Narrative:

During the climb phase of a flight from sql; the C182R with 1 passenger was being vectored for the VFR climb in VMC by norcal due to traffic. Norcal called out a target; an SR22; descending through the C182R's flight path. At the start of the incident the C182R was at approximately 3000 feet climbing south east bound and the SR22 at 4500; descending north west bound.norcal called the SR22 to notify them of conflicting traffic (the C182R). They reported traffic in sight. C182R was also given a southeast heading and an approximate range and direction to the conflict traffic. The C182R identified a target at approximately the correct location and responded traffic in sight and offered a better vector to avoid said target. Norcal accepted the new vector. The C182R continued its climb on the new vector. A few seconds later; a new target was seen at the same time as a vocal warning was issued by the C182R's gdl-88 showing traffic at 12 o'clock; same altitude; less than a mile. The traffic was immediately identified as the descending SR22 on a near collision course; moving slightly right to left in the windscreen. Evasive action was taken by the C182R; with a steep right hand climbing turn to avoid. I estimate this action occurred when the aircraft were approximately 1000 feet apart (maybe 3 seconds to passing). The norcal controller asked the SR22 to confirm they had had the traffic in sight and the SR22 confirmed. It did not appear the SR22 took evasive action at any time during the incident.the vector of the SR22 prior to the identification and passing is unknown.what went wrong: the C182R failed to verify visually and with onboard means (ads-B traffic) the target was the correct one. This led to an incorrect suggestion to the controller for a new vector. The controller could have (is not responsible for; however) noted the vector was incorrect. It is plausible that the suggested vector actually improved the situation; but that is speculation without knowledge of the SR22's path. Additionally; it is possible the SR22 did not have the correct traffic in sight as there were other similar profiled aircraft behind the C182R. I would characterize the last call from the SR22 carried a bit of 'surprised delay' in tone when responding to the controller's confirmation they had had the traffic in sight.what should have happened:the aircraft were both in a dangerous phase of flight (climbing/descending in dense and complex airspace). The SR22; if they did have the correct aircraft in sight; should have moved to a safer vector. The C182R should have verified the traffic was the correct target. Restriction on the descent/climb for both aircraft would have made the entire thing a non-event; although the controllers are not ultimately responsible for traffic avoidance.what worked:ads-B aural alerts on the C182R. Emergency procedure training/see and avoid (identifying a threat target not moving in windscreen; determining a course of action; and executing occurred within ~1 second) worked. This is the one time I actually wish I had not had flight following (almost a prereq for flights in ca). Had I simply been flying using my onboard means I would have focused more on outside the cockpit; backed up by onboard traffic. Additionally; I would not have been put on an initial vector that setup the conflict.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C182 pilot reported a NMAC with an SR22. Evasive action was taken by the C182 pilot.

Narrative: During the climb phase of a flight from SQL; the C182R with 1 passenger was being vectored for the VFR climb in VMC by Norcal due to traffic. Norcal called out a target; an SR22; descending through the C182R's flight path. At the start of the incident the C182R was at approximately 3000 feet climbing south east bound and the SR22 at 4500; descending north west bound.Norcal called the SR22 to notify them of conflicting traffic (the C182R). They reported traffic in sight. C182R was also given a SE heading and an approximate range and direction to the conflict traffic. The C182R identified a target at approximately the correct location and responded traffic in sight and offered a better vector to avoid said target. Norcal accepted the new vector. The C182R continued its climb on the new vector. A few seconds later; a new target was seen at the same time as a vocal warning was issued by the C182R's GDL-88 showing traffic at 12 o'clock; same altitude; less than a mile. The traffic was immediately identified as the descending SR22 on a near collision course; moving slightly right to left in the windscreen. Evasive action was taken by the C182R; with a steep right hand climbing turn to avoid. I estimate this action occurred when the aircraft were approximately 1000 feet apart (maybe 3 seconds to passing). The Norcal controller asked the SR22 to confirm they had had the traffic in sight and the SR22 confirmed. It did not appear the SR22 took evasive action at any time during the incident.The vector of the SR22 prior to the identification and passing is unknown.What went wrong: The C182R failed to verify visually and with onboard means (ADS-B traffic) the target was the correct one. This led to an incorrect suggestion to the controller for a new vector. The controller could have (is not responsible for; however) noted the vector was incorrect. It is plausible that the suggested vector actually improved the situation; but that is speculation without knowledge of the SR22's path. Additionally; it is possible the SR22 did not have the correct traffic in sight as there were other similar profiled aircraft behind the C182R. I would characterize the last call from the SR22 carried a bit of 'surprised delay' in tone when responding to the controller's confirmation they had had the traffic in sight.What should have happened:The aircraft were both in a dangerous phase of flight (climbing/descending in dense and complex airspace). The SR22; if they did have the correct aircraft in sight; should have moved to a safer vector. The C182R should have verified the traffic was the correct target. Restriction on the descent/climb for both aircraft would have made the entire thing a non-event; although the controllers are not ultimately responsible for traffic avoidance.What worked:ADS-B aural alerts on the C182R. Emergency procedure training/see and avoid (identifying a threat target not moving in windscreen; determining a course of action; and executing occurred within ~1 second) worked. This is the one time I actually wish I had not had flight following (almost a prereq for flights in CA). Had I simply been flying using my onboard means I would have focused more on outside the cockpit; backed up by onboard traffic. Additionally; I would not have been put on an initial vector that setup the conflict.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.