Narrative:

Runway 30L in use, which is used only 5% of the time, with construction in progress at the departure end of the runway, and a temporary displaced threshold in use. Both aircraft called ready for departure. Instructed them to hold short of the runway. When runway was clear, cleared aircraft #1 for takeoff. Observed the aircraft rolling, and instructed aircraft #2 to taxi into position and hold. As aircraft #1 was approximately 1000' down the runway, observed aircraft #2 going onto the runway from an intersection approximately 2000' down the runway. No evasive action was taken. Aircraft #1 was already airborne and flew over the top of aircraft #2 aircraft #2 did make a remark that there was an aircraft on the runway. Factors contributing to the situation were: the procedure in use for an intersection departure were done properly according to the ground controller, but not in my mind. One of the procedures is to write the runway and intersection on the strip. This was done, however, after the strip had been passed once the ground controller pulled it back and wrote the intersection, and even then it looked unreadable--even the atm admitted that. The other coordination required is for ground to verbally tell local about the intersection departure. Ground said he had done that, as the local controller, I don't remember it being done. I never heard it. The cabin coordinator had been signed on the position for 4 mins prior to the occurrence, yet never informed anyone he was open. Had he been open, the coordination should have gone through him. I believe the incident occurred due to a massive lack of coordination between local control, ground control and the cabin coordinator. There is an operational error elimination plan in effect that states all coordination between gnc control and local control shall be done over the landline, and this was not done. Had it been done, this error could have been prevented and would not have happened.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT DEPARTED OVER THE TOP OF ANOTHER ACFT HOLDING ON THE RWY AT A MID-FIELD INTERSECTION.

Narrative: RWY 30L IN USE, WHICH IS USED ONLY 5% OF THE TIME, WITH CONSTRUCTION IN PROGRESS AT THE DEP END OF THE RWY, AND A TEMPORARY DISPLACED THRESHOLD IN USE. BOTH ACFT CALLED READY FOR DEP. INSTRUCTED THEM TO HOLD SHORT OF THE RWY. WHEN RWY WAS CLR, CLRED ACFT #1 FOR TKOF. OBSERVED THE ACFT ROLLING, AND INSTRUCTED ACFT #2 TO TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD. AS ACFT #1 WAS APPROX 1000' DOWN THE RWY, OBSERVED ACFT #2 GOING ONTO THE RWY FROM AN INTXN APPROX 2000' DOWN THE RWY. NO EVASIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN. ACFT #1 WAS ALREADY AIRBORNE AND FLEW OVER THE TOP OF ACFT #2 ACFT #2 DID MAKE A REMARK THAT THERE WAS AN ACFT ON THE RWY. FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE SITUATION WERE: THE PROC IN USE FOR AN INTXN DEP WERE DONE PROPERLY ACCORDING TO THE GND CTLR, BUT NOT IN MY MIND. ONE OF THE PROCS IS TO WRITE THE RWY AND INTXN ON THE STRIP. THIS WAS DONE, HOWEVER, AFTER THE STRIP HAD BEEN PASSED ONCE THE GND CTLR PULLED IT BACK AND WROTE THE INTXN, AND EVEN THEN IT LOOKED UNREADABLE--EVEN THE ATM ADMITTED THAT. THE OTHER COORD REQUIRED IS FOR GND TO VERBALLY TELL LCL ABOUT THE INTXN DEP. GND SAID HE HAD DONE THAT, AS THE LCL CTLR, I DON'T REMEMBER IT BEING DONE. I NEVER HEARD IT. THE CABIN COORDINATOR HAD BEEN SIGNED ON THE POS FOR 4 MINS PRIOR TO THE OCCURRENCE, YET NEVER INFORMED ANYONE HE WAS OPEN. HAD HE BEEN OPEN, THE COORD SHOULD HAVE GONE THROUGH HIM. I BELIEVE THE INCIDENT OCCURRED DUE TO A MASSIVE LACK OF COORD BTWN LCL CTL, GND CTL AND THE CABIN COORDINATOR. THERE IS AN OPERROR ELIMINATION PLAN IN EFFECT THAT STATES ALL COORD BTWN GNC CTL AND LCL CTL SHALL BE DONE OVER THE LANDLINE, AND THIS WAS NOT DONE. HAD IT BEEN DONE, THIS ERROR COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED AND WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.