Narrative:

Flight was delayed 20 minutes. The first officer and I met the plane after the passengers deplaned. The exiting ca informed us that he wrote up the ca-side-yoke-map-light. Maintenance arrived and deferred the item and a new MEL was generated and a release 1 was issued. This delayed the flight even more. Our flight attendant arrived after us and upon completion of the boarding; just prior to removal of the jet-bridge she informed us that a latch in the galley would not move appropriately to secure a catering container. Her concern was that the container would fall out during climb-out. I went and tried to move the latch with no effect. We called maintenance and they could not move the latch either; and removed the catering container. I called dispatch and let them know about the situation; and was told by maintenance that no log book entry was needed. Dispatch and maintenance mentioned that the empty catering container weighed less than 2 pounds and would not affect the weight and balance of the aircraft and that the numbers we received for takeoff would not be affected. This situation delayed the flight even more. We were cleared by maintenance and dispatch; and were ready to depart. We did not have a ramp crew to push the plane. The jet-bridge was moved with the help of the maintenance person and another gate agent on the jet-bridge. We were able to close the main cabin door and we tested the anti-skid system with the parking break momentarily off and then placed back on. We conducted the appropriate pre-flight and push-back checklists and waited for a ramp crew to push the plane. We initiated 3 calls to operations and after waiting more than 20 minutes we had a crew to push back the plane. I made 3 announcements to the passengers during this time to inform them about the wait for pushing back the plane; and I thanked them for their patience. Once the ramp crew arrived we were informed that the headset being used did not have a working microphone; but the crew could hear us. I mentioned to them that we would use hand-signals and delay the start of the engines until the push back was completed. He acknowledged by thumbs up; and gave me a sign to release the breaks. I released the brakes and mentioned to him that we would call for the push. When getting the clearance to push back the ramp control mentioned to us to contact metering prior to taxi. I mentioned to the push back driver that we were cleared to push and as we started to push back I noticed that the nose wheel steering was not in the off position. Before any turns were made I moved the nose wheel steering to the off position. The push back driver stopped the push abruptly as a van raced behind us as we were pushing back and if he would not have stopped we would have hit the van going to the aircraft next to us. The push back was resumed; and immediately stopped again once a turn was initiated as he ran over the headset cord. Upon completion of the push-back we initiated the engine start sequence and both engines were started. The first officer was concerned about not having experience contacting metering before; and I said that I would make the call and she could listen. We called metering and there was no answer; we contacted ramp control to verify and they gave us a new frequency; then metering said contact ramp for taxi; we contacted ramp and they informed us that we needed to start to taxi as two aircraft were waiting for us to move to get into the ramp area. We started to move and I realized that the nose wheel steering was not armed due to the distractions we encountered that were out of the ordinary during and after the push back. I stopped the aircraft and a steering inop caution message appeared. I turned on and then off and then on the nose wheel steering; and the system was reset and we were able to taxi out of the ramp area. As we proceeded to taxi clear of other aircraft we were able to complete an after start checklist and a taxi check up to the point of ca control check. Once we stopped as we waited in line for takeoff we were number 7 and had the opportunity to set the parking brake and perform the rudder check. As we taxied we noticed the nose gear making a whining noise like a squeaky brake; but thought this to be somewhat normal as the weather was cold outside and it disappeared prior to us being number 3 for takeoff. All of the remaining checklists were completed as normal. The takeoff was normal and I was the pilot flying. We performed all of the normal calls and followed ATC instructions on departure. We leveled off at lower altitudes as we climbed to our cruise altitude of FL180. Upon reaching FL180 the first officer said look at our gear indications. She then said; I thought I heard a thump noise. The gear indication lights were white; then the nose turned yellow slashes and then turned to red slashes; and we got a gear disagree warning message. We canceled the warning and the indications went back to yellow; then white and then disappeared. Then within seconds it came back again in the same sequence as before. The first officer asked about the QRH for the gear disagree; and I said yes lets run the checklist. As she was looking for the checklist; I pulled up the hydraulics synoptic page and all of the indications were green and normal levels were indicating on all systems. At this time the gear disagree indications disappeared and we continued with the checklist anyway. We complied with all of the checklist items including the last item of 'land at the nearest suitable airport'. It was decided to return to the departure airport by both the first officer and me. We notified ATC and informed them of our situation for an air return. We did not declare an emergency; and were given a new clearance back. I transferred controls of the aircraft and ATC to the first officer. I made an ACARS message to dispatch regarding gear disagree and problem rectified. Precautionary return all systems normal. Then I called the flight attendant and informed her. Then I made an announcement to the passengers letting them know the situation and the precautionary nature of our return with all systems