Narrative:

We received a: 'wheel north/west steering fault'; while en-route to ZZZ. The QRH page was reviewed and discussed with the first officer (first officer). I sent a message [maintenance control] and asked for additional guidance since cycling the anti-skid was not necessarily ideal in flight. However; [maintenance control] did not respond despite repeated requests. We were trying to wait for [them] to weigh in since the QRH had a caution note; which stated it was possible to lose anti-skid functionality if any braking errors existed. (We did not see or discover any brake and steering control unit (bscu) or brake failures). Essentially our options were: 1). Land without nose wheel (northwest) steering functionality and stop straight ahead on the runway; then reset on the ground or 2). Re-cycle the anti-skid switch in flight with the caution in mind. We mutually decided to re-cycle the anti-skid switch per [QRH]; just prior to final approach. The reset appeared to be successfully as the northwest steering fault disappeared. However; upon landing between 100kts-80kts the northwest steering fault re- manifested itself. At this point; I assumed control of the aircraft and pointed the jet toward the high speed turnoff using rudders for steering while slowing the jet. We successfully cleared the runway and I used a combination of engine thrust and differential breaking to ensure the tail section was clear. After coordinating with ground control; ATC called company via a land line and arranged for a tug to meet the aircraft. A passenger announcement was made and the tow-in checklist completed. We were then towed to the gate without incident. The tug driver told us during the tow-in; the hydraulic service panel was open. I understood that meant it was open the entire flight. Arguably; maintenance should have closed the access panel and or the push back crew should have seen it during their inspection.after parking at the gate; our checklist was completed and I followed up with an inspection of the hydraulic service panel. It was open and unsecured as reported. I then placed a call into [maintenance control] and queried them as to why they did not respond to my request for guidance. I was told they were on the phone with other issues and did not have time to respond. Moreover; he stated that [maintenance control] normally does not have the capacity to help in these situations like they did in days past. In my view; items which involve safety of flight should be paramount and receive additional support when requested.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 flight crew reported that while in flight they received a 'Wheel N/W steering fault'; possibly caused by an open hydraulic service panel.

Narrative: We received a: 'Wheel N/W steering fault'; while en-route to ZZZ. The QRH page was reviewed and discussed with the First Officer (FO). I sent a message [maintenance control] and asked for additional guidance since cycling the anti-skid was not necessarily ideal in flight. However; [maintenance control] did not respond despite repeated requests. We were trying to wait for [them] to weigh in since the QRH had a caution note; which stated it was possible to lose anti-skid functionality if any braking errors existed. (We did not see or discover any Brake and Steering Control Unit (BSCU) or brake failures). Essentially our options were: 1). Land without Nose Wheel (NW) steering functionality and stop straight ahead on the runway; then reset on the ground or 2). Re-cycle the anti-skid switch in flight with the caution in mind. We mutually decided to re-cycle the anti-skid switch per [QRH]; just prior to final approach. The reset appeared to be successfully as the NW steering fault disappeared. However; upon landing between 100kts-80kts the NW steering fault re- manifested itself. At this point; I assumed control of the aircraft and pointed the jet toward the high speed turnoff using rudders for steering while slowing the jet. We successfully cleared the runway and I used a combination of engine thrust and differential breaking to ensure the tail section was clear. After coordinating with ground control; ATC called company via a land line and arranged for a tug to meet the aircraft. A passenger announcement was made and the tow-in checklist completed. We were then towed to the gate without incident. The tug driver told us during the tow-in; the hydraulic service panel was open. I understood that meant it was open the entire flight. Arguably; maintenance should have closed the access panel and or the push back crew should have seen it during their inspection.After parking at the gate; our checklist was completed and I followed up with an inspection of the hydraulic service panel. It was open and unsecured as reported. I then placed a call into [maintenance control] and queried them as to why they did not respond to my request for guidance. I was told they were on the phone with other issues and did not have time to respond. Moreover; he stated that [maintenance control] normally does not have the capacity to help in these situations like they did in days past. In my view; items which involve safety of flight should be paramount and receive additional support when requested.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.