Narrative:

We (flight crew) went on-call at [early morning]. We dutied -in [two hours thirty minutes later] to re-position an aircraft. That aircraft had an inoperative APU and was located on the hangar ramp. The hangar did not have ballast (required) and we were told fuel would take a long time. Sector manager recommended we taxi over to get fuel and ballast. We started the right engine only (yes; 2B on for flaps-up taxi) and taxied over and we hot fueled the aircraft; got 450 pounds ballast and then pushed. We flew to destination and had a radar failure immediately after takeoff flying into the decaying thunderstorm. We landed in our destination and handed off the aircraft to the next crew.we were then put to rest for 10 hours [mid-morning]. I can't just put myself to 'rest' [mid-morning]. The above is to indicate that this was a long (but legal; 2 duty-period) day.we returned to the airport [at dusk] and found another APU-less aircraft. Coordination for ballast and a huffer was more difficult than [in our prior flight]. The company bottle did not work and we had to get [a contractor ground service] to come to the hangar with their huffer. We finally got the left engine started. ACARS weight and balance transmission was non-functional (osc issue) and complicating matters was the fact that the dispatcher calculated ballast required with 2 flight attendants on board - which we did not have. The door was closed by the time I realized this issue; so we requested the dispatcher recalculate and it was determined that we needed more sand bags. Again; to speed the process; we taxied the aircraft over to the gates area to pick up more sand.finally taxiing to the runway; when the first officer selected xflow auto override to manual; we received an xflow pump failure. We stopped at the end of the runway and I conferred with dispatch and maintenance control. We decided that it was deferrable and that we could continue with an entry in the [logs].shortly after takeoff; the first officer called for gear up. I grabbed the handle and it would not move. I pulled it out; I pulled it up - it would not move. Shortly thereafter; we received a 'wow input' caution message. I told the first officer not to exceed 200 KTS and told ATC that we had a retraction issue; did not want to climb above 5000 ft and request box vectors around the airport. I ran the QRH checklist; but immediately stopped because it basically starts with 'prior to landing...' I contacted the [company] and maintenance control confirmed no gear disagree; then said talk to your dispatcher. Dispatcher and I agreed we did not have the fuel to fly to [our destination] with the gear down; so we should return [to the airport].the QRH references that nose wheel steering may be inoperative and brakes (anti-skid) may be an issue so I decided to [relay this information to ATC]. We were vectored around for an uneventful landing.the QRH was sequentially completed -multiple steps at multiple phases of flight; with some on the ground prior to shut down. With the engines shutdown back on the hangar ramp; maintenance began inspecting. After consulting with the maintenance diagnostics computer; the proceeded to find a tests article in the nose wheel system. I don't know what it is / was; but they showed me a small 1 inch block of metal that they place on a wow sensor to test the aircraft's systems. I have no idea where that sensor is - and I doubt the first officer does either. In other words; there was no way we knew to look for that thing and the gear was not coming up with it there. I did verify three gear pins prior to accepting the aircraft. That test item was removed; the xflow pump deferred and we finally flew home. Essentially 19+ hours in one workday.landing gear that would not retract due to a maintenance oversight and a long day consisting of two duty periods were causes [that led up to this predicament].I'm sure procedures are in place for mechanics to capture this error; the same way we now confirm gear pins in the flight deck. I must say that the maintenance lead seemed kind of lax in his demeanor and was not very familiar with the aircraft (while on ground power; flight crew in the first class cabin and maintenance in flight deck; he had to ask us how much fuel was on the airplane).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-700 flight crew reported that after takeoff the crew was unable to raise the gear handle; (the gear handle would not move).

Narrative: We (flight crew) went on-call at [early morning]. We dutied -in [two hours thirty minutes later] to re-position an aircraft. That aircraft had an inoperative APU and was located on the hangar ramp. The hangar did not have ballast (required) and we were told fuel would take a long time. Sector Manager recommended we taxi over to get fuel and ballast. We started the right engine only (yes; 2B on for flaps-up taxi) and taxied over and we hot fueled the aircraft; got 450 LBS ballast and then pushed. We flew to destination and had a radar failure immediately after takeoff flying into the decaying thunderstorm. We landed in our destination and handed off the aircraft to the next crew.We were then put to rest for 10 hours [mid-morning]. I can't just put myself to 'rest' [mid-morning]. The above is to indicate that this was a long (but legal; 2 duty-period) day.We returned to the airport [at dusk] and found another APU-less aircraft. Coordination for ballast and a Huffer was more difficult than [in our prior flight]. The company bottle did not work and we had to get [a contractor ground service] to come to the hangar with their Huffer. We finally got the left engine started. ACARS weight and balance transmission was non-functional (OSC issue) and complicating matters was the fact that the dispatcher calculated ballast required with 2 flight attendants on board - which we did not have. The door was closed by the time I realized this issue; so we requested the dispatcher recalculate and it was determined that we needed more sand bags. Again; to speed the process; we taxied the aircraft over to the gates area to pick up more sand.Finally taxiing to the runway; when the First Officer selected XFlow Auto Override to Manual; we received an XFlow pump failure. We stopped at the end of the runway and I conferred with Dispatch and Maintenance Control. We decided that it was deferrable and that we could continue with an entry in the [logs].Shortly after takeoff; the First Officer called for gear up. I grabbed the handle and it would not move. I pulled it out; I pulled it up - it would not move. Shortly thereafter; we received a 'WOW INPUT' caution message. I told the First Officer not to exceed 200 KTS and told ATC that we had a retraction issue; did not want to climb above 5000 FT and request box vectors around the airport. I ran the QRH checklist; but immediately stopped because it basically starts with 'Prior to landing...' I contacted the [company] and Maintenance Control confirmed no GEAR DISAGREE; then said talk to your dispatcher. Dispatcher and I agreed we did not have the fuel to fly to [our destination] with the gear down; so we should return [to the airport].The QRH references that nose wheel steering may be inoperative and brakes (anti-skid) may be an issue so I decided to [relay this information to ATC]. We were vectored around for an uneventful landing.The QRH was sequentially completed -multiple steps at multiple phases of flight; with some on the ground prior to shut down. With the engines shutdown back on the hangar ramp; maintenance began inspecting. After consulting with the Maintenance Diagnostics Computer; the proceeded to find a tests article in the nose wheel system. I don't know what it is / was; but they showed me a small 1 inch block of metal that they place on a WOW sensor to test the aircraft's systems. I have no idea where that sensor is - and I doubt the First Officer does either. In other words; there was no way we knew to look for that thing and the gear was not coming up with it there. I did verify three gear pins prior to accepting the aircraft. That test item was removed; the XFlow pump deferred and we finally flew home. Essentially 19+ hours in one workday.Landing gear that would not retract due to a maintenance oversight and a long day consisting of two duty periods were causes [that led up to this predicament].I'm sure procedures are in place for mechanics to capture this error; the same way we now confirm gear pins in the flight deck. I must say that the maintenance lead seemed kind of lax in his demeanor and was not very familiar with the aircraft (while on ground power; flight crew in the first class cabin and maintenance in flight deck; he had to ask us how much fuel was on the airplane).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.