Narrative:

The first officer was flying the descent with VNAV and RNAV selected. Center cleared us to make a heading change to intercept a radial and cross 30 DME prior to the VOR at 11000'. I verified that we could make the restriction and observed the first officer program the computer. The new first officer made several errors in the fairly lengthy procedure, which required a new waypoint, a radial to the waypoint, crossing restrictions at the waypoint as well as a turn to intercept the new course. Time became short, and as I attempted to assist him correct his errors, I inadvertently inserted the wrong waypoint (I inserted the radial/altitude rather than the radial/DME as the fix). I then assisted the first officer in the accomplishing the procedure. I did not realize the error until we were leveling at the waypoint and approach control asked us if center had given us the crossing restriction. This error emphasizes that the complex cockpit can, at times, be a hindrance rather than an advantage. A constant verification of data and inputs is required. It would have been much easier to have forgotten the magic of the computer and reverted to VOR navigation while discussing the proper procedures for computer programming after we were on the ground. I feel that below 10000' during the approach phase of the flight, the computer can be detrimental to safety. During this phase, it is essential for 1 pilot to be looking outside and it is very easy for both heads to be looking at the computer. The navigation display can still be used and is extremely useful for map reference, but probably should be reprogrammed as little as necessary and only when the other pilot is maintaining a vigil for traffic.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ALT DEVIATION. CROSSING RESTRICTION NOT MET.

Narrative: THE F/O WAS FLYING THE DSNT WITH VNAV AND RNAV SELECTED. CENTER CLRED US TO MAKE A HDG CHANGE TO INTERCEPT A RADIAL AND CROSS 30 DME PRIOR TO THE VOR AT 11000'. I VERIFIED THAT WE COULD MAKE THE RESTRICTION AND OBSERVED THE F/O PROGRAM THE COMPUTER. THE NEW F/O MADE SEVERAL ERRORS IN THE FAIRLY LENGTHY PROC, WHICH REQUIRED A NEW WAYPOINT, A RADIAL TO THE WAYPOINT, XING RESTRICTIONS AT THE WAYPOINT AS WELL AS A TURN TO INTERCEPT THE NEW COURSE. TIME BECAME SHORT, AND AS I ATTEMPTED TO ASSIST HIM CORRECT HIS ERRORS, I INADVERTENTLY INSERTED THE WRONG WAYPOINT (I INSERTED THE RADIAL/ALT RATHER THAN THE RADIAL/DME AS THE FIX). I THEN ASSISTED THE F/O IN THE ACCOMPLISHING THE PROC. I DID NOT REALIZE THE ERROR UNTIL WE WERE LEVELING AT THE WAYPOINT AND APCH CTL ASKED US IF CENTER HAD GIVEN US THE XING RESTRICTION. THIS ERROR EMPHASIZES THAT THE COMPLEX COCKPIT CAN, AT TIMES, BE A HINDRANCE RATHER THAN AN ADVANTAGE. A CONSTANT VERIFICATION OF DATA AND INPUTS IS REQUIRED. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH EASIER TO HAVE FORGOTTEN THE MAGIC OF THE COMPUTER AND REVERTED TO VOR NAV WHILE DISCUSSING THE PROPER PROCS FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMMING AFTER WE WERE ON THE GND. I FEEL THAT BELOW 10000' DURING THE APCH PHASE OF THE FLT, THE COMPUTER CAN BE DETRIMENTAL TO SAFETY. DURING THIS PHASE, IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR 1 PLT TO BE LOOKING OUTSIDE AND IT IS VERY EASY FOR BOTH HEADS TO BE LOOKING AT THE COMPUTER. THE NAV DISPLAY CAN STILL BE USED AND IS EXTREMELY USEFUL FOR MAP REF, BUT PROBABLY SHOULD BE REPROGRAMMED AS LITTLE AS NECESSARY AND ONLY WHEN THE OTHER PLT IS MAINTAINING A VIGIL FOR TFC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.