Narrative:

The morning in lrd started with an aircraft (emb 135) with an APU on MEL. The ca notified the gate agent that we would need an air start. When it came time to push back they said they didn't have external air to help us get the engine started. After some time; they were able to find one from the [other company] operations and borrow it but it needed to be charged up with a certain psi before use and they had to find a ramp worker who was certified to work it. With the aircraft door closed we waited 1 hour and 20 mins before we got the engine started. During this time the visibility was increasing from 1 SM to 2 SM and the tower was still closed. I made the appropriate traffic calls on the CTAF and we pushed back; taxied to the runway and holding short I called houston center for clearance and release. When I called he said that the tower in laredo was open and I should just call them. The ca and I were immediately concerned that we may have taxied without clearance. But; upon verifying on our charts; we had briefed it correctly; so the controller was mistaken. I called center back and got our release. We had briefed the potential threats well in the airspace; proximity to the mexican border and the crew communication in general was very good. We discussed and verified the runway several times since our charts and the paint on the pavement called it 18L while the runway signs still said 17L. We departed; climbed out and the flight continued. On the way to ZZZ it was pretty bumpy with turbulence and we changed altitudes looking for a better ride and flew slower (maximum 280 kts). I remember thinking the aircraft was pretty loud. I thought that I don't fly the 135 that often so; it must be that the engines are a little closer or the aerodynamics are different (the ca and I are both based elsewhere and although we are both relatively senior; we don't fly the 135s as often). On descent into ZZZ when the ca called for flaps 9; I looked down and realized that the flaps were at 9 already and we had flown the whole flight with them down. We had not realized we did not complete the after takeoff checklist. We continued the flight and reported the incident to maintenance and wrote it up in the logbook. There were several threats. We had already had a few events that morning with the air start problems in laredo; the marginal weather; proximity to the mexico border and departing to the south; potential miscommunication with center; tower being closed; the very early morning wakeup call and the runway signage reading both 17L and 18L referring to the same runway. Even though throughout the rest of this trip; this ca and I had great communication; efficiency; and in general we worked very well together. But; this one time we failed to manage the situation and a mistake was made on both our parts. When he did not call for the after takeoff checklist; I should have been ready with it anyway. When I felt the noise level in cruise was higher than normal; I should have verbalized it to the ca. Turns out; we both had similar thinking and if we would have discussed it out loud; we may have detected the error sooner. I felt like we were going slowly because we knew we were in a high threat situation with all the abnormal happenings that morning. I did not feel rushed. We were both working hard and actively engaged in everything that was going on. But; even though we weren't feeling rushed; we still made errors in managing the situation and errors in communication by not discussing it more in flight when we both noticed abnormalities. I may have been quieter and less likely to speak up than normal because it was so early. I was drinking my coffee and am not as talkative in cruise that early in the morning.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-135 flight crew reported failure to retract the flaps after takeoff due to distractions on departure. They flew the whole flight with the flaps partially down.

Narrative: The morning in LRD started with an aircraft (EMB 135) with an APU on MEL. The CA notified the gate agent that we would need an air start. When it came time to push back they said they didn't have external air to help us get the engine started. After some time; they were able to find one from the [other Company] operations and borrow it but it needed to be charged up with a certain PSI before use and they had to find a ramp worker who was certified to work it. With the aircraft door closed we waited 1 hour and 20 mins before we got the engine started. During this time the visibility was increasing from 1 SM to 2 SM and the tower was still closed. I made the appropriate traffic calls on the CTAF and we pushed back; taxied to the runway and holding short I called Houston Center for clearance and release. When I called he said that the tower in Laredo was open and I should just call them. The CA and I were immediately concerned that we may have taxied without clearance. But; upon verifying on our charts; we had briefed it correctly; so the controller was mistaken. I called center back and got our release. We had briefed the potential threats well in the airspace; proximity to the Mexican border and the crew communication in general was very good. We discussed and verified the runway several times since our charts and the paint on the pavement called it 18L while the runway signs still said 17L. We departed; climbed out and the flight continued. On the way to ZZZ it was pretty bumpy with turbulence and we changed altitudes looking for a better ride and flew slower (maximum 280 kts). I remember thinking the aircraft was pretty loud. I thought that I don't fly the 135 that often so; it must be that the engines are a little closer or the aerodynamics are different (The CA and I are both based elsewhere and although we are both relatively senior; we don't fly the 135s as often). On descent into ZZZ when the CA called for flaps 9; I looked down and realized that the flaps were at 9 already and we had flown the whole flight with them down. We had not realized we did not complete the after takeoff checklist. We continued the flight and reported the incident to maintenance and wrote it up in the logbook. There were several threats. We had already had a few events that morning with the air start problems in Laredo; the marginal weather; proximity to the Mexico border and departing to the south; potential miscommunication with Center; Tower being closed; the very early morning wakeup call and the runway signage reading both 17L and 18L referring to the same runway. Even though throughout the rest of this trip; this CA and I had great communication; efficiency; and in general we worked very well together. But; this one time we failed to manage the situation and a mistake was made on both our parts. When he did not call for the after takeoff checklist; I should have been ready with it anyway. When I felt the noise level in cruise was higher than normal; I should have verbalized it to the CA. Turns out; we both had similar thinking and if we would have discussed it out loud; we may have detected the error sooner. I felt like we were going slowly because we knew we were in a high threat situation with all the abnormal happenings that morning. I did not feel rushed. We were both working hard and actively engaged in everything that was going on. But; even though we weren't feeling rushed; we still made errors in managing the situation and errors in communication by not discussing it more in flight when we both noticed abnormalities. I may have been quieter and less likely to speak up than normal because it was so early. I was drinking my coffee and am not as talkative in cruise that early in the morning.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.