Narrative:

During complex and busy traffic holding diverting and deviating northeast of atlanta. The aircraft in question diverted to knoxville after holding as long as it could. In the confusion that followed coordination between seven controllers only half the job was done. Radar information was passed to the controller whose airspace the aircraft was over but no verbal approval gained. The aircraft was descended into this sector west/O the necessary verbal approval. Several things can be attributed to this error. The controller that assumed prior approval was gained (me) witnessed another controller make the computer entry that sent a data block to the sector in question. Since normal operating practice is to call that sector and complete the task I assumed this was done. Prior to my assuming the duties of tracker (coordinator), I worked the radar (radios) position for 1 hour and 46 min. 3/4 of this time the sector was borderline saturated. Fatigue played a major role. The tmu unit (flow control) did little if nothing to relieve the situation (ie take aircraft off the busy northeast arrival to even the load at all 4 arrival fixs) the supervision in the area could have done more as an overseer with respect to flow control as well. Finally the controller whose airspace was violated could have been more cognizant of the sectors around him and helped out by calling us, there was no traffic involved. This touches on a very large problem in the FAA and that is mgmnts inability to promote professionalism and motivate the controller work force.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: UNAUTH UNCOORD PENETRATION OF AIRSPACE. OPDEV.

Narrative: DURING COMPLEX AND BUSY TFC HOLDING DIVERTING AND DEVIATING NE OF ATLANTA. THE ACFT IN QUESTION DIVERTED TO KNOXVILLE AFTER HOLDING AS LONG AS IT COULD. IN THE CONFUSION THAT FOLLOWED COORD BTWN SEVEN CTLRS ONLY HALF THE JOB WAS DONE. RADAR INFO WAS PASSED TO THE CTLR WHOSE AIRSPACE THE ACFT WAS OVER BUT NO VERBAL APPROVAL GAINED. THE ACFT WAS DSNDED INTO THIS SECTOR W/O THE NECESSARY VERBAL APPROVAL. SEVERAL THINGS CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THIS ERROR. THE CTLR THAT ASSUMED PRIOR APPROVAL WAS GAINED (ME) WITNESSED ANOTHER CTLR MAKE THE COMPUTER ENTRY THAT SENT A DATA BLOCK TO THE SECTOR IN QUESTION. SINCE NORMAL OPERATING PRACTICE IS TO CALL THAT SECTOR AND COMPLETE THE TASK I ASSUMED THIS WAS DONE. PRIOR TO MY ASSUMING THE DUTIES OF TRACKER (COORDINATOR), I WORKED THE RADAR (RADIOS) POS FOR 1 HR AND 46 MIN. 3/4 OF THIS TIME THE SECTOR WAS BORDERLINE SATURATED. FATIGUE PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE. THE TMU UNIT (FLOW CTL) DID LITTLE IF NOTHING TO RELIEVE THE SITUATION (IE TAKE ACFT OFF THE BUSY NE ARR TO EVEN THE LOAD AT ALL 4 ARR FIXS) THE SUPERVISION IN THE AREA COULD HAVE DONE MORE AS AN OVERSEER WITH RESPECT TO FLOW CTL AS WELL. FINALLY THE CTLR WHOSE AIRSPACE WAS VIOLATED COULD HAVE BEEN MORE COGNIZANT OF THE SECTORS AROUND HIM AND HELPED OUT BY CALLING US, THERE WAS NO TFC INVOLVED. THIS TOUCHES ON A VERY LARGE PROB IN THE FAA AND THAT IS MGMNTS INABILITY TO PROMOTE PROFESSIONALISM AND MOTIVATE THE CTLR WORK FORCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.