Narrative:

First officer (first officer) pilot flying (PF); captain (ca) pilot monitoring (pm). Visual approach to runway 26R; backed up with RNAV to runway 26R. Winds 160/11g18 which equates to a 17kt crosswind; with a 7kt tailwind for 26R (272 degrees). Stable approach throughout final segment; in gusty conditions. Crew configured aircraft for tailwind conditions; flaps 40; and autobrakes 2. Landing assessment had been completed using the full 10 knot tailwind limit.strong gusts and a quartering tailwind encountered crossing the runway threshold; negatively affected the landing phase of the approach. First officer countered a rapid loss of lift with power and pitch; to initially arrest descent. A subsequent loss of lift with pitch correction triggered a 'tailstrike' annunciation in the HUD. Ca immediately directed a go-around. The training kicked in immediately as the first officer acted positively; executed a missed approach and cleaned up the aircraft.subsequent approach to 26R; with better wind components was uneventful.this was the first go-around on a flight while acting as captain. As pilot monitoring; my training also kicked in. While informing tower of the go-around; I used the call sign 'air carrier xyx'. Tower was kind enough to respond with our correct call sign; 'air carrier zaab.'gusty winds; a strong crosswind and tailwind elements all contributed to this go-around. The airport should have been landing to the east to maximize safety margins; even though the given conditions at a point in time were within the capabilities and limits of the aircraft.one can plan for bad conditions; as we did; for this approach; and yet still not obtain the outcome that is desired. The wind conditions encountered crossing the runway numbers were changing enough so as to jeopardize the safest landing possible.our aircrews are so experienced to handle the less than optimum environment; that we don't ask ATC to swap the landing operation in favor of better windage. More requesting and less accepting could lead to better scenarios for our crews.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 Captain reported a tail strike warning on approach in gusty wind conditions that resulted in a go-around.

Narrative: First Officer (FO) Pilot Flying (PF); Captain (CA) Pilot Monitoring (PM). Visual approach to Runway 26R; backed up with RNAV to Runway 26R. WINDS 160/11G18 which equates to a 17kt crosswind; with a 7kt tailwind for 26R (272 degrees). Stable approach throughout final segment; in gusty conditions. Crew configured aircraft for tailwind conditions; FLAPS 40; and Autobrakes 2. Landing assessment had been completed using the full 10 knot tailwind limit.Strong gusts and a quartering tailwind encountered crossing the runway threshold; negatively affected the Landing phase of the approach. FO countered a rapid loss of lift with power and pitch; to initially arrest descent. A subsequent loss of lift with pitch correction triggered a 'tailstrike' annunciation in the HUD. CA immediately directed a GO-AROUND. The training kicked in immediately as the FO acted positively; executed a missed approach and cleaned up the aircraft.Subsequent approach to 26R; with better wind components was uneventful.This was the first GO-AROUND on a flight while acting as Captain. As pilot monitoring; my training also kicked in. While informing tower of the go-around; I used the call sign 'Air Carrier XYX'. Tower was kind enough to respond with our correct call sign; 'Air Carrier ZAAB.'Gusty winds; a strong crosswind and tailwind elements all contributed to this GO-AROUND. The airport should have been landing to the East to maximize safety margins; even though the given conditions at a point in time were within the capabilities and limits of the aircraft.One can plan for bad conditions; as we did; for this approach; and yet still not obtain the outcome that is desired. The wind conditions encountered crossing the runway numbers were changing enough so as to jeopardize the safest landing possible.Our aircrews are so experienced to handle the less than optimum environment; that we don't ask ATC to swap the landing operation in favor of better windage. More requesting and less accepting could lead to better scenarios for our crews.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.