Narrative:

Prior to my flight I was approached by a check airman and he told me to pay close attention to fuel due to the fact that on several flights he and several other pilots experienced actual critical fuel (cf) trending less than flight planned critical fuel. I advised my first officer of the discussion I had with the check airman and we decided to pay close attention to detail on our fuel burn. At the gate we called fuel at 70;000 lbs. Ramp fuel on flight plan was 70;166 and minimum release was 67;846. Fuel on board (fob) reduced to 69;822 prior to engine start. Fuel over destination (FOD) on flight plan was 19;100. Mcdu FOD showed 18;100 prior to engine start. Enroute to ZZZ at top of climb we noticed that our fuel over destination showed 17;100 and fob showed 37.2. Flight plan critical fuel was 37;396. Actual critical fuel was showing less than planned.we sent an ACARS to dispatch to inform them that we were showing less than critical fuel on our mcdu than what was reflected on the flight plan. Dispatch responded via ACARS with 'copy critical fuel; dispatch.' we sent them a second message again and asked them what plan of action we should take and then we got no response. We decided to satcom dispatch directly and explained the above scenario. Dispatcher decided to try running scenarios in his system [to] recover some fuel. He tried removing alternate but it didn't reduce our planned cf enough to reflect what we were going to have. [He] then took our actual ZFW which was less than planned and it gave us a new cf of 37;298. It was the best he could do. It was better than our original on the flight plan so he sent us a re-analysis reflecting our new cf of 37;298.at that point we improved somewhat on our cf which was 37;200...still close. We decided to call [a company flight] up ahead of us and asked them what their critical fuel situation (spread) was and what their winds were at FL410. They said that their cf was fine and that they had a stronger tailwind of 45 kts versus what we had at our altitude which was about 28 kts. Big difference and I asked them if we could take their altitude to improve our fuel and they obliged. We simultaneously asked for our change of altitudes with ATC and we were granted a climb to FL410 while they descended to FL400. Upon reaching FL410 our cf estimate improved to 37;300 and finally increased to 37;500.looking back and reviewing our flight plan had we took off with min take off fuel of 67;846 with our flight plan etp accumulated fuel burn of 30;400; that would leave us with 37;446 at etp which is only 50 lbs more than the flight plan cf of 37;396. This fuel margin is extremely tight. In post-flight discussion with dispatchers; they advised me that they are being told to reduce the 'fuel margins' and cannot increase them unless the captain requests for more fuel. I think the cause is the pressure put upon the dispatchers to reduce fuel allowances to save money. This is now causing greater concern about the safety of our flights (regarding fuel) and placing a greater burden on our pilots insist that the fuel loads be more scrutinized even more than ever.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A330 Captain on an oceanic flight reported a low fuel situation developed when they had less than forecasted tailwinds. Flight requested a higher altitude with better winds.

Narrative: Prior to my flight I was approached by a Check Airman and he told me to pay close attention to fuel due to the fact that on several flights he and several other pilots experienced actual Critical Fuel (CF) trending less than flight planned Critical Fuel. I advised my First Officer of the discussion I had with the Check Airman and we decided to pay close attention to detail on our fuel burn. At the gate we called fuel at 70;000 lbs. Ramp fuel on flight plan was 70;166 and minimum release was 67;846. Fuel on Board (FOB) reduced to 69;822 prior to engine start. Fuel over Destination (FOD) on flight plan was 19;100. MCDU FOD showed 18;100 prior to engine start. Enroute to ZZZ at top of climb we noticed that our fuel over destination showed 17;100 and FOB showed 37.2. Flight plan critical fuel was 37;396. Actual critical fuel was showing less than planned.We sent an ACARS to dispatch to inform them that we were showing less than critical fuel on our MCDU than what was reflected on the Flight Plan. Dispatch responded via ACARS with 'copy critical fuel; dispatch.' We sent them a second message again and asked them what plan of action we should take and then we got no response. We decided to SATCOM Dispatch directly and explained the above scenario. Dispatcher decided to try running scenarios in his system [to] recover some fuel. He tried removing alternate but it didn't reduce our planned CF enough to reflect what we were going to have. [He] then took our actual ZFW which was less than planned and it gave us a new CF of 37;298. It was the best he could do. It was better than our original on the Flight Plan so he sent us a re-analysis reflecting our new CF of 37;298.At that point we improved somewhat on our CF which was 37;200...still close. We decided to call [a company flight] up ahead of us and asked them what their Critical Fuel Situation (spread) was and what their winds were at FL410. They said that their CF was fine and that they had a stronger tailwind of 45 kts versus what we had at our altitude which was about 28 kts. Big difference and I asked them if we could take their altitude to improve our fuel and they obliged. We simultaneously asked for our change of altitudes with ATC and we were granted a climb to FL410 while they descended to FL400. Upon reaching FL410 our CF estimate improved to 37;300 and finally increased to 37;500.Looking back and reviewing our Flight Plan had we took off with min take off fuel of 67;846 with our Flight Plan ETP accumulated Fuel Burn of 30;400; that would leave us with 37;446 at ETP which is only 50 lbs more than the Flight Plan CF of 37;396. This fuel margin is extremely tight. In post-flight discussion with Dispatchers; they advised me that they are being told to reduce the 'fuel margins' and cannot increase them unless the Captain requests for more fuel. I think the cause is the pressure put upon the Dispatchers to reduce fuel allowances to save money. This is now causing greater concern about the SAFETY of our flights (regarding fuel) and placing a greater burden on our pilots insist that the fuel loads be more scrutinized even more than ever.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.