normal. I returned to the pilot flying role and asked for a longer final and slowed to place the gear down farther out than normal to ensure proper operation. All was indicating normal and tower was informed that we were indicating all systems normal. They informed us that the arff trucks were standing by as a precaution. We landed normally; and taxied into the ramp area uneventfully. Upon arriving at the gate; we experienced a wait of over 20 minutes for a ramp crew to park us. Initially operations answered us to give us a gate location; but once we arrived at gate parking area the operations frequency had no reply. We contacted ramp to have them help us coordinate a parking crew. We contacted maintenance operations to inform them that we were at the gate; and could use help with ramp coordination. We contacted maintenance over 3 times and were monitoring the frequency when dispatch contacted us on the maintenance frequency; and let us know that they were trying to get us help to park the aircraft. I thanked them; and told them that I would call them on the phone once we were parked. We finally were informed by maintenance personnel that they sent someone to the ramp and were able to locate a crew to help us park. After we parked and set the break and turned the seat belt sign off; we were never given a chocks-in signal. We were motioning to the gate agent on the jet bridge to notify ramp personnel that we needed a chocks-in sign. We finally got this signal; and I notified the flight attendant 'doors for arrival.' she called me and mentioned that the ground personnel opened the door from the outside; and someone was waiting at the cockpit door waiting to talk with us. We then had someone banging on the cockpit door. I told the first officer to slow down and complete the parking checklist; and then we would open the door. Once the checklist was completed we opened the door and started getting questioned by someone. I said wait; who are you and then I introduced myself. He was a maintenance person; and at that moment we heard banging on the first officer side of the plane. Another individual was outside making hand signals to the first officer. She was confused and said what does that mean; he wants us to shut down the APU... #3 engine??? I immediately said; wait; don't touch anything. Everyone needs to slow down and take a chill pill! We don't have hand signals for these things like hydraulic systems etc. Maintenance is here and they have radios to communicate. Let's relax and think clearly or someone could get injured. At that time the gate agent entered the cockpit area and wanted to know about the passengers. I let him know that the passengers should deplane and wait in the gate area. The maintenance person agreed that this plane was not going to leave tonight and that there were other planes available. The first officer mentioned that she was not interested in going back to ZZZ with lower weather and at such a late hour with the idea that we would be returning almost immediately with no time in the hotel for the rest we were expecting. I mentioned that we would work this out with dispatch. I then called dispatch on the phone. He explained that the weather was forecasted to decrease to 3/4 mile visibility with snow; and that we could not use the exemption for a high mins ca and high mins first officer were the operating crew. Based on this information and the fact that it was already late; and by the time we would get another plane and get to ZZZ we would have no time for an expected rest in the hotel. Fatigue was starting to set in; and based on the situation we just experienced; and were continuing to experience; the first officer and I decided that it would be an issue of safety of flight if we accepted the new assignment to take another aircraft to ZZZ. I informed dispatch and the dispatcher said he would transfer me to a supervisor. A supervisor answered and we were able to discuss logically the situation; and being in agreement we decided to remove us from the flight. I did ask to be connected to the chief pilot on duty to discuss the situation. The supervisor placed me on hold and to call the chief pilot. He returned to the line and said that a message was left for the chief pilot and they would call me back when both were on the line. I agreed; and at that time the flight attendant entered and said that passengers were asking for an update. I asked; we still have passengers on board; I thought I told the [gate agent] that the passengers should deplane. The [gate agent] entered and mentioned that he just offered for them to deplane if they wanted. We still had the majority of the passengers on board. I said that I would make an announcement from the flight attendant PA system and look the passengers in the eye and give the information from me. I let them know that the plane needed to be inspected and that they should deplane and take all of their belongings with them. One woman asked me if they would get to ZZZ tonight. I replied that I did not know that information yet. As I was making the announcement my phone was ringing in my pocket; and I realized operations was calling me back. I re-entered the cockpit and answered another phone call from operations. The chief pilot was on the line and everyone agreed that we should not take the flight to ZZZ this evening based on all of the issues; the late hour of the evening; the warning message situation; the ZZZ weather; the delay; and the expected return from ZZZ. The chief pilot agreed and so did operations. We then called crew scheduling and they wanted us to say that we were fatigued. We complied and they issued us a hotel.after about 20 minutes on hold they issued us a hotel and gave us a number. The number was called and it was the hotel in ZZZ. We called back and placed on hold for another 10 minutes; got another number and called a hotel where we were. We waited over 50 minutes for a van and made 3 ca

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ200 Captain reported on a series of frustrating delays that led to a late departure. Once airborne; an unsafe gear indication led to a return and a canceled flight.

