Narrative:

I reached out to aircraft X who was switched to my new tower frequency. The student pilot acknowledged he was on frequency and I gave him instructions to make a right turn after landing; and to 'change to runway 30L cleared to land.' the reason for the right turn was to protect for helicopter traffic operating on the taxiway to the left of runway 30L. I believe the pilot read back my instructions correctly.I turned my scan to check the position of the helicopter and the other fixed wing aircraft in my pattern and began to sequence the fixed wing aircraft to follow aircraft X. As I issued the position of aircraft X as being '1/2 mile final;' I realized something was wrong because aircraft X did not appear in the right position. I suddenly realized he was touching down on runway 30R and alerted the other controller. The local 1 controller immediately sent around jet traffic on final for runway 30R and the pilot made the go around prior to the runway threshold. The instructor in aircraft X began asking if he was cleared for a touch-and-go; to which I responded that it appeared he landed on runway 30R; to cancel his takeoff; and to exit at taxiway B and advise ground control of his intentions. The instructor acknowledged. Aircraft X called once again to request taxi clearance; and I coordinated with ground control to taxi him; issuing him the brasher warning. The instructor acknowledged; said he'd switch to ground control. I continued to scramble on local 2 to receive additional aircraft that were shipped to me for arrival to runway 30L; along with doing my best to provide watch supervision as the controller in charge (controller in charge). The controller in training at ground control helped me with some of the watch supervision tasks; such as handling internal and outside calls to the tower cab. Later on; the pilot called the facility promptly and was transferred to personnel downstairs to discuss the event. He was reportedly very apologetic and seemed well aware of the wrong runway landing. The other controller that took his call advised they had a positive and productive conversation. This event took place during a busy rush with high volume and complexity and was a 'squeeze play' to get aircraft X across the local 1 final. Controller expectation bias played a role here; as I watched the aircraft appear to cross the runway 30R final before I turned my attention to the other aircraft in my pattern. In my scan; I did not see in time that the aircraft instead lined up for the wrong runway. Local 1's awareness and swift action was commendable in response to the event. I believe the lesson here is continue to stay vigilant and keep scanning and watching for things that may be out of place. Pilot expectation bias may have also occurred here; as the aircraft was originally sequenced to runway 30R and then changed over to runway 30L. Being issued a new tower frequency on the base leg can definitely increase the pilot's workload at a critical time and it might be more desirable to have the aircraft remain on downwind while making that frequency change in the future; if feasible. In fact; there is a work group reviewing these kinds of issues right now. The work group is expected to develop some best practices for the use of local 2 and more standardized procedures to issue frequency changes and split the two local positions. I have provided some input to date and eagerly await their findings. In the long run; their work will help provide a more standardized and less chaotic approach to splitting our locals; which should ultimately enhance safety of the operation.additional staffing that afternoon; even one more controller; would have allowed the controller in charge/supervisor position to be worked stand alone in the cab; split from local 2. During good weather our traffic numbers should reflect that on this day; afternoon rush is fairly common. Having an additional set of eyes in the cab might have spotted aircraft X line up for the wrong runwaysooner; allowing faster corrective action to be taken. Traffic is up significantly in recent months; yet we are continuing to work many shifts with limited staffing or where the supervisor and/or controllers in training are used for coverage. Better staffing and/or watch supervision in the future would help ensure improved oversight of the operation during peak traffic periods and should also help ensure we have the resources to effectively train our newer controllers.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BJC Controller in Charge (CIC) was also working Local Control did not notice that an arriving aircraft was aligned to land on the wrong runway.

Narrative: I reached out to Aircraft X who was switched to my new tower frequency. The student pilot acknowledged he was on frequency and I gave him instructions to make a right turn after landing; and to 'change to Runway 30L cleared to land.' The reason for the right turn was to protect for helicopter traffic operating on the taxiway to the left of Runway 30L. I believe the pilot read back my instructions correctly.I turned my scan to check the position of the helicopter and the other fixed wing aircraft in my pattern and began to sequence the fixed wing aircraft to follow Aircraft X. As I issued the position of Aircraft X as being '1/2 mile final;' I realized something was wrong because Aircraft X did not appear in the right position. I suddenly realized he was touching down on Runway 30R and alerted the other controller. The Local 1 controller immediately sent around jet traffic on final for Runway 30R and the pilot made the go around prior to the runway threshold. The instructor in Aircraft X began asking if he was cleared for a touch-and-go; to which I responded that it appeared he landed on Runway 30R; to cancel his takeoff; and to exit at Taxiway B and advise Ground Control of his intentions. The instructor acknowledged. Aircraft X called once again to request taxi clearance; and I coordinated with Ground Control to taxi him; issuing him the Brasher warning. The instructor acknowledged; said he'd switch to Ground Control. I continued to scramble on Local 2 to receive additional aircraft that were shipped to me for arrival to Runway 30L; along with doing my best to provide watch supervision as the CIC (Controller in Charge). The controller in training at Ground control helped me with some of the watch supervision tasks; such as handling internal and outside calls to the tower cab. Later on; the pilot called the facility promptly and was transferred to personnel downstairs to discuss the event. He was reportedly very apologetic and seemed well aware of the wrong runway landing. The other controller that took his call advised they had a positive and productive conversation. This event took place during a busy rush with high volume and complexity and was a 'squeeze play' to get Aircraft X across the Local 1 final. Controller expectation bias played a role here; as I watched the aircraft appear to cross the Runway 30R final before I turned my attention to the other aircraft in my pattern. In my scan; I did not see in time that the aircraft instead lined up for the wrong runway. Local 1's awareness and swift action was commendable in response to the event. I believe the lesson here is continue to stay vigilant and keep scanning and watching for things that may be out of place. Pilot expectation bias may have also occurred here; as the aircraft was originally sequenced to Runway 30R and then changed over to Runway 30L. Being issued a new tower frequency on the base leg can definitely increase the pilot's workload at a critical time and it might be more desirable to have the aircraft remain on downwind while making that frequency change in the future; if feasible. In fact; there is a work group reviewing these kinds of issues right now. The work group is expected to develop some best practices for the use of Local 2 and more standardized procedures to issue frequency changes and split the two Local positions. I have provided some input to date and eagerly await their findings. In the long run; their work will help provide a more standardized and less chaotic approach to splitting our Locals; which should ultimately enhance safety of the operation.Additional staffing that afternoon; even one more controller; would have allowed the CIC/Supervisor position to be worked stand alone in the cab; split from Local 2. During good weather our traffic numbers should reflect that on this day; afternoon rush is fairly common. Having an additional set of eyes in the cab might have spotted Aircraft X line up for the wrong runwaysooner; allowing faster corrective action to be taken. Traffic is up significantly in recent months; yet we are continuing to work many shifts with limited staffing or where the Supervisor and/or controllers in training are used for coverage. Better staffing and/or watch supervision in the future would help ensure improved oversight of the operation during peak traffic periods and should also help ensure we have the resources to effectively train our newer controllers.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.