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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 145123 |
Time | |
Date | 199005 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : bfi |
State Reference | WA |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 800 msl bound upper : 800 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : sea tower : bfi |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear |
Flight Phase | descent other landing other other |
Route In Use | approach : straight in |
Flight Plan | None |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | general aviation : instructional |
Make Model Name | Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Retractable Gear |
Flight Phase | descent : approach landing other |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | flight crew : single pilot oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : commercial pilot : cfi |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 33 flight time total : 1470 |
ASRS Report | 145123 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | Other |
Function | instruction : instructor oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument pilot : cfi |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : nmac other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | none taken : insufficient time |
Consequence | Other |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 43 vertical : 10 |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Narrative:
On 5/fri/90, I conducted a short VFR flight from S36 to bfi. I departed on runway 33. I climbed to 1500' MSL and turned to an approximately westerly or n-westerly heading. I flew until west of the northbound approach paths to boeing field and rnt, and also descended over the valley to stay outside of the seattle TCA. Received the boeing field ATIS and called boeing tower when I was about 7 1/2 mi from the airport. Requested a straight-in approach to runway 31L. The controller cleared me for a straight-in approach, told me to report a 2 mi final, and said to reduce my airspeed on final. I was told to follow a high wing small aircraft on downwind. Another high wing small aircraft downwind was told to follow me. A few mi out I moved to my right, aligning myself with the runway. This put me in a rather narrow 'corridor' between the sea and the TCA on my left, and traffic approaching boeing runway 31R on my right. The runway 31R traffic was on a different radio frequency (118.3). At about xa:20 hours I heard the tower controller advise an aircraft to watch for a low wing small aircraft Y near or over longacres. A high wing small aircraft had been told to follow me, and no one had been given an amended clearance or told of a possible traffic conflict. At about a little more than 2 mi from the runway, at about 800' MSL, I was reducing my airspeed, and configuring my aircraft for landing. Although I was still watching for traffic, much of my attention was directed to matters inside the aircraft. As I looked to my left, I saw a low wing small aircraft Y about 40' to 45' to my left and about 10' or so above me. The small aircraft Y was paralleling my course, also headed toward boeing runway 31L. I estimated its speed at about 15 KTS faster then mine. I did not take evasive action because the small aircraft Y would be past me in a very few seconds and because any turn to the right, away from the low wing small aircraft Y, might have conflicted with traffic headed for runway 31R. I immediately told the tower controller that I had just been passed on the left by a low wing small aircraft very close. I asked for further instruction, as there was an obvious conflict for landing. The controller asked the small aircraft Y if they had seen an small aircraft X and he replied that they had not. The controller said that they should be behind an small aircraft X. He replied that he was (or thought he was). The controller told me that the small aircraft Y was behind me. I told the controller again that I had just been passed by the small aircraft Y, and that the small aircraft Y was now about 100 yds ahead and directly in front of me. I told the controller that I was too close behind the small aircraft Y to land behind it and asked if I should do s-turns or something for spacing and was told to offset to the left, to overfly the taxiway, and to plan to land on the last half of the runway. Shortly thereafter that was amended to overfly the grass between the runway and the taxiway. I acknowledged and complied. The small aircraft Y landed on runway 31L and was told to turn off at the next exit if possible. As soon as it was apparent that the small aircraft Y would exit at intersection A-10 I asked if I could move back to the runway and land. I was cleared to do so. When I exited FBO several mins later, a man walked up to me and introduced himself. He said that he was the flight instrument aboard the small aircraft Y at the time of this incident and said that his student was under the hood at the time of this incident, on an instrument approach to boeing. The instrument said that they were 'over crest' when the approach controller advised them of traffic 'maneuvering' ahead. We think that this might have been my aircraft, at about the time I was turning back up the valley toward boeing field. The small aircraft Y was instructed to go to tower frequency at lacre intersection and was told that the tower would have further traffic advisories for them. I did not hear the small aircraft Y report inbound from lacre. The instrument told me that neither he nor his his student saw my aircraft until after they had passed me. Several things concern me about this incident: first and foremost, 3 pilots came within about 50' of having a mid-air collision. The instrument seemed to feel that since he was on an IFR approach that he was being provided IFR sep, that no one should have been in his way, and that he should have been told of all other traffic. The instrument had the responsibility to see and avoid all other traffic, especially since his student was under the hood at the time. He did not see me. Apparently, he just did not look almost directly in front of him or to his right. It appears that the approach controller did not tell the small aircraft Y that I was directly ahead of them and very close before handing them off to the tower. Both aircraft were equipped with operating mode C xponders. The approach controller told the small aircraft Y that the tower controller would have traffic advisories for them. Tower never advised the small aircraft Y of traffic, although they had cleared me to be where I was and knew where the small aircraft Y was. Even though 2 aircraft were so close together and both quite close to the runway, in very good visibility, (I even had my landing light on), the tower controller seemed unaware of where we were, as shown by his response after I told him that the small aircraft Y had just passed me. Lest I sound totally negative, there was some positive aspects to this incident as well. The tower controller did do a good job of quickly and efficiently resolving the traffic conflict once we had sorted out who was where, west/O disrupting the flow of other traffic, in an unnerving and rapidly changing situation, the radio traffic showed that everyone remained calm and professional. I do not think that this was any one person's 'fault'. Like most such incidents. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. Reporter stated that he had no additional information on the circumstances leading to this problem. He was not aware of the FAA's near miss reporting system, and therefore, he filed no report, nor did he do any follow up with the tower.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: SMA PLT ON VFR STRAIGHTIN APCH TO BFI IS PASSED BY ANOTHER SMA WITH INSTRUCTOR AND STUDENT UNDER THE HOOD EXECUTING THE LOCALIZER BC APCH TO RWY 31L. MISS DISTANCE WAS LESS THAN 50'.
