Narrative:

After landing I did the walk around and found very heavy frost on the bottom of both wings. Returned to cabin and viewed the tops of both wings and found frost which appeared to be melting quickly. Checked again after about 10 minutes and it was no longer melting and it did not look like it would melt off even after being fueled. Advised operations that deicing would be required. About 15 or more minutes later someone stepped into the cockpit and asked if we needed to be deiced. I responded yes...we need to deice. He then said well we have had three flights this evening ask for deice and all [the origin airports] crews and I want to know if you really need to deice. At this point I asked him who he was and he told me he was the station manager. I once again repeated that yes...we need to be deiced....that is why we called to be deiced. He then told me that this deicing was causing ramp delays and that this would delay the flight. I then explained that ramp delays were not my concern and this problem was not going to change that fact that we need to deice. He again asked me to make sure it was really needed and he would come back in a bit. I waited until we were down to our last 25 or so passengers for boarding and went back to look at the wing from the window for a third time. The frost level had not changed at all from my last viewing....this was a large area of frost what appeared to be some ice on the edges. The manager returned just as I was returning from the back of the cabin and I told him we need to deice. Our scheduled departure time was XA20 and the door was closed at XA16 and a deice delay time was put into ACARS at this point. Over the next half hour we found out the deiced truck had a dead battery and they were trying to get it started. I was on interphone and on the phone working and talking with dispatch and the ground crew to figure out how long this process would take and keep everyone informed of the delays. PA's were made to the passengers and flight attendants were kept briefed. We were finally told the truck was not going to start and the maintenance folks in phx came on the interphone to tell us another flight (another 737) was just cleared of the frost with water. They wanted to do the same on our aircraft and they wanted to board the flight to look at the wings from on top. Jet bridge was brought back to allow them to view the upper wings and to see a lot of frost on both wings...especially the right. I gave them the go ahead to get things together to use water to take off the frost and asked the number one flight attendant to have the gate agent step in the cockpit so I could coordinate with him before making the PA to the passengers that they were allowed to deplane at this point if desired. Instead of an agent coming into the cockpit it was once again the manager. I asked him where the agent was and he said up at the gate. I told him I need to make my 30 minute PA and advise passengers they can deplane and I wanted to make sure the agent was aware of this and ready if anyone wanted to get off the flight. The manager then told me I didn't need to make this PA. I told him that PA was required and I was going to make it as soon as I knew they were ready to handle any passengers that wanted to deplane. Manager repeated that we didn't need to make this PA but he said I should if I felt it was necessary. I told him the PA was going to be made as required in part 1. PA was made on time as was a second PA about 25 minutes later. While the deiced process was started with water I called [dispatch] to get their thoughts on this process and also spoke with the chief pilot on duty to explain the situation and confirm this water plan was acceptable. The first officer (first officer) and I both combed through our manuals to find any restrictions that would prevent us from using this process. Phx staff told us this process had also been used in the past as did phx maintenance but as a former captain (ca) I clearly recall restrictions on this process based on latitudes for that aircraft. After discussing with [dispatch]; phx maintenance; chief pilot on duty; and phx ground crews; as well as reviewing all our manuals; we could find no restrictions for the 737. Shortly after reaching this conclusion the process was complete and we once again closed the door and departed for [our destination].

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 flight crew reported difficulty getting their aircraft de-iced due to station equipment problems.

Narrative: After landing I did the walk around and found very heavy frost on the bottom of both wings. Returned to cabin and viewed the tops of both wings and found frost which appeared to be melting quickly. Checked again after about 10 minutes and it was no longer melting and it did not look like it would melt off even after being fueled. Advised operations that deicing would be required. About 15 or more minutes later someone stepped into the cockpit and asked if we needed to be deiced. I responded yes...we need to deice. He then said well we have had three flights this evening ask for deice and all [the origin airports] crews and I want to know if you REALLY need to deice. At this point I asked him who he was and he told me he was the station manager. I once again repeated that yes...we need to be deiced....that is why we called to be deiced. He then told me that this deicing was causing ramp delays and that this would delay the flight. I then explained that ramp delays were not my concern and this problem was not going to change that fact that we need to deice. He again asked me to make sure it was really needed and he would come back in a bit. I waited until we were down to our last 25 or so passengers for boarding and went back to look at the wing from the window for a third time. The frost level had not changed at all from my last viewing....this was a large area of frost what appeared to be some ice on the edges. The manager returned just as I was returning from the back of the cabin and I told him we need to deice. Our scheduled departure time was XA20 and the door was closed at XA16 and a deice delay time was put into ACARS at this point. Over the next half hour we found out the deiced truck had a dead battery and they were trying to get it started. I was on interphone and on the phone working and talking with dispatch and the ground crew to figure out how long this process would take and keep everyone informed of the delays. PA's were made to the passengers and flight attendants were kept briefed. We were finally told the truck was not going to start and the maintenance folks in PHX came on the interphone to tell us another flight (another 737) was just cleared of the frost with water. They wanted to do the same on our aircraft and they wanted to board the flight to look at the wings from on top. Jet bridge was brought back to allow them to view the upper wings and to see a lot of frost on both wings...especially the right. I gave them the go ahead to get things together to use water to take off the frost and asked the number one flight attendant to have the gate agent step in the cockpit so I could coordinate with him before making the PA to the passengers that they were allowed to deplane at this point if desired. Instead of an agent coming into the cockpit it was once again the manager. I asked him where the agent was and he said up at the gate. I told him I need to make my 30 minute PA and advise passengers they can deplane and I wanted to make sure the agent was aware of this and ready if anyone wanted to get off the flight. The manager then told me I didn't need to make this PA. I told him that PA was required and I was going to make it as soon as I knew they were ready to handle any passengers that wanted to deplane. Manager repeated that we didn't need to make this PA but he said I should if I felt it was necessary. I told him the PA was going to be made as required in Part 1. PA was made on time as was a second PA about 25 minutes later. While the deiced process was started with water I called [dispatch] to get their thoughts on this process and also spoke with the Chief Pilot on duty to explain the situation and confirm this water plan was acceptable. The First Officer (FO) and I both combed through our manuals to find any restrictions that would prevent us from using this process. PHX staff told us this process had also been used in the past as did PHX maintenance but as a former Captain (CA) I clearly recall restrictions on this process based on latitudes for that aircraft. After discussing with [dispatch]; PHX maintenance; Chief Pilot on duty; and PHX ground crews; as well as reviewing all our manuals; we could find no restrictions for the 737. Shortly after reaching this conclusion the process was complete and we once again closed the door and departed for [our destination].

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.