Narrative:

We were cleared for the ILS approach [runway] 08. During the landing roll out tower control cleared us to exit bravo and contact ground control. Once we realized we could not make bravo we continued to the next taxiway while crossing runway 15. (Lahso was not in effect nor are we permitted to accept the clearance per our sops.) we were instructed to exit D2 without delay due to a gulfstream on short final. We contacted ground control and were instructed to proceed via delta and hold short of taxiway alpha and then to hold short runway 15. We were then cleared to cross runway 15 and asked to call tower for a 'possible pilot deviation.' the first officer [and I] were perplexed as to what this request was about.after reaching the terminal I called the tower. The tower manager informed me that the tower controller had to cancel a takeoff clearance issued to a B737 on a line up and wait clearance on runway 15 after it had powered up. I explained to the tower manager that while I was on the landing rollout I was not able to respond quickly enough to inform the controller I was unable to make bravo; as my primary responsibility at the time was controlling the aircraft while on an active runway. He explained that I should not have accepted the clearance to make bravo and I agreed. He also explained that another aircraft was on short final and that they (ATC) had separation criteria on aircraft speed over specific land marks on final approach which they based aircraft separation on. Further; he explained I should not have accepted the taxi clearance if I could not comply. I agreed. Finally; he explained that 'we all learned from this scenario.' the possible outcome could have been disastrous had the B737 not been able to stop in time as we crossed runway 15 on the landing rollout.in hindsight; this scenario highlights a very thin margin for error regarding separation of landing aircraft during a very busy time at this airport; and the possible error on the controller's part. I agree with the controller's instruction to not accept a clearance if unable to comply. Another contributing factor was my lack of situational awareness of the aircraft in position for takeoff and the aircraft cleared to land on short final. Lastly; I believe the controller was rushed to keep things moving and subsequently should not have issued the takeoff clearance until our aircraft was clear of the intersecting runway and no conflict existed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PC 12 flight crew reported being unable to make the turnoff that ATC was planning; resulting in cancellation of takeoff clearance for a B737 in position on the crossing runway.

Narrative: We were cleared for the ILS approach [Runway] 08. During the landing roll out Tower Control cleared us to exit Bravo and contact Ground Control. Once we realized we could not make Bravo we continued to the next taxiway while crossing Runway 15. (LAHSO was not in effect nor are we permitted to accept the clearance per our SOPs.) We were instructed to exit D2 without delay due to a Gulfstream on short final. We contacted Ground Control and were instructed to proceed via Delta and hold short of taxiway Alpha and then to hold short Runway 15. We were then cleared to cross Runway 15 and asked to call Tower for a 'possible pilot deviation.' The First Officer [and I] were perplexed as to what this request was about.After reaching the terminal I called the Tower. The Tower manager informed me that the Tower Controller had to cancel a takeoff clearance issued to a B737 on a line up and wait clearance on Runway 15 after it had powered up. I explained to the Tower manager that while I was on the landing rollout I was not able to respond quickly enough to inform the Controller I was unable to make Bravo; as my primary responsibility at the time was controlling the aircraft while on an active runway. He explained that I should not have accepted the clearance to make Bravo and I agreed. He also explained that another aircraft was on short final and that they (ATC) had separation criteria on aircraft speed over specific land marks on final approach which they based aircraft separation on. Further; he explained I should not have accepted the taxi clearance if I could not comply. I agreed. Finally; he explained that 'we all learned from this scenario.' The possible outcome could have been disastrous had the B737 not been able to stop in time as we crossed Runway 15 on the landing rollout.In hindsight; this scenario highlights a very thin margin for error regarding separation of landing aircraft during a very busy time at this airport; and the possible error on the Controller's part. I agree with the Controller's instruction to not accept a clearance if unable to comply. Another contributing factor was my lack of situational awareness of the aircraft in position for takeoff and the aircraft cleared to land on short final. Lastly; I believe the Controller was rushed to keep things moving and subsequently should not have issued the takeoff clearance until our aircraft was clear of the intersecting runway and no conflict existed.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.