Narrative:

I was captain on company flight B into position and hold on runway 19, and our flight was cleared to do the same behind him. Flight a was then cleared for takeoff and to fly runway heading. As flight a retracted their gear and continued their climb, the tower cleared us to depart on runway 19 and to fly runway heading also. Since no immediate turns were being issued ot us, I elected to use a minimum torque power setting for takeoff. This extended our ground roll somewhat. After lifting off and retracting the gear and climbing to approximately 150', I heard a different tower controller say, 'company flight a, turn right 270 degrees and remain north of runway 9 localizer, aircraft on mi final for runway 9.' I saw flight a was already well beyond runway 9 and immediately suspected he meant for us (flight B) to turn. I called, 'tower, flight B, you want us to turn to 270 and remain north of runway 9 final?' he said, 'affirmative, flight B turn right 270 degrees, remain north of 9, aircraft on final 9.' I then rolled into a 30 degree right bank and our company flight C came into view in our windscreen. It was evident that this turn would not keep us from colliding with the other aircraft. At this point we were approximately 200' AGL and our company flight was about the same distance (200') above us. I advanced the power to maximum takeoff torque and increased my bank angle and turn rate until it became evident that we would not collide. It required 55-60 degrees of bank and we were not able to continue climbing at our 140 KIAS. We had reached 300' AGL and as we passed our company flight C I recognized the captain looking out his window at us. He remarked later that he hadn't seen any missing rivets on the belly of our aircraft. After we were handed off to departure control, I asked the controller if he would ask tower for me if in the future such turns were required to advise us in the initial takeoff clearance. After reaching cruise altitude, I called back to the tower and requested the tap recordings from 3 mins before to 3 mins after the incident be pulled and given to the supervisor for safekeeping until we could all talk about it. Upon arrival at lnk, I was given a phone # and the supervisor's name to call. During that discussion, I learned that the tower was conducting training at the time and the fpl had been the one to step in and issue the clearance to turn. The supervisor also said that they were using visibility sep and that according to his manual, as long as we didn't collide, it was legal sep. I find that somewhat disturbing.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NMAC BETWEEN 2 COMMUTER ACFT OF THE SAME COMPANY AT MCI.

Narrative: I WAS CAPT ON COMPANY FLT B INTO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 19, AND OUR FLT WAS CLRED TO DO THE SAME BEHIND HIM. FLT A WAS THEN CLRED FOR TKOF AND TO FLY RWY HDG. AS FLT A RETRACTED THEIR GEAR AND CONTINUED THEIR CLB, THE TWR CLRED US TO DEPART ON RWY 19 AND TO FLY RWY HDG ALSO. SINCE NO IMMEDIATE TURNS WERE BEING ISSUED OT US, I ELECTED TO USE A MINIMUM TORQUE PWR SETTING FOR TKOF. THIS EXTENDED OUR GND ROLL SOMEWHAT. AFTER LIFTING OFF AND RETRACTING THE GEAR AND CLBING TO APPROX 150', I HEARD A DIFFERENT TWR CTLR SAY, 'COMPANY FLT A, TURN RIGHT 270 DEGS AND REMAIN N OF RWY 9 LOC, ACFT ON MI FINAL FOR RWY 9.' I SAW FLT A WAS ALREADY WELL BEYOND RWY 9 AND IMMEDIATELY SUSPECTED HE MEANT FOR US (FLT B) TO TURN. I CALLED, 'TWR, FLT B, YOU WANT US TO TURN TO 270 AND REMAIN N OF RWY 9 FINAL?' HE SAID, 'AFFIRMATIVE, FLT B TURN RIGHT 270 DEGS, REMAIN N OF 9, ACFT ON FINAL 9.' I THEN ROLLED INTO A 30 DEG RIGHT BANK AND OUR COMPANY FLT C CAME INTO VIEW IN OUR WINDSCREEN. IT WAS EVIDENT THAT THIS TURN WOULD NOT KEEP US FROM COLLIDING WITH THE OTHER ACFT. AT THIS POINT WE WERE APPROX 200' AGL AND OUR COMPANY FLT WAS ABOUT THE SAME DISTANCE (200') ABOVE US. I ADVANCED THE PWR TO MAX TKOF TORQUE AND INCREASED MY BANK ANGLE AND TURN RATE UNTIL IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT WE WOULD NOT COLLIDE. IT REQUIRED 55-60 DEGS OF BANK AND WE WERE NOT ABLE TO CONTINUE CLBING AT OUR 140 KIAS. WE HAD REACHED 300' AGL AND AS WE PASSED OUR COMPANY FLT C I RECOGNIZED THE CAPT LOOKING OUT HIS WINDOW AT US. HE REMARKED LATER THAT HE HADN'T SEEN ANY MISSING RIVETS ON THE BELLY OF OUR ACFT. AFTER WE WERE HANDED OFF TO DEP CTL, I ASKED THE CTLR IF HE WOULD ASK TWR FOR ME IF IN THE FUTURE SUCH TURNS WERE REQUIRED TO ADVISE US IN THE INITIAL TKOF CLRNC. AFTER REACHING CRUISE ALT, I CALLED BACK TO THE TWR AND REQUESTED THE TAP RECORDINGS FROM 3 MINS BEFORE TO 3 MINS AFTER THE INCIDENT BE PULLED AND GIVEN TO THE SUPVR FOR SAFEKEEPING UNTIL WE COULD ALL TALK ABOUT IT. UPON ARR AT LNK, I WAS GIVEN A PHONE # AND THE SUPVR'S NAME TO CALL. DURING THAT DISCUSSION, I LEARNED THAT THE TWR WAS CONDUCTING TRNING AT THE TIME AND THE FPL HAD BEEN THE ONE TO STEP IN AND ISSUE THE CLRNC TO TURN. THE SUPVR ALSO SAID THAT THEY WERE USING VIS SEP AND THAT ACCORDING TO HIS MANUAL, AS LONG AS WE DIDN'T COLLIDE, IT WAS LEGAL SEP. I FIND THAT SOMEWHAT DISTURBING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.