Narrative:

While on descent to rap, we were given the WX at the airport by ellsworth approach control. The winds indicated an approach to runway 14. We had anticipated a straight-in approach to runway 32 due to an earlier sequence report. Ellsworth approach gave us a vector heading and requested that we report the airport in sight for a visibility to runway 14. When we broke out of the overcast, I could see a rain shower just north of the airport. I told him that I did not want to make a visibility approach. The controller told us to maintain 6000' and gave us vectors for a VOR approach to runway 14. We went into heavy rain and cloud and we could no longer see the airport. We had not been cleared for the intercept nor cleared for the approach. The controller was talking to another aircraft. We were not able to contact him before passing through the approach course. At the first officer's questioning, we were given a heading to intercept the approach course, told to maintain 6000' until intercepting, and cleared for the approach. We intercepted the approach course, and started our descent. I was in the process of determining from the DME at the VOR whether the approach was going to work. As we began to exit the heavy rain and cloud, the first officer pointed out the runway off our nose. I could see the runway and the VASI which indicated that we were somewhat high as I had suspected that we would be. We continued toward the runway with reference to the VASI. As we came further out of the shower and cloud, things began to look right. The VOR course had moved off center, the ADF needle which I had tuned to the NDB for runway 32 was no longer pointing correctly and, as the visibility improved, I could see that the runway was wider and longer than at regional. Also, there were VASI's on both sides of the runway. We were approaching ellsworth. I called for and executed a missed approach. We requested radar vectors ack to the VOR approach course, flew the approach and landed at regional. I called regional tower on the telephone and discussed what had happened. He told me that the approach had been coordinated with ellsworth and that there had been no conflicts and no problems. In passing, he said that it is a relatively common occurrence when the VOR approach to runway 14 is utilized. This was the second to last leg of six days of flying which included 18 takeoffs and lndgs, several instrument approachs, holdings, gate holds, thunderstorm diversions, a few minor mechanical problems, and a FAA safety inspector on the jumpseat. All of these things are just part of the job and to be expected, but eventfully they do cause fatigue.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR MLG WRONG ARPT ALPCH.

Narrative: WHILE ON DSNT TO RAP, WE WERE GIVEN THE WX AT THE ARPT BY ELLSWORTH APCH CTL. THE WINDS INDICATED AN APCH TO RWY 14. WE HAD ANTICIPATED A STRAIGHT-IN APCH TO RWY 32 DUE TO AN EARLIER SEQUENCE RPT. ELLSWORTH APCH GAVE US A VECTOR HDG AND REQUESTED THAT WE RPT THE ARPT IN SIGHT FOR A VIS TO RWY 14. WHEN WE BROKE OUT OF THE OVCST, I COULD SEE A RAIN SHOWER JUST N OF THE ARPT. I TOLD HIM THAT I DID NOT WANT TO MAKE A VIS APCH. THE CTLR TOLD US TO MAINTAIN 6000' AND GAVE US VECTORS FOR A VOR APCH TO RWY 14. WE WENT INTO HVY RAIN AND CLOUD AND WE COULD NO LONGER SEE THE ARPT. WE HAD NOT BEEN CLRED FOR THE INTERCEPT NOR CLRED FOR THE APCH. THE CTLR WAS TALKING TO ANOTHER ACFT. WE WERE NOT ABLE TO CONTACT HIM BEFORE PASSING THROUGH THE APCH COURSE. AT THE F/O'S QUESTIONING, WE WERE GIVEN A HDG TO INTERCEPT THE APCH COURSE, TOLD TO MAINTAIN 6000' UNTIL INTERCEPTING, AND CLRED FOR THE APCH. WE INTERCEPTED THE APCH COURSE, AND STARTED OUR DSNT. I WAS IN THE PROCESS OF DETERMINING FROM THE DME AT THE VOR WHETHER THE APCH WAS GOING TO WORK. AS WE BEGAN TO EXIT THE HVY RAIN AND CLOUD, THE F/O POINTED OUT THE RWY OFF OUR NOSE. I COULD SEE THE RWY AND THE VASI WHICH INDICATED THAT WE WERE SOMEWHAT HIGH AS I HAD SUSPECTED THAT WE WOULD BE. WE CONTINUED TOWARD THE RWY WITH REFERENCE TO THE VASI. AS WE CAME FURTHER OUT OF THE SHOWER AND CLOUD, THINGS BEGAN TO LOOK RIGHT. THE VOR COURSE HAD MOVED OFF CTR, THE ADF NEEDLE WHICH I HAD TUNED TO THE NDB FOR RWY 32 WAS NO LONGER POINTING CORRECTLY AND, AS THE VISIBILITY IMPROVED, I COULD SEE THAT THE RWY WAS WIDER AND LONGER THAN AT REGIONAL. ALSO, THERE WERE VASI'S ON BOTH SIDES OF THE RWY. WE WERE APCHING ELLSWORTH. I CALLED FOR AND EXECUTED A MISSED APCH. WE REQUESTED RADAR VECTORS ACK TO THE VOR APCH COURSE, FLEW THE APCH AND LANDED AT REGIONAL. I CALLED REGIONAL TWR ON THE TELEPHONE AND DISCUSSED WHAT HAD HAPPENED. HE TOLD ME THAT THE APCH HAD BEEN COORDINATED WITH ELLSWORTH AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CONFLICTS AND NO PROBS. IN PASSING, HE SAID THAT IT IS A RELATIVELY COMMON OCCURRENCE WHEN THE VOR APCH TO RWY 14 IS UTILIZED. THIS WAS THE SECOND TO LAST LEG OF SIX DAYS OF FLYING WHICH INCLUDED 18 TKOFS AND LNDGS, SEVERAL INSTRUMENT APCHS, HOLDINGS, GATE HOLDS, TSTM DIVERSIONS, A FEW MINOR MECHANICAL PROBS, AND A FAA SAFETY INSPECTOR ON THE JUMPSEAT. ALL OF THESE THINGS ARE JUST PART OF THE JOB AND TO BE EXPECTED, BUT EVENTFULLY THEY DO CAUSE FATIGUE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.