Narrative:

The problem arose when we were dispatched from dca near maximum allowable takeoff weight and our weight and balance record offered only one possible confign option which was to use 'normal power and flaps 18'. The captain felt that a flaps 5 takeoff would be more appropriate and so he asked me to consult the airport restrictions manual (arm) and find some new 'numbers' for flaps 5 at dca. There were no 'numbers' in our arm for flaps 5 at dca so I told him that we should call flight control, from the cockpit, because it was my understanding that if the 'numbers' for flaps 5 at dca were not in the arm, then we were prohibited from making the takeoff. The captain then asked for the operations data manual (not the arm) and was able to come up with some new V speeds for the flaps 5 confign and then told me that we would make the flaps 5 takeoff using the new V speeds. I then told him that I did not think this was an acceptable procedure as the V speed chart gave no consideration for field length. A min or two before receiving takeoff clearance I told him that I was not sure that we 'understood everything we know' about what we were about to do, but he was convinced that the procedure and the new numbers would be fine. Well it was evident that he was mistaken when we roared down the runway, I was flying, and rotated at vr about 2000' from the end. Though this late rotation was not a significant problem and in fact is an acceptable procedure when possible wind shears exist, the fact that we were not able to achieve V2 speed until this point has some very obvious and potentially dangerous implication. Had we been forced to abort the takeoff somewhere near our protracted V1, we would have ended up in the overrun or the river. After climbing to cruise we had a lengthy discussion about this situation and I then discovered that the captain, though having made many flaps 5 takeoffs in the medium large transport, he had never made a takeoff at flaps 18. Who was wrong? First, I think the captain should have given more consideration to what I was trying to tell him and should have respected the fact that, though I was new to the medium large transport, I had been a pilot for over 22 yrs and that I had a significant amount of experience and good 'air sense'. Second, I fault myself for letting him override my better judgement. I think I was suckered into this situation because I figured that maybe he knew something I didn't. I have never considered myself lacking in assertiveness but in this case I should have flat refused to go west/O a call to flight control. It's a tough situation to be in but I love my job too much to lose it because someone else's bad judgement. Supplemental information from acn 143863. We should have used flaps 18 and the appropriate V speeds. We goofed when I fixed on flaps 5 versus 18. I was locked on flaps 5 and reason and logic were not going to change my mind.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG TKOF AT GROSS WEIGHT IN EXCESS OF ARPT RWY MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE FOR TKOF.

Narrative: THE PROB AROSE WHEN WE WERE DISPATCHED FROM DCA NEAR MAX ALLOWABLE TKOF WT AND OUR WT AND BALANCE RECORD OFFERED ONLY ONE POSSIBLE CONFIGN OPTION WHICH WAS TO USE 'NORMAL PWR AND FLAPS 18'. THE CAPT FELT THAT A FLAPS 5 TKOF WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE AND SO HE ASKED ME TO CONSULT THE ARPT RESTRICTIONS MANUAL (ARM) AND FIND SOME NEW 'NUMBERS' FOR FLAPS 5 AT DCA. THERE WERE NO 'NUMBERS' IN OUR ARM FOR FLAPS 5 AT DCA SO I TOLD HIM THAT WE SHOULD CALL FLT CTL, FROM THE COCKPIT, BECAUSE IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT IF THE 'NUMBERS' FOR FLAPS 5 AT DCA WERE NOT IN THE ARM, THEN WE WERE PROHIBITED FROM MAKING THE TKOF. THE CAPT THEN ASKED FOR THE OPS DATA MANUAL (NOT THE ARM) AND WAS ABLE TO COME UP WITH SOME NEW V SPDS FOR THE FLAPS 5 CONFIGN AND THEN TOLD ME THAT WE WOULD MAKE THE FLAPS 5 TKOF USING THE NEW V SPDS. I THEN TOLD HIM THAT I DID NOT THINK THIS WAS AN ACCEPTABLE PROC AS THE V SPD CHART GAVE NO CONSIDERATION FOR FIELD LENGTH. A MIN OR TWO BEFORE RECEIVING TKOF CLRNC I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS NOT SURE THAT WE 'UNDERSTOOD EVERYTHING WE KNOW' ABOUT WHAT WE WERE ABOUT TO DO, BUT HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE PROC AND THE NEW NUMBERS WOULD BE FINE. WELL IT WAS EVIDENT THAT HE WAS MISTAKEN WHEN WE ROARED DOWN THE RWY, I WAS FLYING, AND ROTATED AT VR ABOUT 2000' FROM THE END. THOUGH THIS LATE ROTATION WAS NOT A SIGNIFICANT PROB AND IN FACT IS AN ACCEPTABLE PROC WHEN POSSIBLE WIND SHEARS EXIST, THE FACT THAT WE WERE NOT ABLE TO ACHIEVE V2 SPD UNTIL THIS POINT HAS SOME VERY OBVIOUS AND POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS IMPLICATION. HAD WE BEEN FORCED TO ABORT THE TKOF SOMEWHERE NEAR OUR PROTRACTED V1, WE WOULD HAVE ENDED UP IN THE OVERRUN OR THE RIVER. AFTER CLBING TO CRUISE WE HAD A LENGTHY DISCUSSION ABOUT THIS SITUATION AND I THEN DISCOVERED THAT THE CAPT, THOUGH HAVING MADE MANY FLAPS 5 TKOFS IN THE MLG, HE HAD NEVER MADE A TKOF AT FLAPS 18. WHO WAS WRONG? FIRST, I THINK THE CAPT SHOULD HAVE GIVEN MORE CONSIDERATION TO WHAT I WAS TRYING TO TELL HIM AND SHOULD HAVE RESPECTED THE FACT THAT, THOUGH I WAS NEW TO THE MLG, I HAD BEEN A PLT FOR OVER 22 YRS AND THAT I HAD A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF EXPERIENCE AND GOOD 'AIR SENSE'. SECOND, I FAULT MYSELF FOR LETTING HIM OVERRIDE MY BETTER JUDGEMENT. I THINK I WAS SUCKERED INTO THIS SITUATION BECAUSE I FIGURED THAT MAYBE HE KNEW SOMETHING I DIDN'T. I HAVE NEVER CONSIDERED MYSELF LACKING IN ASSERTIVENESS BUT IN THIS CASE I SHOULD HAVE FLAT REFUSED TO GO W/O A CALL TO FLT CTL. IT'S A TOUGH SITUATION TO BE IN BUT I LOVE MY JOB TOO MUCH TO LOSE IT BECAUSE SOMEONE ELSE'S BAD JUDGEMENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 143863. WE SHOULD HAVE USED FLAPS 18 AND THE APPROPRIATE V SPDS. WE GOOFED WHEN I FIXED ON FLAPS 5 VERSUS 18. I WAS LOCKED ON FLAPS 5 AND REASON AND LOGIC WERE NOT GOING TO CHANGE MY MIND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.