37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1440791 |
Time | |
Date | 201704 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | BED.Airport |
State Reference | MA |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Light Transport Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Descent |
Route In Use | STAR ZELKA1 |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Flight Director |
Person 1 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Instrument |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 75 Flight Crew Total 12800 Flight Crew Type 600 |
Person 2 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Flight Instructor Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Instrument |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 32 Flight Crew Total 8500 Flight Crew Type 67 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met Deviation - Altitude Overshoot Deviation - Procedural Clearance Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
While on arrival to bed (hanscom) airport; we were given a descent clearance to descend to and maintain FL240. Our location; at that time; was just west of eegul intersection. In preparation for an anticipated descend via clearance; I attempted to load a VNAV descent to cross teria at FL240. The first attempt to set-up the VNAV was not successful and the flight director was giving me a steeper descent profile than was necessary. At approximately the same time; center issued a descent via the zelka 1 RNAV arrival. This required me to cross teria intersection at FL240. At this point the descent profile was loaded in the FMZ2000 flight management system. All that should have been required was to press the dir button; line select FL240 at teria intersection; and engage VNAV to give us vertical guidance to cross teria intersection at FL240. Once again; the flight director gave us a steeper descent profile than was necessary. After a failed second attempt to use VNAV and being very close to teria intersection; at a descent rate that was higher than what was required; I disengaged the autopilot and VNAV and took over manually. At this point; we were just west of teria intersection and at an altitude of 23;700. I was attempting to arrest the descent and start a climb back to FL240 to cross teria intersection when center advised us that the descend via clearance required us to cross teria intersection at FL240. We agreed and advised center that we were dealing with a problem and we were climbing back to FL240. Center then issued a clearance to cross teria intersection at FL230 and descend via zelka 1 RNAV arrival. We continued the descent as cleared.it is my belief that what led up to the addressed situation is twofold. First; I relied too much on automation; rather than taking over and flying the aircraft before it got to this point. Second; I was paired with a first officer who had not been in the actual aircraft in quite some time. I discovered along the way that he was starting to 'get behind the airplane' with his limited knowledge of the FMZ2000 FMS; which added to my workload as the flying pilot.to correct this situation and ensure it doesn't happen again; I think we would all be better off by not relying so much on automation.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Corporate jet flight crew and Air Traffic Controllers reported on the cause and effects of the jet not meeting the crossing restriction at TERIA intersection on the ZELKA 1 RNAV Arrival at BED.
Narrative: While on arrival to BED (Hanscom) Airport; we were given a descent clearance to descend to and maintain FL240. Our location; at that time; was just west of EEGUL intersection. In preparation for an anticipated descend via clearance; I attempted to load a VNAV descent to cross TERIA at FL240. The first attempt to set-up the VNAV was not successful and the flight director was giving me a steeper descent profile than was necessary. At approximately the same time; Center issued a descent via the ZELKA 1 RNAV arrival. This required me to cross TERIA intersection at FL240. At this point the descent profile was loaded in the FMZ2000 Flight Management System. All that should have been required was to press the DIR button; line select FL240 at TERIA intersection; and engage VNAV to give us vertical guidance to cross TERIA intersection at FL240. Once again; the flight director gave us a steeper descent profile than was necessary. After a failed second attempt to use VNAV and being very close to TERIA intersection; at a descent rate that was higher than what was required; I disengaged the autopilot and VNAV and took over manually. At this point; we were just west of TERIA intersection and at an altitude of 23;700. I was attempting to arrest the descent and start a climb back to FL240 to cross TERIA intersection when Center advised us that the descend via clearance required us to cross TERIA intersection at FL240. We agreed and advised Center that we were dealing with a problem and we were climbing back to FL240. Center then issued a clearance to cross TERIA intersection at FL230 and descend via ZELKA 1 RNAV arrival. We continued the descent as cleared.It is my belief that what led up to the addressed situation is twofold. First; I relied too much on automation; rather than taking over and flying the aircraft before it got to this point. Second; I was paired with a First Officer who had not been in the actual aircraft in quite some time. I discovered along the way that he was starting to 'get behind the airplane' with his limited knowledge of the FMZ2000 FMS; which added to my workload as the flying pilot.To correct this situation and ensure it doesn't happen again; I think we would all be better off by not relying so much on automation.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.