Narrative:

I made the decision to reject the takeoff at what I believe was around 115 knots because of a left thrust rev unsafe caution message. I took control of the aircraft; doing the aborted takeoff; and slowing back to a safe taxi speed. We exited the runway and safely taxied back to the terminal to call maintenance.the left thrust reverser had been written up and placed on an MEL the prior day. The flight that we did the rejected takeoff was our fifth flight of the day. On the previous four flights we had gotten the same message 'left thrust rev unsafe' caution message after the plane had left the ground and was weight off wheels per the MEL. This happened the exact same time on each and every flight except for the flight when we aborted the takeoff. The caution message happened at what I remember was 115 knots just below our V1 speed of 129 knots. Because the caution message happened at a different time or point in our takeoff and departure than the previous four flights I made the decision to discontinue the takeoff. Another factor that I feel may have been a factor in the rejected takeoff was we had a problem with the plane before this flight. We had written the plane up for a prox system fault that was cleared by maintenance. Knowing there was history of problems with the prox system caused me to wonder if there was some problem that may have been bigger than our original message of a left thrust rev unsafe message. I chose to abort the takeoff for the safety of the flight.as a flight crew I felt I could have been a better leader in leading the briefing of the situation that we were in. We had brief the weather and terrain that was around us but briefing all the potential problems and messages we were going to receive because of this MEL. This was the fourth flight of the day in this airplane and my briefing was probably a little rushed through. Complacency was setting in from dealing with this issue all day. Next time I will tackle the briefing as if it was the first time we had briefed the problem and possible situations it can put us in no matter if it is the first flight of the day or the sized flight of the day.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-200 flight crew reported rejecting the takeoff at approximately 115 knots; about 14 knots below V1; after receiving a LEFT THRUST REV caution message.

Narrative: I made the decision to reject the takeoff at what I believe was around 115 knots because of a Left Thrust Rev Unsafe caution message. I took control of the aircraft; doing the aborted takeoff; and slowing back to a safe taxi speed. We exited the runway and safely taxied back to the terminal to call maintenance.The left thrust reverser had been written up and placed on an MEL the prior day. The flight that we did the rejected takeoff was our fifth flight of the day. On the previous four flights we had gotten the same message 'Left Thrust Rev Unsafe' caution message after the plane had left the ground and was weight off wheels per the MEL. This happened the exact same time on each and every flight except for the flight when we aborted the takeoff. The caution message happened at what I remember was 115 knots just below our V1 speed of 129 knots. Because the caution message happened at a different time or point in our takeoff and departure than the previous four flights I made the decision to discontinue the takeoff. Another factor that I feel may have been a factor in the rejected takeoff was we had a problem with the plane before this flight. We had written the plane up for a Prox System Fault that was cleared by maintenance. Knowing there was history of problems with the Prox System caused me to wonder if there was some problem that may have been bigger than our original message of a Left Thrust Rev Unsafe message. I chose to abort the takeoff for the safety of the flight.As a flight crew I felt I could have been a better leader in leading the briefing of the situation that we were in. We had brief the weather and terrain that was around us but briefing all the potential problems and messages we were going to receive because of this MEL. This was the fourth flight of the day in this airplane and my briefing was probably a little rushed through. Complacency was setting in from dealing with this issue all day. Next time I will tackle the briefing as if it was the first time we had briefed the problem and possible situations it can put us in no matter if it is the first flight of the day or the sized flight of the day.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.