Narrative:

During the final approach to runway 17 at phl, the first officer and I noticed the aircraft surging after selecting flaps 20 degrees. I discovered the flap indicator moving approximately plus/minus 2 degrees. This was in sync with the surging we felt. Not knowing what the problem could be with the flaps, we decided to land with the flaps at 0 degrees, and reset our speed bugs for vref at flaps 0 degrees. I then discussed with the first officer that we will not accept a landing clearance to hold short of runway 27R. Because of our higher landing speed and the loss of the lift dump function of the flaps. (Phl often makes aircraft hold short of runway 27R when landing on runway 17). The first officer agreed. On short final, we were cleared to land on runway 17. We were not asked to hold short. I repeated the landing clearance to the controller, during the landing roll, the tower controller asked if we were going to hold short of runway 27R. I immediately transmitted 'negative.' the controller then told the 737 to go around. I took control of the aircraft and got on the brakes. I was able to hold short of the runway but was across the hold short line. We were then told to cross runway 27R and contact ground clearing the runway. The first officer informed the controller that we had not received a hold short clearance. Nothing more was said. In retrospect, if we had informed the tower controller we were unable to accept a hold short when the first officer and I made the decision, that would have given him a heads up and time to coordinate. The whole conflict probably would have been avoided.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF AN LTT WERE UNABLE TO COMPLY WITH THE TWR'S DESIRE TO HAVE THEM HOLD SHORT DURING LNDG ROLL CAUSING CTLR TO 'SEND ANOTHER ACFT AROUND' ON AN INTERSECTING RWY. PLT DEV.

Narrative: DURING THE FINAL APCH TO RWY 17 AT PHL, THE FO AND I NOTICED THE ACFT SURGING AFTER SELECTING FLAPS 20 DEGS. I DISCOVERED THE FLAP INDICATOR MOVING APPROX PLUS/MINUS 2 DEGS. THIS WAS IN SYNC WITH THE SURGING WE FELT. NOT KNOWING WHAT THE PROB COULD BE WITH THE FLAPS, WE DECIDED TO LAND WITH THE FLAPS AT 0 DEGS, AND RESET OUR SPD BUGS FOR VREF AT FLAPS 0 DEGS. I THEN DISCUSSED WITH THE FO THAT WE WILL NOT ACCEPT A LNDG CLRNC TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27R. BECAUSE OF OUR HIGHER LNDG SPD AND THE LOSS OF THE LIFT DUMP FUNCTION OF THE FLAPS. (PHL OFTEN MAKES ACFT HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27R WHEN LNDG ON RWY 17). THE FO AGREED. ON SHORT FINAL, WE WERE CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 17. WE WERE NOT ASKED TO HOLD SHORT. I REPEATED THE LNDG CLRNC TO THE CTLR, DURING THE LNDG ROLL, THE TWR CTLR ASKED IF WE WERE GOING TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27R. I IMMEDIATELY XMITTED 'NEGATIVE.' THE CTLR THEN TOLD THE 737 TO GAR. I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND GOT ON THE BRAKES. I WAS ABLE TO HOLD SHORT OF THE RWY BUT WAS ACROSS THE HOLD SHORT LINE. WE WERE THEN TOLD TO CROSS RWY 27R AND CONTACT GND CLRING THE RWY. THE FO INFORMED THE CTLR THAT WE HAD NOT RECEIVED A HOLD SHORT CLRNC. NOTHING MORE WAS SAID. IN RETROSPECT, IF WE HAD INFORMED THE TWR CTLR WE WERE UNABLE TO ACCEPT A HOLD SHORT WHEN THE FO AND I MADE THE DECISION, THAT WOULD HAVE GIVEN HIM A HEADS UP AND TIME TO COORDINATE. THE WHOLE CONFLICT PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.