Narrative:

This trip began as a three pilot crew. All 3 members of the crew had never flown together. The captain was pilot flying (PF) and I was the pilot monitoring (pm) and the international relief officer. The pm and international relief officer met at the briefing room 1:40 prior to departure and reviewed the paperwork waiting for the captain to arrive. At 1 hour prior to departure; we proceeded to the aircraft across the hall and began our duties. The international relief officer called operations via the agents to find the captain's location at about 50 minutes and the captain arrived inside 40 minutes during boarding. He gave a quick brief to the flight attendants (fas) while settling in and proceeded to tell stories of his upcoming retirement. A quick brief of the departure and card items was accomplished and the checklist where completed.we taxied to the runway for departure without issue and were cleared for takeoff. Upon rotation; a le slat asym EICAS message flashed for a second and then disappeared. Climbing through 200 feet without flap/slat movement it did it again to which I commented that's weird and the international relief officer stated 'yeah'. As the PF began his turn to heading 190 he called flaps 1 with a positive trend vector to flap speed; the pm received the tower handoff to departure. At approximately 1000 feet; another le flap asym EICAS message appeared and disappeared during the pm radio call to departure then the stick shaker activated. The pm called airspeed and the PF called out we are overspeeding and pulled back on the yoke. The PF disconnected the autothrottles and pulled power back while pulling nose up. The international relief officer called stick forward; the pm placed his hand on the yoke pushing forward and putting hand under the PF's on the thrust while the PF advanced the power to max power regaining his situational awareness of our shaker stall event versus an overspeed. The PF began to call for flaps up not paying attention to being slow; the pm did not comply saying airspeed; and we need at accelerate in order to retract flaps. The PF again commanded flaps up without compliance from the pm who called airspeed again when the international relief officer stated very forcefully we are below flap speed; we need to accelerate to configure. The international relief officer's loud verbalization gained the attention of the PF and he began to be receptive of the pm and international relief officer's verbalization and actions to regain aircraft control. The aircraft was stabilized and accelerated to climb speed without further incident. The international relief officer stayed on the flight deck until leveling at initial cruise altitude.once the international relief officer departed for crew rest; the PF made continuous comments about why the aircraft was overspeeding during climb out and that was the reason for pitch up and power reduction. In fact all the international relief officer and pm were able to see was decreasing airspeed and increasing pitch while the PF called overspeed ignoring the stick shaker and misinterpreting the red low speed hash on the airspeed tape. The PF lost complete situational awareness of the event; it took both the pm; and international relief officer to bring him back [to] reality while recovering the aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 flight crew reported an early flap retraction resulting in a stick shaker followed by poor CRM during the event.

Narrative: This trip began as a three pilot crew. ALL 3 members of the crew had never flown together. The Captain was Pilot Flying (PF) and I was the pilot Monitoring (PM) and the IRO. The PM and IRO met at the briefing room 1:40 prior to departure and reviewed the paperwork waiting for the Captain to arrive. At 1 hour prior to departure; we proceeded to the aircraft across the hall and began our duties. The IRO called operations via the agents to find the Captain's location at about 50 minutes and the Captain arrived inside 40 minutes during boarding. He gave a quick brief to the Flight Attendants (FAs) while settling in and proceeded to tell stories of his upcoming retirement. A quick brief of the departure and card items was accomplished and the checklist where completed.We taxied to the runway for departure without issue and were cleared for takeoff. Upon rotation; a LE SLAT ASYM EICAS MSG flashed for a second and then disappeared. Climbing through 200 feet without flap/slat movement it did it again to which I commented that's weird and the IRO stated 'yeah'. As the PF began his turn to heading 190 he called flaps 1 with a positive trend vector to flap speed; the PM received the tower handoff to departure. At approximately 1000 feet; another LE Flap ASYM EICAS MSG appeared and disappeared during the PM radio call to departure then the stick shaker activated. The PM called airspeed and the PF called out we are overspeeding and pulled back on the yoke. The PF disconnected the Autothrottles and pulled power back while pulling nose up. The IRO CALLED STICK FORWARD; the PM placed his hand on the yoke pushing forward and putting hand under the PF's on the thrust while the PF advanced the power to Max power regaining his Situational Awareness of our shaker stall event versus an overspeed. The PF began to call for flaps up not paying attention to being slow; the PM did not comply saying airspeed; and we need at accelerate in order to retract flaps. The PF again commanded flaps up without compliance from the PM who called AIRSPEED again when the IRO stated very forcefully we are below flap speed; we need to accelerate to configure. The IRO's loud verbalization gained the attention of the PF and he began to be receptive of the PM and IRO's verbalization and actions to regain aircraft control. The aircraft was stabilized and accelerated to climb speed without further incident. The IRO stayed on the Flight Deck until leveling at initial cruise altitude.Once the IRO departed for crew rest; the PF made continuous comments about why the aircraft was overspeeding during climb out and that was the reason for pitch up and power reduction. In fact all the IRO and PM were able to see was decreasing airspeed and increasing pitch while the PF called overspeed ignoring the stick shaker and misinterpreting the red low speed hash on the airspeed tape. The PF lost complete Situational Awareness of the event; it took both the PM; and IRO to bring him back [to] reality while recovering the aircraft.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.