Narrative:

The event was a near miss between a heavy jet and a king air, with evasive action taken by the heavy jet. Visual contact from the king air to the heavy jet was never made. The event occurred somewhere within 1 mi, to directly overhead, of the cross keys airport (17N) which is an active skydive drop zone. It's unknown to me where the near miss occurred, but given the localizer of the occurrence, the king air would have been in a short cruise at 13000 ft followed by a turn back to the southeast and descent, after releasing jumpers. The LOA between the drop zone and the phl TRACON calls for all climbs and dscnts to be conducted south and east of the airport. Class B exits north and west of the field. Operation of the king air was conducted in our allotted area and to SOP. We were in direct contact with phl approach. In fact, we were conversing about a dash 8 over the drop zone. Approach suggested that I hold my jumpers while it passed. This was done and reapproval was given to commence skydiving activities. Jumpers were dispatched and the king air made its normal descent-to-landing in the approved operations area. This was done exactly like approximately 1000 other operations conducted by myself at this airport alone during this summer season. All rules, regulations and procedures were followed exactly as set forth in far part 91, far part 105, and by LOA with the phl TRACON. Why there was no message received about additional conflicting traffic I do not know. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated that, after the flight, phl TRACON requested that he give them a call. He found out that the heavy jet had to take evasive action to avoid his aircraft. The reporter felt that he had followed the LOA between his company and phl TRACON and that he conducted this flight as he had the other 20-25 flts that day. This summer alone he has logged more than 500 loads. He recalled that he and his company have met with the phl TRACON team supervisors on a number of occasions. During the meetings the subject of the LOA his company has with tampa and minneapolis, respectively, have been discussed. The reporter attributed the success of these LOA's to the tracons' assignment of discrete codes to the jump planes so that the controllers knew what to expect of the pilots. He reported that the phl TRACON refuses to offer discrete codes. He also stated that phl refuses to coordinate with center, but that the other class B tracons do coordinate with their respective ctrs. The reporter asserted that his workload is increased by phl's refusal to coordinate with center, causing him to monitor 2 frequencys, both of which issue TA's -- sometimes simultaneously.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: KING AIR JUMP PLT RPTED THAT HE HAD NMAC WITH A HVY JET WHICH HE NEVER SAW. THE RPTR DOES NOT INDICATE HOW HE KNEW THAT THE HVY JET TOOK EVASIVE ACTION TO AVOID HIM.

Narrative: THE EVENT WAS A NEAR MISS BTWN A HVY JET AND A KING AIR, WITH EVASIVE ACTION TAKEN BY THE HVY JET. VISUAL CONTACT FROM THE KING AIR TO THE HVY JET WAS NEVER MADE. THE EVENT OCCURRED SOMEWHERE WITHIN 1 MI, TO DIRECTLY OVERHEAD, OF THE CROSS KEYS ARPT (17N) WHICH IS AN ACTIVE SKYDIVE DROP ZONE. IT'S UNKNOWN TO ME WHERE THE NEAR MISS OCCURRED, BUT GIVEN THE LOC OF THE OCCURRENCE, THE KING AIR WOULD HAVE BEEN IN A SHORT CRUISE AT 13000 FT FOLLOWED BY A TURN BACK TO THE SE AND DSCNT, AFTER RELEASING JUMPERS. THE LOA BTWN THE DROP ZONE AND THE PHL TRACON CALLS FOR ALL CLBS AND DSCNTS TO BE CONDUCTED S AND E OF THE ARPT. CLASS B EXITS N AND W OF THE FIELD. OP OF THE KING AIR WAS CONDUCTED IN OUR ALLOTTED AREA AND TO SOP. WE WERE IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH PHL APCH. IN FACT, WE WERE CONVERSING ABOUT A DASH 8 OVER THE DROP ZONE. APCH SUGGESTED THAT I HOLD MY JUMPERS WHILE IT PASSED. THIS WAS DONE AND REAPPROVAL WAS GIVEN TO COMMENCE SKYDIVING ACTIVITIES. JUMPERS WERE DISPATCHED AND THE KING AIR MADE ITS NORMAL DSCNT-TO-LNDG IN THE APPROVED OPS AREA. THIS WAS DONE EXACTLY LIKE APPROX 1000 OTHER OPS CONDUCTED BY MYSELF AT THIS ARPT ALONE DURING THIS SUMMER SEASON. ALL RULES, REGS AND PROCS WERE FOLLOWED EXACTLY AS SET FORTH IN FAR PART 91, FAR PART 105, AND BY LOA WITH THE PHL TRACON. WHY THERE WAS NO MESSAGE RECEIVED ABOUT ADDITIONAL CONFLICTING TFC I DO NOT KNOW. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THAT, AFTER THE FLT, PHL TRACON REQUESTED THAT HE GIVE THEM A CALL. HE FOUND OUT THAT THE HVY JET HAD TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION TO AVOID HIS ACFT. THE RPTR FELT THAT HE HAD FOLLOWED THE LOA BTWN HIS COMPANY AND PHL TRACON AND THAT HE CONDUCTED THIS FLT AS HE HAD THE OTHER 20-25 FLTS THAT DAY. THIS SUMMER ALONE HE HAS LOGGED MORE THAN 500 LOADS. HE RECALLED THAT HE AND HIS COMPANY HAVE MET WITH THE PHL TRACON TEAM SUPVRS ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS. DURING THE MEETINGS THE SUBJECT OF THE LOA HIS COMPANY HAS WITH TAMPA AND MINNEAPOLIS, RESPECTIVELY, HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED. THE RPTR ATTRIBUTED THE SUCCESS OF THESE LOA'S TO THE TRACONS' ASSIGNMENT OF DISCRETE CODES TO THE JUMP PLANES SO THAT THE CTLRS KNEW WHAT TO EXPECT OF THE PLTS. HE RPTED THAT THE PHL TRACON REFUSES TO OFFER DISCRETE CODES. HE ALSO STATED THAT PHL REFUSES TO COORDINATE WITH CTR, BUT THAT THE OTHER CLASS B TRACONS DO COORDINATE WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE CTRS. THE RPTR ASSERTED THAT HIS WORKLOAD IS INCREASED BY PHL'S REFUSAL TO COORDINATE WITH CTR, CAUSING HIM TO MONITOR 2 FREQS, BOTH OF WHICH ISSUE TA'S -- SOMETIMES SIMULTANEOUSLY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.