Narrative: ON 5/FRI/90, I CONDUCTED A SHORT VFR FLT FROM S36 TO BFI. I DEPARTED ON RWY 33. I CLBED TO 1500' MSL AND TURNED TO AN APPROX WESTERLY OR N-WESTERLY HDG. I FLEW UNTIL W OF THE NBOUND APCH PATHS TO BOEING FIELD AND RNT, AND ALSO DSNDED OVER THE VALLEY TO STAY OUTSIDE OF THE SEATTLE TCA. RECEIVED THE BOEING FIELD ATIS AND CALLED BOEING TWR WHEN I WAS ABOUT 7 1/2 MI FROM THE ARPT. REQUESTED A STRAIGHT-IN APCH TO RWY 31L. THE CTLR CLRED ME FOR A STRAIGHT-IN APCH, TOLD ME TO RPT A 2 MI FINAL, AND SAID TO REDUCE MY AIRSPD ON FINAL. I WAS TOLD TO FOLLOW A HIGH WING SMA ON DOWNWIND. ANOTHER HIGH WING SMA DOWNWIND WAS TOLD TO FOLLOW ME. A FEW MI OUT I MOVED TO MY R, ALIGNING MYSELF WITH THE RWY. THIS PUT ME IN A RATHER NARROW 'CORRIDOR' BTWN THE SEA AND THE TCA ON MY L, AND TFC APCHING BOEING RWY 31R ON MY R. THE RWY 31R TFC WAS ON A DIFFERENT RADIO FREQ (118.3). AT ABOUT XA:20 HRS I HEARD THE TWR CTLR ADVISE AN ACFT TO WATCH FOR A LOW WING SMA Y NEAR OR OVER LONGACRES. A HIGH WING SMA HAD BEEN TOLD TO FOLLOW ME, AND NO ONE HAD BEEN GIVEN AN AMENDED CLRNC OR TOLD OF A POSSIBLE TFC CONFLICT. AT ABOUT A LITTLE MORE THAN 2 MI FROM THE RWY, AT ABOUT 800' MSL, I WAS REDUCING MY AIRSPD, AND CONFIGURING MY ACFT FOR LNDG. ALTHOUGH I WAS STILL WATCHING FOR TFC, MUCH OF MY ATTN WAS DIRECTED TO MATTERS INSIDE THE ACFT. AS I LOOKED TO MY L, I SAW A LOW WING SMA Y ABOUT 40' TO 45' TO MY L AND ABOUT 10' OR SO ABOVE ME. THE SMA Y WAS PARALLELING MY COURSE, ALSO HEADED TOWARD BOEING RWY 31L. I ESTIMATED ITS SPD AT ABOUT 15 KTS FASTER THEN MINE. I DID NOT TAKE EVASIVE ACTION BECAUSE THE SMA Y WOULD BE PAST ME IN A VERY FEW SECS AND BECAUSE ANY TURN TO THE R, AWAY FROM THE LOW WING SMA Y, MIGHT HAVE CONFLICTED WITH TFC HEADED FOR RWY 31R. I IMMEDIATELY TOLD THE TWR CTLR THAT I HAD JUST BEEN PASSED ON THE L BY A LOW WING SMA VERY CLOSE. I ASKED FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTION, AS THERE WAS AN OBVIOUS CONFLICT FOR LNDG. THE CTLR ASKED THE SMA Y IF THEY HAD SEEN AN SMA X AND HE REPLIED THAT THEY HAD NOT. THE CTLR SAID THAT THEY SHOULD BE BEHIND AN SMA X. HE REPLIED THAT HE WAS (OR THOUGHT HE WAS). THE CTLR TOLD ME THAT THE SMA Y WAS BEHIND ME. I TOLD THE CTLR AGAIN THAT I HAD JUST BEEN PASSED BY THE SMA Y, AND THAT THE SMA Y WAS NOW ABOUT 100 YDS AHEAD AND DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF ME. I TOLD THE CTLR THAT I WAS TOO CLOSE BEHIND THE SMA Y TO LAND BEHIND IT AND ASKED IF I SHOULD DO S-TURNS OR SOMETHING FOR SPACING AND WAS TOLD TO OFFSET TO THE L, TO OVERFLY THE TXWY, AND TO PLAN TO LAND ON THE LAST HALF OF THE RWY. SHORTLY THEREAFTER THAT WAS AMENDED TO OVERFLY THE GRASS BTWN THE RWY AND THE TXWY. I ACKNOWLEDGED AND COMPLIED. THE SMA Y LANDED ON RWY 31L AND WAS TOLD TO TURN OFF AT THE NEXT EXIT IF POSSIBLE. AS SOON AS IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE SMA Y WOULD EXIT AT INTXN A-10 I ASKED IF I COULD MOVE BACK TO THE RWY AND