Narrative:

The problem arose on our approach descent to fmn. Approximately 35 northeast passing through 14500' MSL I helped the first officer see the airport. Contributing factors were large shadows over the ground cast by large cumulus clouds. The airport I spotted was not fmn, but aztec airport just 6.5 mi northeast of fmn. It looked almost exactly like fmn, both on a plateau, runways to the west/east, northeast/southwest and bldgs on the south end side. The PF was the first officer, who is unfamiliar to fmn, and we were both unfamiliar with aztec airport and its location. We cancelled IFR and contacted fmn tower, requesting a straight in approach to runway 25, and we were cleared to land runway 25. We were not in sight by fmn tower. We did the in-range checklist, and we briefed the ILS runway 25 approach to fmn planning on first descending to 9700' until 10.0 DME, then down to 7500' when established on the ILS. I told the first officer to intercept the ILS east of fmn VOR and use the ILS for our approach. I kept my navigation radio on the VOR and the first officer switched his to the ILS frequency. It was my perception that he was doing as we planned and although I was doing other duties (passenger briefing, company communications, etc) I do remember asking him twice to intercept the ILS east of the VOR, but I did not say 10 DME east. The first officer was descending rapidly and at 4 NM per min. He was focused on aztec airport, not on intercepting the ILS as I expected and assumed that he would. I should have realized what he was doing and made him do what we planned. It was our first flight together, as well as our first flight of our 2 day trip together. When the first officer called for flaps takeoff I looked at my VOR needle which was moving slowly to the left as though we were going by it but I did not confirm the distance. I did look up and saw the airport, gave him takeoff flaps and switched to the ILS to follow the first officer on the ILS. But what I saw was the needle full deflection to the left. I called that to the first officer and saw his was the same. He then called for gear horn button, flaps approach, before landing checklist which I did, because the airport was in sight. I asked fmn tower if the ILS was operational and they confirmed that it was, and again cleared us to land. They did not say that we were in sight, nor did I ask. We landed and immediately realized that we landed on the wrong airport. I tried to contact fmn tower and company but unable. Aztec airport was virtually west/O any facs, phone, etc. We taxied back to runway 26 to depart because I felt that it would create more of a problem to shutdown and for company to locate us. It was a wrong decision--I completely forgot about having to have a new release from system control in houston. I checked all performance, charts, weight and balance and was safe in that respect. I should have flown the leg and am convinced the incident wouldn't have happened. I made more than 1 wrong decision, and failed to act at the appropriate time because I wanted to believe that aztec airport was fmn. I also wanted to right a wrong and acted hastily in my decision to depart aztec airport for fmn west/O a company release. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following: reporter said that there has been no punitive action by the FAA, but after failing chkrides in the wake of retraining with his company, he resigned and is now looking for another job. He takes full responsibility for his errors, but also complains of the strain the company's captain are under due to the high vol of first officer new hires that they are required to train on the job.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF COMMUTER LTT ON ARR TO FMN LANDS INSTEAD AT Q19. CAPT THEN DECIDES TO DEPART FOR FMN WITHOUT COORDINATING A RELEASE AS REQUIRED.