Narrative: Flight was delayed 20 minutes. The FO and I met the plane after the passengers deplaned. The exiting CA informed us that he wrote up the CA-side-yoke-map-light. Maintenance arrived and deferred the item and a new MEL was generated and a Release 1 was issued. This delayed the flight even more. Our FA arrived after us and upon completion of the boarding; just prior to removal of the jet-bridge she informed us that a latch in the galley would not move appropriately to secure a catering container. Her concern was that the container would fall out during climb-out. I went and tried to move the latch with no effect. We called maintenance and they could not move the latch either; and removed the catering container. I called dispatch and let them know about the situation; and was told by maintenance that no log book entry was needed. Dispatch and maintenance mentioned that the empty catering container weighed less than 2 pounds and would not affect the weight and balance of the aircraft and that the numbers we received for takeoff would not be affected. This situation delayed the flight even more. We were cleared by maintenance and dispatch; and were ready to depart. We did not have a ramp crew to push the plane. The jet-bridge was moved with the help of the maintenance person and another gate agent on the jet-bridge. We were able to close the main cabin door and we tested the anti-skid system with the parking break momentarily off and then placed back on. We conducted the appropriate pre-flight and push-back checklists and waited for a ramp crew to push the plane. We initiated 3 calls to Operations and after waiting more than 20 minutes we had a crew to push back the plane. I made 3 announcements to the Passengers during this time to inform them about the wait for pushing back the plane; and I thanked them for their patience. Once the ramp crew arrived we were informed that the headset being used did not have a working microphone; but the crew could hear us. I mentioned to them that we would use hand-signals and delay the start of the engines until the push back was completed. He acknowledged by thumbs up; and gave me a sign to release the breaks. I released the brakes and mentioned to him that we would call for the push. When getting the clearance to push back the ramp control mentioned to us to contact metering prior to taxi. I mentioned to the push back driver that we were cleared to push and as we started to push back I noticed that the nose wheel steering was not in the off position. Before any turns were made I moved the nose wheel steering to the off position. The push back driver stopped the push abruptly as a van raced behind us as we were pushing back and if he would not have stopped we would have hit the van going to the aircraft next to us. The push back was resumed; and immediately stopped again once a turn was initiated as he ran over the headset cord. Upon completion of the push-back we initiated the engine start sequence and both engines were started. The FO was concerned about not having experience contacting Metering before; and I said that I would make the call and she could listen. We called metering and there was no answer; we contacted ramp control to verify and they gave us a new frequency; then metering said contact ramp for taxi; we contacted ramp and they informed us that we needed to start to taxi as two aircraft were waiting for us to move to get into the ramp area. We started to move and I realized that the nose wheel steering was not armed due to the distractions we encountered that were out of the ordinary during and after the push back. I stopped the aircraft and a steering inop caution message appeared. I turned on and then off and then on the nose wheel steering; and the system was reset and we were able to taxi out of the ramp area. As we proceeded to taxi clear of other aircraft we were able to complete an after start checklist and a taxi check up to the point of CA control check. Once we stopped as we waited in line for takeoff we were number 7 and had the opportunity to set the parking brake and perform the rudder check. As we taxied we noticed the nose gear making a whining noise like a squeaky brake; but thought this to be somewhat normal as the weather was cold outside and it disappeared prior to us being number 3 for Takeoff. All of the remaining checklists were completed as normal. The Takeoff was normal and I was the pilot flying. We performed all of the normal calls and followed ATC instructions on departure. We leveled off at lower altitudes as we climbed to our cruise altitude of FL180. Upon reaching FL180 the FO said look at our gear indications. She then said; I thought I heard a thump noise. The gear indication lights were white; then the nose turned yellow slashes and then turned to red slashes; and we got a gear disagree warning message. We canceled the warning and the indications went back to yellow; then white and then disappeared. Then within seconds it came back again in the same sequence as before. The FO asked about the QRH for the gear disagree; and I said yes lets run the checklist. As she was looking for the checklist; I pulled up the hydraulics synoptic page and all of the indications were green and normal levels were indicating on all systems. At this time the gear disagree indications disappeared and we continued with the checklist anyway. We complied with all of the checklist items including the last item of 'land at the nearest suitable airport'. It was decided to return to the departure airport by both the FO and me. We notified ATC and informed them of our situation for an air return. We did not declare an emergency; and were given a new clearance back. I transferred controls of the aircraft and ATC to the FO. I made an ACARS message to dispatch regarding gear disagree and problem rectified. Precautionary return all systems normal. Then I called the FA and informed her. Then I made an announcement to the passengers letting them know