Narrative:

While practicing touch and go lndgs, we had completed 2. It was time for a no flap landing. I had 1 student flying while a second was in the rear seat observing. This was to be the student flying's first no flap landing. Because the student was slow in reducing power to keep the approach speed from being excessive, he was high and fast entering final. Shortly after taking up the final heading, I asked him to close the throttle, which he did. However, at this point, I closed the throttle and kept it there throughout the remainder of the approach. Reaching the threshold we were on altitude, but 5-10 KTS fast. The student continued in the approach, drifting downwind from the centerline. At a point where he was unable to recover from this unstable situation, I got on the controls with him to assist/demonstrate returning to the centerline for T/D. It was apparently at T/D that the landing gear had not been in a position to support the aircraft. We skidded for a few ft and came to rest. A wheel's up landing had occurred. We immediately secured all electrical and fuel sources and evacked the aircraft. From a safe distance I could observe that the landing gear was clearly not in a position to support a landing. Further, the landing gear handle and gear override lever were in the up position. When maintenance personnel arrived on the scene within a few mins, a supervisor entered the cockpit, turned on the master switch and immediately checked to see if the gear warning light and warning horn were operational. My student and I witnessed this check. Initially the red gear warning light (designed to illuminate along with the sounding of the warning horn with the gear handle up and throttle at 14' or below) did not illuminate when the supervisor touched it. This caused the bulb to fall in its socket at which time it illuminated. During the test we all heard the horn sounding. However, we 3 occupants did not hear the horn at anytime during the approach, even though the gear handle was up and the throttle closed. The 2 of us in the front seats had headsets on, which may have impeded our ability to hear the horn, however the student in the rear had no phone and he did not hear the horn at any time. I feel that had the warning light been properly seated and had illuminated that I may have seen it and avoided the event. I estimate that due to the circumstances I had a window well in excess of 15 seconds to have seen the light and heard the horn. The cause of the event is the fact that we did not remember to extend the landing gear, and in addition, since the aircraft had a backup automatic extended system, did not place the gear override lever in the neutral position. Had we done so, the gear could have been expected to automatically extended. Involved in this event were: 1) the student was at a point in pre-solo training that he needed to return from the training area being allowed to perform all checklists and procedures on his own. Early in the progress of his arrival, I noted that he had not completed certain checklists including the approach checklist, and I decided to let him proceed and let him discover this. I forgot to follow up. During the first 2 touch and go's he (we) missed the gear override on the downwind checklists, but remembered to lower the landing gear. On the third downwind and approach leading up to the event, the downwind, base and final checklists were missed allowing the event. An extension downwind may have contributed. As flight instrument I accept full responsibility for the progression of actions/inactions that led to the event, however in the future I intend: 1) nt to let the student go so far west/O my interventions where checklists are concerned. 2) to very emphatically involve the back seat student in all operations, particularly the use of checklists. 3) generally renew/recommit to the timely use of checklists for all our modes of operation for myself and to manage police, persuade, inculcate and demand if necessary to assure that the students onboard do the same.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GEAR UP LNDG BY SMA DOING TOUCH AND GO'S FOR PRIMARY TRAINING.