Narrative: THE PROB AROSE ON OUR APCH DSNT TO FMN. APPROX 35 NE PASSING THROUGH 14500' MSL I HELPED THE F/O SEE THE ARPT. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE LARGE SHADOWS OVER THE GND CAST BY LARGE CUMULUS CLOUDS. THE ARPT I SPOTTED WAS NOT FMN, BUT AZTEC ARPT JUST 6.5 MI NE OF FMN. IT LOOKED ALMOST EXACTLY LIKE FMN, BOTH ON A PLATEAU, RWYS TO THE W/E, NE/SW AND BLDGS ON THE S END SIDE. THE PF WAS THE F/O, WHO IS UNFAMILIAR TO FMN, AND WE WERE BOTH UNFAMILIAR WITH AZTEC ARPT AND ITS LOCATION. WE CANCELLED IFR AND CONTACTED FMN TWR, REQUESTING A STRAIGHT IN APCH TO RWY 25, AND WE WERE CLRED TO LAND RWY 25. WE WERE NOT IN SIGHT BY FMN TWR. WE DID THE IN-RANGE CHKLIST, AND WE BRIEFED THE ILS RWY 25 APCH TO FMN PLANNING ON FIRST DSNDING TO 9700' UNTIL 10.0 DME, THEN DOWN TO 7500' WHEN ESTABLISHED ON THE ILS. I TOLD THE F/O TO INTERCEPT THE ILS E OF FMN VOR AND USE THE ILS FOR OUR APCH. I KEPT MY NAV RADIO ON THE VOR AND THE F/O SWITCHED HIS TO THE ILS FREQ. IT WAS MY PERCEPTION THAT HE WAS DOING AS WE PLANNED AND ALTHOUGH I WAS DOING OTHER DUTIES (PAX BRIEFING, COMPANY COMS, ETC) I DO REMEMBER ASKING HIM TWICE TO INTERCEPT THE ILS E OF THE VOR, BUT I DID NOT SAY 10 DME E. THE F/O WAS DSNDING RAPIDLY AND AT 4 NM PER MIN. HE WAS FOCUSED ON AZTEC ARPT, NOT ON INTERCEPTING THE ILS AS I EXPECTED AND ASSUMED THAT HE WOULD. I SHOULD HAVE REALIZED WHAT HE WAS DOING AND MADE HIM DO WHAT WE PLANNED. IT WAS OUR FIRST FLT TOGETHER, AS WELL AS OUR FIRST FLT OF OUR 2 DAY TRIP TOGETHER. WHEN THE F/O CALLED FOR FLAPS TKOF I LOOKED AT MY VOR NEEDLE WHICH WAS MOVING SLOWLY TO THE LEFT AS THOUGH WE WERE GOING BY IT BUT I DID NOT CONFIRM THE DISTANCE. I DID LOOK UP AND SAW THE ARPT, GAVE HIM TKOF FLAPS AND SWITCHED TO THE ILS TO FOLLOW THE F/O ON THE ILS. BUT WHAT I SAW WAS THE NEEDLE FULL DEFLECTION TO THE LEFT. I CALLED THAT TO THE F/O AND SAW HIS WAS THE SAME. HE THEN CALLED FOR GEAR HORN BUTTON, FLAPS APCH, BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST WHICH I DID, BECAUSE THE ARPT WAS IN SIGHT. I ASKED FMN TWR IF THE ILS WAS OPERATIONAL AND THEY CONFIRMED THAT IT WAS, AND AGAIN CLRED US TO LAND. THEY DID NOT SAY THAT WE WERE IN SIGHT, NOR DID I ASK. WE LANDED AND IMMEDIATELY REALIZED THAT WE LANDED ON THE WRONG ARPT. I TRIED TO CONTACT FMN TWR AND COMPANY BUT UNABLE. AZTEC ARPT WAS VIRTUALLY W/O ANY FACS, PHONE, ETC. WE TAXIED BACK TO RWY 26 TO DEPART BECAUSE I FELT THAT IT WOULD CREATE MORE OF A PROB TO SHUTDOWN AND FOR COMPANY TO LOCATE US. IT WAS A WRONG DECISION--I COMPLETELY FORGOT ABOUT HAVING TO HAVE A NEW RELEASE FROM SYS CTL IN HOUSTON. I CHKED ALL PERFORMANCE, CHARTS, WT AND BAL AND WAS SAFE IN THAT RESPECT. I SHOULD HAVE FLOWN THE LEG AND AM CONVINCED THE INCIDENT WOULDN'T HAVE HAPPENED. I MADE MORE THAN 1 WRONG DECISION, AND FAILED TO ACT AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME BECAUSE I WANTED TO BELIEVE THAT AZTEC ARPT WAS FMN. I ALSO WANTED TO RIGHT A WRONG AND ACTED HASTILY IN MY DECISION TO DEPART AZTEC ARPT FOR FMN W/O A COMPANY RELEASE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING: RPTR SAID THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO PUNITIVE ACTION BY THE FAA, BUT AFTER FAILING CHKRIDES IN THE WAKE OF RETRAINING WITH HIS COMPANY, HE RESIGNED AND IS NOW LOOKING FOR ANOTHER JOB. HE TAKES FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ERRORS, BUT ALSO COMPLAINS OF THE STRAIN THE COMPANY'S CAPT ARE UNDER DUE TO THE HIGH VOL OF F/O NEW HIRES THAT THEY ARE REQUIRED TO TRAIN ON THE JOB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.