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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1466557 |
Time | |
Date | 201707 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZOB.ARTCC |
State Reference | OH |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Large Transport Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Large Transport Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Enroute |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 3 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence |
Narrative:
The blue ridge controller called and informed me I was shutoff for bwi/iad/dca arrivals and that tmu said I should have been rerouting them. I had no knowledge of this and asked my supervisor for clarification. My supervisor asked tmu. Tmu informed my supervisor bwi/iad/dca had been shutoff. My supervisor and I were both shocked to learn of this information from the receiving sector without prior notice from tmu. I was extremely dismayed at the obvious breakdown in communication. I immediately had trepidation about what to do with all my bwi/iad/dca arrivals. Meanwhile; aircraft X and aircraft Y; six miles in trail; were in pending hand off status to the blue ridge sector. Additionally; aircraft Z was approximately five minutes in trail. All three were bwi arrivals. My panic was relieved when the blue ridge controller said he would accept aircraft X and aircraft Y. Then; having to ignore shout line calls from adjacent sectors; my focus shifted to aircraft Z; at which time I informed the pilot to slow and plan for holding or a possible reroute. After conferring with my supervisor about how this happened and how I would proceed; I was able to reestablish my scan and get back to other priorities like point outs; hand offs; and coordination.this period of inattention and distraction could've been avoided. During the fray I switched aircraft a communications without a hand off; which could've lead to an airspace violation. And; I delayed about four minutes to answer an appleton sector point out on aircraft B; causing the aircraft to fly into moderate precipitation and potentially endangering the passengers and crew. After more coordination with the blue ridge controller; they accepted aircraft Z. Aircraft X; aircraft Y and aircraft Z all exited my airspace via lundy; the normal route; but were quickly vectored by the blue ridge controller. I imagine this created extra workload for the blue ridge controller and unnecessarily put all three aircraft in a proximity to weather conditions that were undesirable. There was a failure to provide the necessary service to all the flights impacted: aircraft X; aircraft Y; aircraft Z; aircraft a and aircraft B. Despite low volume; a highly complex and dangerous situation was created; which was unnecessary and avoidable.I believe there was a breakdown in the prompt communication of holding/rerouting/route-shutoff. Known weather was affecting the area for hours leading to this event. The potential for holding/rerouting/shutoff should have been anticipated. I recommend contacting the sector and/or area supervisor immediately with specific call signs of which aircraft will be accepted; and which will have to hold. The same goes for when a reroute is necessary; even if a route hasn't been established yet; at least give the controller/sector team as much time as possible to prepare. This notification will also aid the supervisor in adding staffing resources quicker.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ZOB Center Controller reported having to go into no notice holding and the problems that followed.
Narrative: The Blue Ridge Controller called and informed me I was shutoff for BWI/IAD/DCA arrivals and that TMU said I should have been rerouting them. I had no knowledge of this and asked my Supervisor for clarification. My Supervisor asked TMU. TMU informed my Supervisor BWI/IAD/DCA had been shutoff. My Supervisor and I were both shocked to learn of this information from the receiving sector without prior notice from TMU. I was extremely dismayed at the obvious breakdown in communication. I immediately had trepidation about what to do with all my BWI/IAD/DCA arrivals. Meanwhile; Aircraft X and Aircraft Y; six miles in trail; were in pending hand off status to the Blue Ridge Sector. Additionally; Aircraft Z was approximately five minutes in trail. All three were BWI arrivals. My panic was relieved when the Blue Ridge Controller said he would accept Aircraft X and Aircraft Y. Then; having to ignore shout line calls from adjacent sectors; my focus shifted to Aircraft Z; at which time I informed the pilot to slow and plan for holding or a possible reroute. After conferring with my Supervisor about how this happened and how I would proceed; I was able to reestablish my scan and get back to other priorities like point outs; hand offs; and coordination.This period of inattention and distraction could've been avoided. During the fray I switched Aircraft A communications without a hand off; which could've lead to an airspace violation. And; I delayed about four minutes to answer an Appleton Sector point out on Aircraft B; causing the aircraft to fly into moderate precipitation and potentially endangering the passengers and crew. After more coordination with the Blue Ridge Controller; they accepted Aircraft Z. Aircraft X; Aircraft Y and Aircraft Z all exited my airspace via LUNDY; the normal route; but were quickly vectored by the Blue Ridge Controller. I imagine this created extra workload for the Blue Ridge Controller and unnecessarily put all three aircraft in a proximity to weather conditions that were undesirable. There was a failure to provide the necessary service to all the flights impacted: Aircraft X; Aircraft Y; Aircraft Z; Aircraft A and Aircraft B. Despite low volume; a highly complex and dangerous situation was created; which was unnecessary and avoidable.I believe there was a breakdown in the prompt communication of holding/rerouting/route-shutoff. Known weather was affecting the area for hours leading to this event. The potential for holding/rerouting/shutoff should have been anticipated. I recommend contacting the sector and/or area supervisor immediately with specific call signs of which aircraft will be accepted; and which will have to hold. The same goes for when a reroute is necessary; even if a route hasn't been established yet; at least give the controller/sector team as much time as possible to prepare. This notification will also aid the supervisor in adding staffing resources quicker.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.