the situation and the precautionary nature of our return with all systems normal. I returned to the pilot flying role and asked for a longer final and slowed to place the gear down farther out than normal to ensure proper operation. All was indicating normal and tower was informed that we were indicating all systems normal. They informed us that the ARFF trucks were standing by as a precaution. We landed normally; and taxied into the ramp area uneventfully. Upon arriving at the gate; we experienced a wait of over 20 minutes for a ramp crew to park us. Initially operations answered us to give us a gate location; but once we arrived at gate parking area the operations frequency had no reply. We contacted ramp to have them help us coordinate a parking crew. We contacted maintenance operations to inform them that we were at the gate; and could use help with ramp coordination. We contacted maintenance over 3 times and were monitoring the frequency when Dispatch contacted us on the maintenance frequency; and let us know that they were trying to get us help to park the aircraft. I thanked them; and told them that I would call them on the phone once we were parked. We finally were informed by maintenance personnel that they sent someone to the ramp and were able to locate a crew to help us park. After we parked and set the break and turned the seat belt sign off; we were never given a chocks-in signal. We were motioning to the gate agent on the jet bridge to notify ramp personnel that we needed a chocks-in sign. We finally got this signal; and I notified the flight attendant 'doors for arrival.' She called me and mentioned that the ground personnel opened the door from the outside; and someone was waiting at the cockpit door waiting to talk with us. We then had someone banging on the cockpit door. I told the FO to slow down and complete the parking checklist; and then we would open the door. Once the checklist was completed we opened the door and started getting questioned by someone. I said wait; who are you and then I introduced myself. He was a maintenance person; and at that moment we heard banging on the FO side of the plane. Another individual was outside making hand signals to the FO. She was confused and said what does that mean; he wants us to shut down the APU... #3 engine??? I immediately said; wait; don't touch anything. Everyone needs to slow down and take a chill pill! We don't have hand signals for these things like hydraulic systems etc. Maintenance is here and they have radios to communicate. Let's relax and think clearly or someone could get injured. At that time the gate agent entered the cockpit area and wanted to know about the passengers. I let him know that the passengers should deplane and wait in the gate area. The maintenance person agreed that this plane was not going to leave tonight and that there were other planes available. The first officer mentioned that she was not interested in going back to ZZZ with lower weather and at such a late hour with the idea that we would be returning almost immediately with no time in the hotel for the rest we were expecting. I mentioned that we would work this out with dispatch. I then called dispatch on the phone. He explained that the weather was forecasted to decrease to 3/4 mile visibility with snow; and that we could not use the exemption for a high mins CA and high mins FO were the operating crew. Based on this information and the fact that it was already late; and by the time we would get another plane and get to ZZZ we would have no time for an expected rest in the hotel. Fatigue was starting to set in; and based on the situation we just experienced; and were continuing to experience; the FO and I decided that it would be an issue of safety of flight if we accepted the new assignment to take another aircraft to ZZZ. I informed dispatch and the Dispatcher said he would transfer me to a supervisor. A supervisor answered and we were able to discuss logically the situation; and being in agreement we decided to remove us from the flight. I did ask to be connected to the Chief Pilot on duty to discuss the situation. The supervisor placed me on hold and to call the Chief Pilot. He returned to the line and said that a message was left for the Chief Pilot and they would call me back when both were on the line. I agreed; and at that time the FA entered and said that passengers were asking for an update. I asked; we still have passengers on board; I thought I told the [gate agent] that the passengers should deplane. The [gate agent] entered and mentioned that he just offered for them to deplane if they wanted. We still had the majority of the passengers on board. I said that I would make an announcement from the FA PA system and look the Passengers in the eye and give the information from me. I let them know that the plane needed to be inspected and that they should deplane and take all of their belongings with them. One woman asked me if they would get to ZZZ tonight. I replied that I did not know that information yet. As I was making the announcement my phone was ringing in my pocket; and I realized operations was calling me back. I re-entered the cockpit and answered another phone call from Operations. The Chief Pilot was on the line and everyone agreed that we should not take the flight to ZZZ this evening based on all of the issues; the late hour of the evening; the Warning Message situation; the ZZZ Weather; the Delay; and the expected return from ZZZ. The Chief Pilot agreed and so did Operations. We then called Crew Scheduling and they wanted us to say that we were Fatigued. We complied and they issued us a hotel.After about 20 minutes on hold they issued us a hotel and gave us a number. The number was called and it was the hotel in ZZZ. We called back and placed on hold for another 10 minutes; got another number and called a hotel where we were. We waited over 50 minutes for a van and made 3 ca

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.