Narrative:

The first officer was flying the aircraft. We were cleared for a visibility approach to runway 28 at bwi. Several mi out, while on a right base leg for runway 28. The tower controller asked us to extend or widen our base leg to allow for departures off of runway 28. We flew through the extended runway centerline, then turned inbound, slowing to minimum approach speed. Approximately 2-3 mi out the controller instructed us to make a right turn and enter a downwind for runway 22. Shortly thereafter the controller asked us to make a short approach. We were then cleared to land on runway 22 with no restrictions to hold short of intersecting runways. We still had significant forward speed as the tower controller instructed us to turn off at a particular taxiway and cross runway 28. I repeated the instructions, not at that moment knowing where the taxiway was. (Upon later study of the airport diagram, I believe this taxiway must have been D.) I glanced at the airport diagram to determine where the requested turnoff was. Before I could accomplish this however, the controller immediately instructed us to hold short of 33L, which I acknowledged. We were approaching the intersection of runway 33L, now at a rather low speed. I glanced left, noticing a jet aircraft on final approach for 33L and repeated to the first officer to stop short of the intersecting runway. We were able to stop well clear of 33L. The tower controller then gave us taxi instructions, which I believe were to make a right turn onto 33L, then a right turn on taxiway east. We held our position momentarily while I checked the airport diagram to determine the requested taxi route. Before we could proceed, the controller exclaimed that 'we were over the hold line,' and instructed the jet aircraft to go around. There are, of course, no hold lines on a runway. The controller then gave us instructions to make a 180 degree turn on runway 22, a left on D, cross 28 on east, and contact ground. We had remained well clear of 33L during the entire time. I feel there were many factors contributing to this occurrence: 1) our landing runway assignment was changed at the last minute, and we then were instructed to make a short approach, allowing no time to examine the airport diagram to become familiar with txwys and intersecting runways. 2) the crew was unfamiliar with runway 22 and its txwys, having never landed on it before. 3) the tower controller gave no hold short restrictions when clearing us to land on runway 22. The request to hold short of 33L was made during the rollout. 4) my primary concern during initial landing was a satisfactory recovery from the first officer's bounced landing, which delayed my assessment of where we would exit the runway. 5) the instructions to turn off at taxiway D were given as the aircraft approached it at too fast a speed to make the turnoff. 6) I repeated the instructions to turn off at taxiway D before I knew exactly where D was in relation to the aircraft. 7) during the rollout and once stopped on the runway, we were given at least 4 different sets of instructions in fairly rapid sequence. 8) the tower controller's workload appeared excessive during the entire approach and landing sequence.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER LNDG, ACFT WAS TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF AN INTERSECTING RWY FOR LNDG TRFFIC. CTLR THOUGHT THE ACFT DID NOT HOLD SHORT AND SENT LNDG ACFT AROUND.

Narrative: THE F/O WAS FLYING THE ACFT. WE WERE CLRED FOR A VIS APCH TO RWY 28 AT BWI. SEVERAL MI OUT, WHILE ON A RIGHT BASE LEG FOR RWY 28. THE TWR CTLR ASKED US TO EXTEND OR WIDEN OUR BASE LEG TO ALLOW FOR DEPS OFF OF RWY 28. WE FLEW THROUGH THE EXTENDED RWY CENTERLINE, THEN TURNED INBND, SLOWING TO MINIMUM APCH SPD. APPROX 2-3 MI OUT THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO MAKE A RIGHT TURN AND ENTER A DOWNWIND FOR RWY 22. SHORTLY THEREAFTER THE CTLR ASKED US TO MAKE A SHORT APCH. WE WERE THEN CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 22 WITH NO RESTRICTIONS TO HOLD SHORT OF INTERSECTING RWYS. WE STILL HAD SIGNIFICANT FORWARD SPD AS THE TWR CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO TURN OFF AT A PARTICULAR TXWY AND CROSS RWY 28. I REPEATED THE INSTRUCTIONS, NOT AT THAT MOMENT KNOWING WHERE THE TXWY WAS. (UPON LATER STUDY OF THE ARPT DIAGRAM, I BELIEVE THIS TXWY MUST HAVE BEEN D.) I GLANCED AT THE ARPT DIAGRAM TO DETERMINE WHERE THE REQUESTED TURNOFF WAS. BEFORE I COULD ACCOMPLISH THIS HOWEVER, THE CTLR IMMEDIATELY INSTRUCTED US TO HOLD SHORT OF 33L, WHICH I ACKNOWLEDGED. WE WERE APCHING THE INTXN OF RWY 33L, NOW AT A RATHER LOW SPD. I GLANCED LEFT, NOTICING A JET ACFT ON FINAL APCH FOR 33L AND REPEATED TO THE F/O TO STOP SHORT OF THE INTERSECTING RWY. WE WERE ABLE TO STOP WELL CLR OF 33L. THE TWR CTLR THEN GAVE US TAXI INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH I BELIEVE WERE TO MAKE A RIGHT TURN ONTO 33L, THEN A RIGHT TURN ON TXWY E. WE HELD OUR POS MOMENTARILY WHILE I CHKED THE ARPT DIAGRAM TO DETERMINE THE REQUESTED TAXI ROUTE. BEFORE WE COULD PROCEED, THE CTLR EXCLAIMED THAT 'WE WERE OVER THE HOLD LINE,' AND INSTRUCTED THE JET ACFT TO GO AROUND. THERE ARE, OF COURSE, NO HOLD LINES ON A RWY. THE CTLR THEN GAVE US INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE A 180 DEG TURN ON RWY 22, A LEFT ON D, CROSS 28 ON E, AND CONTACT GND. WE HAD REMAINED WELL CLR OF 33L DURING THE ENTIRE TIME. I FEEL THERE WERE MANY FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THIS OCCURRENCE: 1) OUR LNDG RWY ASSIGNMENT WAS CHANGED AT THE LAST MINUTE, AND WE THEN WERE INSTRUCTED TO MAKE A SHORT APCH, ALLOWING NO TIME TO EXAMINE THE ARPT DIAGRAM TO BECOME FAMILIAR WITH TXWYS AND INTERSECTING RWYS. 2) THE CREW WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH RWY 22 AND ITS TXWYS, HAVING NEVER LANDED ON IT BEFORE. 3) THE TWR CTLR GAVE NO HOLD SHORT RESTRICTIONS WHEN CLRING US TO LAND ON RWY 22. THE REQUEST TO HOLD SHORT OF 33L WAS MADE DURING THE ROLLOUT. 4) MY PRIMARY CONCERN DURING INITIAL LNDG WAS A SATISFACTORY RECOVERY FROM THE F/O'S BOUNCED LNDG, WHICH DELAYED MY ASSESSMENT OF WHERE WE WOULD EXIT THE RWY. 5) THE INSTRUCTIONS TO TURN OFF AT TXWY D WERE GIVEN AS THE ACFT APCHED IT AT TOO FAST A SPD TO MAKE THE TURNOFF. 6) I REPEATED THE INSTRUCTIONS TO TURN OFF AT TXWY D BEFORE I KNEW EXACTLY WHERE D WAS IN RELATION TO THE ACFT. 7) DURING THE ROLLOUT AND ONCE STOPPED ON THE RWY, WE WERE GIVEN AT LEAST 4 DIFFERENT SETS OF INSTRUCTIONS IN FAIRLY RAPID SEQUENCE. 8) THE TWR CTLR'S WORKLOAD APPEARED EXCESSIVE DURING THE ENTIRE APCH AND LNDG SEQUENCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.