Narrative:

This is a turbulence event with a lucky result. Also a communication failure event. The a and the C flight attendants (flight attendant) were briefed at the gate to expect intermittent light chop and to sit immediately if asked to. This was at the gate and based on the information I had. This was our first leg with these fas. [We had no flight plan] in this area we encountered the turbulence. Radar- on ; showing a 10 mile wide green band 40 NM ahead no turbulence showing. Altitude fl 290; we had been descending in steps from fl 370 to maintain an almost smooth ride. OAT at fl 360 isa plus 9; at fl 390 isa plus 20. We had descended from 390; as [the flight computer] showed we were thrust limited there. The seatbelt sign was on for about five minutes. ATC was reporting moderate turbulence fl 260-15;000' in the descent; no turbulence reported at fl 290.approximately two minutes prior to the event I had directed the pilot monitoring (pm) to 'sit the flight attendants down.'we instantly went from very light turbulence to moderate chop; we initiated a descent and at FL260 it lessened to light - moderate; finally smoothing out to light at 15;000'. When the chop let up; I asked the pm to check on the cabin. He reported the flight attendant's had all been up. The a and C were in the forward galley holding on. The B had been tossed into the air and had been able to secure himself between the aft galley storage areas on the floor and was not injured when he landed.we debriefed [upon landing]. I again sought to determine if there had been an injury. All flight attendant's reported no. The communication; the pm could not remember the exact words he used; he had talked to the B with the a picking up at the end of the conversation. The communication that was received was 'clean up the cabin and take your seats it will get rough on the descent.'debrief with dispatch showed a [weather report] for the area where we hit the turbulence was issued at about the exact time we hit it; and dispatch had received our prep. I checked weather [when we landed] and did not show the new [weather report] for about another 30 minutes; but about one hour after it was issued. I had flown one leg (two days earlier) with the first officer (first officer) who was on reserve. The first officer was on reserve and had flown 16 legs in four days with 14 aircraft changes and almost as many captains.preventative measures: ['I understand how the pm misinterpreted my desire to have the fas belted in their seats. In the future I will say' I want the fas in their seats now.' I was wary of the huge temperature change over a small altitude change and also the 80 knot crosswind which I did not communicate; so the pm did not have any real reference as to why I wanted the fas to sit immediately. Some standard terminology would be nice but I realize that is not a possibility at company. I would also pursue a conversation with the first officer regarding fatigue; which I did not do. A six month pilot on reserve does not have the confidence/ job security to really evaluate the fatigue issue. I do.']

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: The Captain of a B737-700 reported he told the first officer to sit the flight attendants down; they encountered turbulence and the flight attendants were all up.

Narrative: This is a turbulence event with a lucky result. Also a communication failure event. The A and the C Flight Attendants (FA) were briefed at the gate to expect intermittent light chop and to sit immediately if asked to. This was at the gate and based on the information I had. This was our first leg with these FAs. [We had no flight plan] in this area we encountered the turbulence. Radar- on ; showing a 10 mile wide green band 40 NM ahead no turbulence showing. Altitude FL 290; we had been descending in steps from FL 370 to maintain an almost smooth ride. OAT at FL 360 ISA plus 9; at FL 390 ISA plus 20. We had descended from 390; as [the flight computer] showed we were thrust limited there. The seatbelt sign was on for about five minutes. ATC was reporting moderate turbulence FL 260-15;000' in the descent; no turbulence reported at FL 290.Approximately two minutes prior to the event I had directed the Pilot Monitoring (PM) to 'sit the Flight Attendants down.'We instantly went from very light turbulence to moderate chop; we initiated a descent and at FL260 it lessened to light - moderate; finally smoothing out to light at 15;000'. When the chop let up; I asked the PM to check on the cabin. He reported the FA's had all been up. The A and C were in the forward galley holding on. The B had been tossed into the air and had been able to secure himself between the aft galley storage areas on the floor and was not injured when he landed.We debriefed [upon landing]. I again sought to determine if there had been an injury. All FA's reported no. The communication; the PM could not remember the exact words he used; he had talked to the B with the A picking up at the end of the conversation. The communication that was received was 'Clean up the cabin and take your seats it will get rough on the descent.'Debrief with Dispatch showed a [weather report] for the area where we hit the turbulence was issued at about the exact time we hit it; and Dispatch had received our prep. I checked Weather [when we landed] and did not show the new [weather report] for about another 30 minutes; but about one hour after it was issued. I had flown one leg (two days earlier) with the First Officer (FO) who was on reserve. The FO was on reserve and had flown 16 legs in four days with 14 aircraft changes and almost as many Captains.Preventative Measures: ['I understand how the PM misinterpreted my desire to have the FAs belted in their seats. In the future I will say' I want the FAs in their seats now.' I was wary of the huge temperature change over a small altitude change and also the 80 knot crosswind which I did not communicate; so the PM did not have any real reference as to why I wanted the FAs to sit immediately. Some standard terminology would be nice but I realize that is not a possibility at Company. I would also pursue a conversation with the FO regarding fatigue; which I did not do. A six month Pilot on reserve does not have the confidence/ job security to really evaluate the fatigue issue. I do.']

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.