Narrative:

Within 30 mins 3 separate aircraft violated the portland arsa west/O first establishing 2-WAY radio communications with the approach controller, as required by far's. The pwm arsa extends from surface to 4100' within 5 NM of the airport and from 1500' to 4100' from 5-10 NM of the airport. The first aircraft a was transponder equipped with no mode C readout. Traffic was issued to several aircraft on this target, 'type and altitude unknown', though past experience and a 4500' ceiling (aircraft a was nebnd) indicated it was probably in the arsa. This proved to be the case when the aircraft called 3 mi from the airport at 3000'. He was advised about the arsa by the controller who also told the supervisor, who did nothing. Ten mins later, another aircraft B, this one mode C equipped violated the arsa, once again only to be scolded by the controller when he finally established radio contact with approach control. Ten mins later another aircraft C established radio contact with approach, negative transponder. Radar contact was made with aircraft C 2 mi from the airport, at 3100' aircraft C had passed, unnoticed, with 1/2 mi and 100' of another VFR aircraft, opp direction. Since this aircraft came close to another one, the supervisor had the pilot call the facility to explain the rules governing an arsa. Case closed. The problem is that FAA's own regulations require much more documentation, as well as FSDO being notified about violations. To my knowledge, this has never occurred at this facility. Something more than what is usually done would certainly help educated the pilots more and enhance the safety of the system. There are several hundred that go unrpted at his facility alone each yr.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT A, B, C, ENTERED PWM ARSA WITHOUT CONTACTING CTLING ATC FAC. PLTDEV. SITUATION: FAC NONREPORTING OF ARSA VIOLATIONS.

Narrative: WITHIN 30 MINS 3 SEPARATE ACFT VIOLATED THE PORTLAND ARSA W/O FIRST ESTABLISHING 2-WAY RADIO COMS WITH THE APCH CTLR, AS REQUIRED BY FAR'S. THE PWM ARSA EXTENDS FROM SURFACE TO 4100' WITHIN 5 NM OF THE ARPT AND FROM 1500' TO 4100' FROM 5-10 NM OF THE ARPT. THE FIRST ACFT A WAS TRANSPONDER EQUIPPED WITH NO MODE C READOUT. TFC WAS ISSUED TO SEVERAL ACFT ON THIS TARGET, 'TYPE AND ALT UNKNOWN', THOUGH PAST EXPERIENCE AND A 4500' CEILING (ACFT A WAS NEBND) INDICATED IT WAS PROBABLY IN THE ARSA. THIS PROVED TO BE THE CASE WHEN THE ACFT CALLED 3 MI FROM THE ARPT AT 3000'. HE WAS ADVISED ABOUT THE ARSA BY THE CTLR WHO ALSO TOLD THE SUPVR, WHO DID NOTHING. TEN MINS LATER, ANOTHER ACFT B, THIS ONE MODE C EQUIPPED VIOLATED THE ARSA, ONCE AGAIN ONLY TO BE SCOLDED BY THE CTLR WHEN HE FINALLY ESTABLISHED RADIO CONTACT WITH APCH CTL. TEN MINS LATER ANOTHER ACFT C ESTABLISHED RADIO CONTACT WITH APCH, NEGATIVE TRANSPONDER. RADAR CONTACT WAS MADE WITH ACFT C 2 MI FROM THE ARPT, AT 3100' ACFT C HAD PASSED, UNNOTICED, WITH 1/2 MI AND 100' OF ANOTHER VFR ACFT, OPP DIRECTION. SINCE THIS ACFT CAME CLOSE TO ANOTHER ONE, THE SUPVR HAD THE PLT CALL THE FAC TO EXPLAIN THE RULES GOVERNING AN ARSA. CASE CLOSED. THE PROB IS THAT FAA'S OWN REGS REQUIRE MUCH MORE DOCUMENTATION, AS WELL AS FSDO BEING NOTIFIED ABOUT VIOLATIONS. TO MY KNOWLEDGE, THIS HAS NEVER OCCURRED AT THIS FAC. SOMETHING MORE THAN WHAT IS USUALLY DONE WOULD CERTAINLY HELP EDUCATED THE PLTS MORE AND ENHANCE THE SAFETY OF THE SYS. THERE ARE SEVERAL HUNDRED THAT GO UNRPTED AT HIS FAC ALONE EACH YR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.