LAND. I WAS CLRED TO DO SO. WHEN I EXITED FBO SEVERAL MINS LATER, A MAN WALKED UP TO ME AND INTRODUCED HIMSELF. HE SAID THAT HE WAS THE FLT INSTR ABOARD THE SMA Y AT THE TIME OF THIS INCIDENT AND SAID THAT HIS STUDENT WAS UNDER THE HOOD AT THE TIME OF THIS INCIDENT, ON AN INSTRUMENT APCH TO BOEING. THE INSTR SAID THAT THEY WERE 'OVER CREST' WHEN THE APCH CTLR ADVISED THEM OF TFC 'MANEUVERING' AHEAD. WE THINK THAT THIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN MY ACFT, AT ABOUT THE TIME I WAS TURNING BACK UP THE VALLEY TOWARD BOEING FIELD. THE SMA Y WAS INSTRUCTED TO GO TO TWR FREQ AT LACRE INTXN AND WAS TOLD THAT THE TWR WOULD HAVE FURTHER TFC ADVISORIES FOR THEM. I DID NOT HEAR THE SMA Y RPT INBOUND FROM LACRE. THE INSTR TOLD ME THAT NEITHER HE NOR HIS HIS STUDENT SAW MY ACFT UNTIL AFTER THEY HAD PASSED ME. SEVERAL THINGS CONCERN ME ABOUT THIS INCIDENT: FIRST AND FOREMOST, 3 PLTS CAME WITHIN ABOUT 50' OF HAVING A MID-AIR COLLISION. THE INSTR SEEMED TO FEEL THAT SINCE HE WAS ON AN IFR APCH THAT HE WAS BEING PROVIDED IFR SEP, THAT NO ONE SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN HIS WAY, AND THAT HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN TOLD OF ALL OTHER TFC. THE INSTR HAD THE RESPONSIBILITY TO SEE AND AVOID ALL OTHER TFC, ESPECIALLY SINCE HIS STUDENT WAS UNDER THE HOOD AT THE TIME. HE DID NOT SEE ME. APPARENTLY, HE JUST DID NOT LOOK ALMOST DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF HIM OR TO HIS R. IT APPEARS THAT THE APCH CTLR DID NOT TELL THE SMA Y THAT I WAS DIRECTLY AHEAD OF THEM AND VERY CLOSE BEFORE HANDING THEM OFF TO THE TWR. BOTH ACFT WERE EQUIPPED WITH OPERATING MODE C XPONDERS. THE APCH CTLR TOLD THE SMA Y THAT THE TWR CTLR WOULD HAVE TFC ADVISORIES FOR THEM. TWR NEVER ADVISED THE SMA Y OF TFC, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD CLRED ME TO BE WHERE I WAS AND KNEW WHERE THE SMA Y WAS. EVEN THOUGH 2 ACFT WERE SO CLOSE TOGETHER AND BOTH QUITE CLOSE TO THE RWY, IN VERY GOOD VISIBILITY, (I EVEN HAD MY LNDG LIGHT ON), THE TWR CTLR SEEMED UNAWARE OF WHERE WE WERE, AS SHOWN BY HIS RESPONSE AFTER I TOLD HIM THAT THE SMA Y HAD JUST PASSED ME. LEST I SOUND TOTALLY NEGATIVE, THERE WAS SOME POSITIVE ASPECTS TO THIS INCIDENT AS WELL. THE TWR CTLR DID DO A GOOD JOB OF QUICKLY AND EFFICIENTLY RESOLVING THE TFC CONFLICT ONCE WE HAD SORTED OUT WHO WAS WHERE, W/O DISRUPTING THE FLOW OF OTHER TFC, IN AN UNNERVING AND RAPIDLY CHANGING SITUATION, THE RADIO TFC SHOWED THAT EVERYONE REMAINED CALM AND PROFESSIONAL. I DO NOT THINK THAT THIS WAS ANY ONE PERSON'S 'FAULT'. LIKE MOST SUCH INCIDENTS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. RPTR STATED THAT HE HAD NO ADDITIONAL INFO ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THIS PROB. HE WAS NOT AWARE OF THE FAA'S NEAR MISS RPTING SYS, AND THEREFORE, HE FILED NO RPT, NOR DID HE DO ANY FOLLOW UP WITH THE TWR.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.