Narrative:

Upon arrival in the terminal area; as expected and briefed; we were in continuous moderate turbulence from 14;000 MSL to the surface. We had briefed the fas to be seated early and informed the passengers early. We also briefed the severe windshear conditions; other than instrument alerts and warnings requiring us to abandon the approach. The captain elected to use flaps 3 as suggested in the FM. I briefed the possibility of a high pitch attitude tendency using flaps 3; as well as; the visual illusion in the 10-7 pages specific to this runway. We both discussed the fact this would be a safe firm landing and would not try to finesse it because of the wind conditions and pitch tendency specific to the configuration and runway. Automation was used to the [maximum] extent possible and we followed the FM guidance for precautions in windshear areas (minimum ground speed; flaps 3; additives on approach; etc.). We also made a plan for if a missed approach was required as we had very little fuel if the need became a diversion to our alternate (something we had discussed with dispatch previously and would put us at 30 min of fuel remaining at the alternate). We determined it was likely more prudent to attempt a second landing if it became necessary and not proceeding to the alternate unless needed for airport operations being suspended at our destination or the first approach being abandoned for unsafe conditions. The flight was dispatched with full tanks; allowing no added fuel for more contingencies at arrival.the approach proceeded as expected and we stabilized early using automation; additive speed then mini-GS. The captain kept the autopilot and autothrust on until approximately 200 ft when he disengaged the autopilot. At approximately 100-125 AGL we received a reactive windshear warning in the final stage of settling the aircraft to the runway. The energy state on the aircraft and proximity to the runway convinced me it was the safer action to complete the landing from this position. The captain and I agreed at the gate we both felt the same regarding the aircraft position and energy condition and that it was the correct decision. After the flight during our further debrief; we reviewed the windshear guidance even further and I realized there doesn't exist any relief in the FM for continuing an approach with a reactive windshear warning and the operation thus was in violation of the SOP. The captain and I discussed that in essence his emergency authority was used in that moment to bring the flight to a safe conclusion considering the position of the aircraft when encountered and the options available (fuel state) if a missed approach was completed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 First Officer reported a windshear alert just prior to touchdown. They elected to land rather than execute the windshear recovery as required by SOP.

Narrative: Upon arrival in the terminal area; as expected and briefed; we were in continuous moderate turbulence from 14;000 MSL to the surface. We had briefed the FAs to be seated early and informed the passengers early. We also briefed the severe windshear conditions; other than instrument alerts and warnings requiring us to abandon the approach. The captain elected to use Flaps 3 as suggested in the FM. I briefed the possibility of a high pitch attitude tendency using Flaps 3; as well as; the visual illusion in the 10-7 pages specific to this runway. We both discussed the fact this would be a safe firm landing and would not try to finesse it because of the wind conditions and pitch tendency specific to the configuration and runway. Automation was used to the [maximum] extent possible and we followed the FM guidance for precautions in windshear areas (Minimum ground speed; Flaps 3; additives on approach; etc.). We also made a plan for if a missed approach was required as we had very little fuel if the need became a diversion to our alternate (something we had discussed with Dispatch previously and would put us at 30 min of fuel remaining at the alternate). We determined it was likely more prudent to attempt a second landing if it became necessary and not proceeding to the alternate unless needed for airport operations being suspended at our destination OR the first approach being abandoned for unsafe conditions. The flight was dispatched with full tanks; allowing no added fuel for more contingencies at arrival.The approach proceeded as expected and we stabilized early using automation; additive speed then Mini-GS. The captain kept the autopilot and autothrust on until approximately 200 ft when he disengaged the autopilot. At approximately 100-125 AGL we received a reactive windshear warning in the final stage of settling the aircraft to the runway. The energy state on the aircraft and proximity to the runway convinced me it was the safer action to complete the landing from this position. The Captain and I agreed at the gate we both felt the same regarding the aircraft position and energy condition and that it was the correct decision. After the flight during our further debrief; we reviewed the Windshear guidance even further and I realized there doesn't exist any relief in the FM for continuing an approach with a reactive windshear warning and the operation thus was in violation of the SOP. The Captain and I discussed that in essence his emergency authority was used in that moment to bring the flight to a safe conclusion considering the position of the aircraft when encountered and the options available (fuel state) if a missed approach was completed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.