Narrative:

Landed on runway 25L. Turned off onto taxiway 45 and was instructed to hold short of runway 25R, which we did. Was held in that position an unusually long time, through several crossing opportunities. The tower also held a commuter on taxiway 36, a widebody transport on 42, and another aircraft on 47. All of which landed after we did. At this point in time the controller cleared a light twin for takeoff on runway 25L, then cleared the commuter on 36, the widebody transport on 42, and us to cross runway 25R. As I was moving the power up on my engines I looked back to my right and saw the light twin on takeoff on runway 25L just crossing behind the widebody transport at a very low altitude, with his landing gear just coming up. I immediately brought me engines to idle but could not warn the widebody transport or the light twin because of frequency congestion. We moved forward across the 'hold line' for runway 25R, but were moving slowly because of the low power setting. By now the tower wanted to land air carrier Y on runway 25R and cancelled our crossing clearance. We advised him that we were stopped inside the hold line and he instructed us to back up. We rejected that request and he subsequently cleared air carrier Y to land on runway 25R in spite of the fact that we were well within the 'clear area'. I think that the primary problem area is lack of awareness of jet blast hazard to aircraft departing past aircraft turned off the active runway on the part of the tower personnel. I consider this and clearing an aircraft to land on a runway that is not clear constitutes a safety hazard. I called and reported my concern to the tower supervisor, advised him to flag the communications tape and that I would be filling out a report on the situation to my company. Footnote: approach control had assigned us a 200 KTS minimum speed assignment to the LOM. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information. Reporter stated he was instructed by the tower to expedite across runway. Other aircraft that had been cleared to cross at the same time as the reporter were across the runway. Reporter stated the tower supervisor was very unreceptive to his reason for not crossing the runway in an expeditious manner. Analyst agrees with tower supervisor. Reporter stated the small transport departing the runway behind him was departing from the approach end. Reporter was mindset and hostile when this analyst suggested that a jet blast would not be a factor for the small transport takeoff with 7000' to the point at which air carrier X was holding. Reporter stated he was holding short of the runway edge line when the air carrier Y landed. Reporter stated he did not like approach control assigning a speed to the OM and then the tower telling him to expedite off the runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR X FAILED TO COMPLY WITH ATC INSTRUCTIONS. PLTDEV. ACR YU CLEARED TO LAND WITH ACR X ACROSS RWY HOLD LINE. SYSTEM ERROR.

Narrative: LANDED ON RWY 25L. TURNED OFF ONTO TXWY 45 AND WAS INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 25R, WHICH WE DID. WAS HELD IN THAT POS AN UNUSUALLY LONG TIME, THROUGH SEVERAL XING OPPORTUNITIES. THE TWR ALSO HELD A COMMUTER ON TXWY 36, A WDB ON 42, AND ANOTHER ACFT ON 47. ALL OF WHICH LANDED AFTER WE DID. AT THIS POINT IN TIME THE CTLR CLRED A LIGHT TWIN FOR TKOF ON RWY 25L, THEN CLRED THE COMMUTER ON 36, THE WDB ON 42, AND US TO CROSS RWY 25R. AS I WAS MOVING THE PWR UP ON MY ENGS I LOOKED BACK TO MY R AND SAW THE LIGHT TWIN ON TKOF ON RWY 25L JUST XING BEHIND THE WDB AT A VERY LOW ALT, WITH HIS LNDG GEAR JUST COMING UP. I IMMEDIATELY BROUGHT ME ENGS TO IDLE BUT COULD NOT WARN THE WDB OR THE LIGHT TWIN BECAUSE OF FREQ CONGESTION. WE MOVED FORWARD ACROSS THE 'HOLD LINE' FOR RWY 25R, BUT WERE MOVING SLOWLY BECAUSE OF THE LOW PWR SETTING. BY NOW THE TWR WANTED TO LAND ACR Y ON RWY 25R AND CANCELLED OUR XING CLRNC. WE ADVISED HIM THAT WE WERE STOPPED INSIDE THE HOLD LINE AND HE INSTRUCTED US TO BACK UP. WE REJECTED THAT REQUEST AND HE SUBSEQUENTLY CLRED ACR Y TO LAND ON RWY 25R IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT WE WERE WELL WITHIN THE 'CLR AREA'. I THINK THAT THE PRIMARY PROB AREA IS LACK OF AWARENESS OF JET BLAST HAZARD TO ACFT DEPARTING PAST ACFT TURNED OFF THE ACTIVE RWY ON THE PART OF THE TWR PERSONNEL. I CONSIDER THIS AND CLRING AN ACFT TO LAND ON A RWY THAT IS NOT CLR CONSTITUTES A SAFETY HAZARD. I CALLED AND RPTED MY CONCERN TO THE TWR SUPVR, ADVISED HIM TO FLAG THE COMS TAPE AND THAT I WOULD BE FILLING OUT A RPT ON THE SITUATION TO MY COMPANY. FOOTNOTE: APCH CTL HAD ASSIGNED US A 200 KTS MINIMUM SPD ASSIGNMENT TO THE LOM. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO. RPTR STATED HE WAS INSTRUCTED BY THE TWR TO EXPEDITE ACROSS RWY. OTHER ACFT THAT HAD BEEN CLRED TO CROSS AT THE SAME TIME AS THE RPTR WERE ACROSS THE RWY. RPTR STATED THE TWR SUPVR WAS VERY UNRECEPTIVE TO HIS REASON FOR NOT XING THE RWY IN AN EXPEDITIOUS MANNER. ANALYST AGREES WITH TWR SUPVR. RPTR STATED THE SMT DEPARTING THE RWY BEHIND HIM WAS DEPARTING FROM THE APCH END. RPTR WAS MINDSET AND HOSTILE WHEN THIS ANALYST SUGGESTED THAT A JET BLAST WOULD NOT BE A FACTOR FOR THE SMT TKOF WITH 7000' TO THE POINT AT WHICH ACR X WAS HOLDING. RPTR STATED HE WAS HOLDING SHORT OF THE RWY EDGE LINE WHEN THE ACR Y LANDED. RPTR STATED HE DID NOT LIKE APCH CTL ASSIGNING A SPD TO THE OM AND THEN THE TWR TELLING HIM TO EXPEDITE OFF THE RWY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.