Narrative:

The crew made a collective decision after much deliberation and consideration with local maintenance and the inbound crew not operate the aircraft with a bleed secured closed or open on the ETOPS segment. When we were departing the hotel; we met the inbound crew that described to us the events they encountered on the inbound leg.shortly after coasting out; they received an EICAS caution message bleed loss wing right. After dealing with that; the crew received a bleed leak body. They were at FL370. They considered lower altitude; the pressurization was stable and there was traffic below them. They decided to continue with the right bleed system inoperative. The captain; a line check airman; further discussed all the limitations with the bleed leak body. Right bleed already inoperative and now center bleed system isolated. There are many considerations especially pressurization and go-around limitations on performance. This was very informative. On the way to the airport; we as a crew conference called maintenance control and dispatch to further gain insight into what the problem was and what would be done to fix the situation.we were on speakerphone with maintenance control and he informed us he had not heard about the situation and had just took over the desk. He then looked up the history and told us the crew that the maintenance had been performed and signed off. I asked what had been done and why the problem was that caused it. He informed us the main duct clamp had probably vibrated loose causing the main duct to come off. Maintenance reattached and secured the duct and signed it off. He went on to tell us that vibrations cause clamps to loosen and duct to 'come off all the time'; to which I stated it has never happened to me in over 32 years of flying. He referred us to speak to local maintenance and they could fill us in further. My other crewmembers had other questions such as what resets were performed and checks. We decided it would be more productive to speak with local maintenance manager. We discussed the situation with local maintenance manager. They too were curious and concerned as to why the clamp would just loosen. They did reattach the duct; secure the clamp; and sign the items off. The flight crew was now cautious about the situation.we pushed back and started engines. The right bleed did not open after engine start causing an engine bleed off right caution to display. Maintenance control was contacted as we were off the gate. We asked for direction and maintenance control told us to return to the gate. Local maintenance manager came onboard and we all discussed what to do. We considered the history; and what the inbound crew had experienced. Maintenance control asked us to perform and idle engine run to see if the bleed would come on. We agreed and with the maintenance manager and our crew; we followed the idle engine run procedure.at idle the bleed would not open. Maintenance asked us to cycle the bleed switch and we did. The bleed opens up no air came out. Maintenance [then] asked us to reset the pack; we did and then the pack drew a load form the bleed. We shut down and discussed with maintenance control what happened. We collectively decided to restart the engine and see if the bleed would operate normally and it failed to open again. We shut down the engine. After much discussion; maintenance control; maintenance manager and our flight crew decided the run failed. Maintenance control determined that sensors were either failed or corroded. [Our] options were discussed. 1. Lock the bleed right closed or 2. Lock the high pressure valve open. Neither option were acceptable due to the ETOPS segment. Neither option made us comfortable as the aircraft had history inbound. If we shut down the bleed we would have only one bleed source; if we locked open and a duct came off again we would not be able to shut it off.the first officers and I discussed these situations; history; and took into account the inbound debrief by [the] captain. We decided we were uncomfortable taking the aircraft in its current state on an ETOPS segment; local maintenance manager did not like either option. My crew had a collective 80-plus years flying experience; [and] I respected their opinion and expertise. We enlisted chief pilot into the conversation. Our decision was based on the flight crews experience and we were not comfortable taking the aircraft on an ETOPS segment. After further discussion; it was decided to take the aircraft to an airport for maintenance; where parts and manpower were available. The flight continued without further incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Boeing 777 Captain reported that the Right Hand Bleed was inoperative and EICAS indicated a 'BLEED LEAK BODY'.

Narrative: The crew made a collective decision after much deliberation and consideration with local maintenance and the inbound crew not operate the aircraft with a bleed secured closed or open on the ETOPS segment. When we were departing the hotel; we met the inbound crew that described to us the events they encountered on the inbound leg.Shortly after coasting out; they received an EICAS caution message BLEED LOSS WING R. After dealing with that; the crew received a BLEED LEAK BODY. They were at FL370. They considered lower altitude; the pressurization was stable and there was traffic below them. They decided to continue with the R BLEED system inoperative. The Captain; a Line Check Airman; further discussed all the limitations with the BLEED LEAK BODY. Right Bleed already INOPERATIVE and now CENTER bleed system ISOLATED. There are many considerations especially pressurization and go-around limitations on performance. This was very informative. On the way to the airport; we as a crew conference called Maintenance Control and Dispatch to further gain insight into what the problem was and what would be done to fix the situation.We were on speakerphone with Maintenance Control and he informed us he had not heard about the situation and had just took over the desk. He then looked up the history and told us the crew that the maintenance had been performed and signed off. I asked what had been done and why the problem was that caused it. He informed us the main duct clamp had probably vibrated loose causing the main duct to come off. Maintenance reattached and secured the duct and signed it off. He went on to tell us that vibrations cause clamps to loosen and duct to 'come off all the time'; to which I stated it has never happened to me in over 32 years of flying. He referred us to speak to Local Maintenance and they could fill us in further. My other crewmembers had other questions such as what resets were performed and checks. We decided it would be more productive to speak with Local Maintenance Manager. We discussed the situation with Local Maintenance Manager. They too were curious and concerned as to why the clamp would just loosen. They did reattach the duct; secure the clamp; and sign the items off. The flight crew was now cautious about the situation.We pushed back and started engines. The right bleed did not open after engine start causing an ENG BLEED OFF R caution to display. Maintenance Control was contacted as we were off the gate. We asked for direction and Maintenance Control told us to return to the gate. Local Maintenance Manager came onboard and we all discussed what to do. We considered the history; and what the inbound crew had experienced. Maintenance Control asked us to perform and idle engine run to see if the bleed would come on. We agreed and with the Maintenance Manager and our crew; we followed the idle engine run procedure.At idle the bleed would not open. Maintenance asked us to cycle the bleed switch and we did. The bleed opens up no air came out. Maintenance [then] asked us to reset the pack; we did and then the pack drew a load form the bleed. We shut down and discussed with Maintenance Control what happened. We collectively decided to restart the engine and see if the bleed would operate normally and it failed to open again. We shut down the engine. After much discussion; Maintenance Control; Maintenance Manager and our flight crew decided the run failed. Maintenance Control determined that sensors were either failed or corroded. [Our] Options were discussed. 1. Lock the bleed R closed or 2. Lock the High Pressure valve open. Neither option were acceptable due to the ETOPS segment. Neither option made us comfortable as the aircraft had history inbound. If we shut down the Bleed we would have only one bleed source; if we locked open and a duct came off again we would not be able to shut it off.The First officers and I discussed these situations; history; and took into account the inbound debrief by [the] Captain. We decided we were uncomfortable taking the aircraft in its current state on an ETOPS segment; Local Maintenance Manager did not like either option. My crew had a collective 80-plus years flying experience; [and] I respected their opinion and expertise. We enlisted Chief Pilot into the conversation. Our decision was based on the flight crews experience and we were NOT COMFORTABLE taking the aircraft on an ETOPS segment. After further discussion; it was decided to take the aircraft to an Airport for Maintenance; where parts and manpower were available. The flight continued without further incident.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.