsciously effected my decision making.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 flight crew reported continuing to a landing after a leading edge slat transit light remained illuminated.

Narrative: We had been cleared to land. The visibility was good with the airport in sight. Above 1000 feet on short final I called for flaps 30 to complete the final aircraft landing configuration. The landing check was also called for at this time. During the landing checklist we did not get the 'green light' for the flaps. We discovered that the #6 leading edge slat transit light was illuminated. However; a visual check of the leading edge flaps confirmed to us that all the slats appeared to be extended to the full position. The autopilot was not engaged and the aircraft showed no rolling tendency. I increased the airspeed slightly. The aircraft felt stable. We talked briefly about our situation and felt that it was safe to land. We continued to a normal landing.First; after thinking about the event and reviewing the QRH; I now believe that we should have abandoned the landing and gone missed approach. We could have then reviewed the procedures more thoroughly and perhaps considered a flaps 15 landing. This would have been the most prudent way to go. It would have been a better decision and the right way to address the situation.Second; I think that since the aircraft appeared to be functioning properly; continuing to a landing just felt right at the time. Everything outside appeared normal and the runway was just right there. There was definitely some expectation bias that took place.Other elements that may have had a part in this scenario are:- We didn't have much time to make a decision. By the time we figured out our situation we were very close to the runway. - We received the aircraft two hours late; so we already were well behind schedule. - We were flying the all-nighter and although I had slept for over 5 hours that evening and felt well rested before heading for the airport shuttle; it is not a part of my normal biorhythms to be awake during those hours of the day. At the time of the event; even though I felt alert; I may not have been at my best. Each of these additional conditions were not at the forefront of my thoughts; but may have subconsciously effected my decision making.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.