Narrative:

After receiving 3 runway changes on taxi out we departed bdl on runway 24 with a clearance to 5000' and given a turn to 360 degrees. Somehow the flight guidance/altitude alerter unarmed itself but was detected by both pilots and corrected west/O incidence. First officer turned the autoplt off to correct the problem and hand flew the aircraft. Later I was accomplishing the after takeoff checklist and simultaneously received an amended route clearance and altitude change. The cockpit workload was at a maximum with the first officer hand-flying the aircraft and clearing visually airspace to be penetrated for both IFR and VFR traffic as I was accomplishing a checklist, copying an amended clearance and setting the altitude change in the altitude alerter. Because I was communicating with ZBW controller, the first officer looked to the altitude alerter for the newly assigned altitude. The alerter said, '15000,' and the first officer leveled at 15000'. The center controller called and claimed he assigned us 14000' and told us to descend and maintain 14000'. I acknowledged the new altitude assignment and the first officer hand-flew to the new altitude. Either the controller erred in initial assignment or the altitude alerter control knob (which must first be rotated, then pulled and then released) jumped a digit upon my release. Because of cockpit workload, at the precise time, the crew coordination of '100' to go' was not possible nor was it possible to acknowledge with the controller because he was transmitting to other aircraft. To prevent a recurrence, perhaps the aircraft manufacturer should look at the altitude alerter to see if it is a design flow that can malfunction from time to time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG ALT DEVIATION OVERSHOT DURING CLIMBOUT FROM BDL.

Narrative: AFTER RECEIVING 3 RWY CHANGES ON TAXI OUT WE DEPARTED BDL ON RWY 24 WITH A CLRNC TO 5000' AND GIVEN A TURN TO 360 DEGS. SOMEHOW THE FLT GUIDANCE/ALT ALERTER UNARMED ITSELF BUT WAS DETECTED BY BOTH PLTS AND CORRECTED W/O INCIDENCE. F/O TURNED THE AUTOPLT OFF TO CORRECT THE PROB AND HAND FLEW THE ACFT. LATER I WAS ACCOMPLISHING THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST AND SIMULTANEOUSLY RECEIVED AN AMENDED RTE CLRNC AND ALT CHANGE. THE COCKPIT WORKLOAD WAS AT A MAX WITH THE F/O HAND-FLYING THE ACFT AND CLRING VISUALLY AIRSPACE TO BE PENETRATED FOR BOTH IFR AND VFR TFC AS I WAS ACCOMPLISHING A CHKLIST, COPYING AN AMENDED CLRNC AND SETTING THE ALT CHANGE IN THE ALT ALERTER. BECAUSE I WAS COMMUNICATING WITH ZBW CTLR, THE F/O LOOKED TO THE ALT ALERTER FOR THE NEWLY ASSIGNED ALT. THE ALERTER SAID, '15000,' AND THE F/O LEVELED AT 15000'. THE CENTER CTLR CALLED AND CLAIMED HE ASSIGNED US 14000' AND TOLD US TO DSND AND MAINTAIN 14000'. I ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEW ALT ASSIGNMENT AND THE F/O HAND-FLEW TO THE NEW ALT. EITHER THE CTLR ERRED IN INITIAL ASSIGNMENT OR THE ALT ALERTER CTL KNOB (WHICH MUST FIRST BE ROTATED, THEN PULLED AND THEN RELEASED) JUMPED A DIGIT UPON MY RELEASE. BECAUSE OF COCKPIT WORKLOAD, AT THE PRECISE TIME, THE CREW COORD OF '100' TO GO' WAS NOT POSSIBLE NOR WAS IT POSSIBLE TO ACKNOWLEDGE WITH THE CTLR BECAUSE HE WAS XMITTING TO OTHER ACFT. TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE, PERHAPS THE ACFT MANUFACTURER SHOULD LOOK AT THE ALT ALERTER TO SEE IF IT IS A DESIGN FLOW THAT CAN MALFUNCTION FROM TIME TO TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.