Narrative: WHILE PRACTICING TOUCH AND GO LNDGS, WE HAD COMPLETED 2. IT WAS TIME FOR A NO FLAP LNDG. I HAD 1 STUDENT FLYING WHILE A SECOND WAS IN THE REAR SEAT OBSERVING. THIS WAS TO BE THE STUDENT FLYING'S FIRST NO FLAP LNDG. BECAUSE THE STUDENT WAS SLOW IN REDUCING PWR TO KEEP THE APCH SPD FROM BEING EXCESSIVE, HE WAS HIGH AND FAST ENTERING FINAL. SHORTLY AFTER TAKING UP THE FINAL HDG, I ASKED HIM TO CLOSE THE THROTTLE, WHICH HE DID. HOWEVER, AT THIS POINT, I CLOSED THE THROTTLE AND KEPT IT THERE THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF THE APCH. REACHING THE THRESHOLD WE WERE ON ALT, BUT 5-10 KTS FAST. THE STUDENT CONTINUED IN THE APCH, DRIFTING DOWNWIND FROM THE CENTERLINE. AT A POINT WHERE HE WAS UNABLE TO RECOVER FROM THIS UNSTABLE SITUATION, I GOT ON THE CONTROLS WITH HIM TO ASSIST/DEMONSTRATE RETURNING TO THE CENTERLINE FOR T/D. IT WAS APPARENTLY AT T/D THAT THE LNDG GEAR HAD NOT BEEN IN A POS TO SUPPORT THE ACFT. WE SKIDDED FOR A FEW FT AND CAME TO REST. A WHEEL'S UP LNDG HAD OCCURRED. WE IMMEDIATELY SECURED ALL ELECTRICAL AND FUEL SOURCES AND EVACKED THE ACFT. FROM A SAFE DISTANCE I COULD OBSERVE THAT THE LNDG GEAR WAS CLEARLY NOT IN A POS TO SUPPORT A LNDG. FURTHER, THE LNDG GEAR HANDLE AND GEAR OVERRIDE LEVER WERE IN THE UP POS. WHEN MAINT PERSONNEL ARRIVED ON THE SCENE WITHIN A FEW MINS, A SUPVR ENTERED THE COCKPIT, TURNED ON THE MASTER SWITCH AND IMMEDIATELY CHKED TO SEE IF THE GEAR WARNING LIGHT AND WARNING HORN WERE OPERATIONAL. MY STUDENT AND I WITNESSED THIS CHK. INITIALLY THE RED GEAR WARNING LIGHT (DESIGNED TO ILLUMINATE ALONG WITH THE SOUNDING OF THE WARNING HORN WITH THE GEAR HANDLE UP AND THROTTLE AT 14' OR BELOW) DID NOT ILLUMINATE WHEN THE SUPVR TOUCHED IT. THIS CAUSED THE BULB TO FALL IN ITS SOCKET AT WHICH TIME IT ILLUMINATED. DURING THE TEST WE ALL HEARD THE HORN SOUNDING. HOWEVER, WE 3 OCCUPANTS DID NOT HEAR THE HORN AT ANYTIME DURING THE APCH, EVEN THOUGH THE GEAR HANDLE WAS UP AND THE THROTTLE CLOSED. THE 2 OF US IN THE FRONT SEATS HAD HEADSETS ON, WHICH MAY HAVE IMPEDED OUR ABILITY TO HEAR THE HORN, HOWEVER THE STUDENT IN THE REAR HAD NO PHONE AND HE DID NOT HEAR THE HORN AT ANY TIME. I FEEL THAT HAD THE WARNING LIGHT BEEN PROPERLY SEATED AND HAD ILLUMINATED THAT I MAY HAVE SEEN IT AND AVOIDED THE EVENT. I ESTIMATE THAT DUE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES I HAD A WINDOW WELL IN EXCESS OF 15 SECS TO HAVE SEEN THE LIGHT AND HEARD THE HORN. THE CAUSE OF THE EVENT IS THE FACT THAT WE DID NOT REMEMBER TO EXTEND THE LNDG GEAR, AND IN ADDITION, SINCE THE ACFT HAD A BACKUP AUTO EXTENDED SYS, DID NOT PLACE THE GEAR OVERRIDE LEVER IN THE NEUTRAL POS. HAD WE DONE SO, THE GEAR COULD HAVE BEEN EXPECTED TO AUTOMATICALLY EXTENDED. INVOLVED IN THIS EVENT WERE: 1) THE STUDENT WAS AT A POINT IN PRE-SOLO TRNING THAT HE NEEDED TO RETURN FROM THE TRNING AREA BEING ALLOWED TO PERFORM ALL CHKLISTS AND PROCS ON HIS OWN. EARLY IN THE PROGRESS OF HIS ARR, I NOTED THAT HE HAD NOT COMPLETED CERTAIN CHKLISTS INCLUDING THE APCH CHKLIST, AND I DECIDED TO LET HIM PROCEED AND LET HIM DISCOVER THIS. I FORGOT TO FOLLOW UP. DURING THE FIRST 2 TOUCH AND GO'S HE (WE) MISSED THE GEAR OVERRIDE ON THE DOWNWIND CHKLISTS, BUT REMEMBERED TO LOWER THE LNDG GEAR. ON THE THIRD DOWNWIND AND APCH LEADING UP TO THE EVENT, THE DOWNWIND, BASE AND FINAL CHKLISTS WERE MISSED ALLOWING THE EVENT. AN EXTENSION DOWNWIND MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED. AS FLT INSTR I ACCEPT FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROGRESSION OF ACTIONS/INACTIONS THAT LED TO THE EVENT, HOWEVER IN THE FUTURE I INTEND: 1) NT TO LET THE STUDENT GO SO FAR W/O MY INTERVENTIONS WHERE CHKLISTS ARE CONCERNED. 2) TO VERY EMPHATICALLY INVOLVE THE BACK SEAT STUDENT IN ALL OPS, PARTICULARLY THE USE OF CHKLISTS. 3) GENERALLY RENEW/RECOMMIT TO THE TIMELY USE OF CHKLISTS FOR ALL OUR MODES OF OPERATION FOR MYSELF AND TO MANAGE POLICE, PERSUADE, INCULCATE AND DEMAND IF NECESSARY TO ASSURE THAT THE STUDENTS ONBOARD DO THE SAME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.