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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1521055 |
Time | |
Date | 201802 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Cessna Stationair/Turbo Stationair 7/8 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 135 |
Flight Phase | Landing |
Person 1 | |
Function | Check Pilot Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Flight Instructor Flight Crew Commercial Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Multiengine |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 110 Flight Crew Total 1500 Flight Crew Type 350 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence |
Narrative:
I was on a ride as a company instructor with a line pilot to ZZZ who had not experienced large westerly wind conditions. We had two passengers from ZZZ1 to ZZZ. The pilot was landing 30 at ZZZ with a westerly wind. We caught a sinker (downdraft) on final; about 50 feet up off the runway. In my opinion; a stabilized approach could have been maintained by adding slight and brief increase in throttle to arrest the effect of the downdraft. The pilot elected to go full throttle and initiate a go-around. We did not catch any downdrafts during the go-around. I was watching the winds on the approach; and winds at the surface appeared to be about 15 knots out of the west (quartering headwind for 30); and the wind socks were remaining steady. I noticed a few errors during the pilot's approach such as getting too low during the base leg and being overly aggressive on throttle adjustments to counter up and down drafts. I have operated hundreds of times in that same wind condition safely; I believed a safe approach could be made; and therefore wanted to attempt the approach. I made a stabilized approach to 30; but upon touching down; got a large wind gust that got the airplane slightly airborne again. I cushioned the landing with a little throttle and set the airplane back down again with plenty of runway remaining. I saw the far wind sock snap like a whip; and another wind gust hit and we became airborne a second time momentarily; but then quickly subsided; and the airplane settled to the ground a third time. At this point the airplane ground speed was low; but was still wanting to fly due to the increased headwind gusts I was experiencing; even at idle power. I saw the wind sock snap again as another gust came down the runway. I had a little over 1000 feet of runway remaining (out of 2;000 feet; and runway stopping distance became in doubt. I initiated a go-around. While the go-around turned out fine; if any downdrafts had occurred; the obstacles at the far end of the runway would have been too close for comfort. I recently helped develop a new company SOP; that is in the process of being codified; about not trying an approach again if a go-around was initiated due to weather conditions. I believed that the first approach could have been made; but lack of pilot experience in that particular weather condition compounded with lower time in make/model of aircraft was a contributing factor.I erred in the decision to attempt the approach again. The weather was dynamic; and conditions at the surface were worse than they had appeared on the first approach. I stand by the SOP that was made; and even if there is a more experienced pilot on board; the approach should not be made again; unless on an actual training flight. If a pilot has not experienced a particular weather condition; it is best to make a training flight for that flight; not just ride along like in an initial operating experience scenario. Other contributing factors: it's been more than a month since I had flown from the right seat. Proficiency may have been a factor. Mitigations: the company [weather briefing] was showing wsw winds from 15-19 during the time that the flight risk was assessed. [The local] forecast was showing winds up to 30kts out of the west for the day. However; we had not seen winds that strong at that point. Another weather tool was showing winds less than 20 at the surface; but in the low 20s at 300 feet. The ZZZ flight winds were risk assessed at 20-24 kts out of the west; giving a 'release approval required' in the flight operations management system from the do (director of operations) or cp (chief pilot). Release approval was granted. As a mitigation; I decided to fly with the pilot. Upon return to the home airport; after a review of the [off site weather station data]; winds were recorded as gusting into the low 30s from the west. I believe that this data would have been a better indicator of current conditions at ZZZ than the forecastmodels that we were using. In the future; I will be diligent about checking the [off site weather data] to help prevent this same scenario from occurring. Anything above 30 showing out of the west will most likely make ZZZ unsatisfactory for operations. This can be added specifically to the wind training for new hires.other mitigation: I debriefed with the left seat pilot; who gained a better understanding of westerly wind operations at ZZZ.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: Instructor Pilot of an air taxi operation reported attempting to land in windy conditions.
Narrative: I was on a ride as a company instructor with a line pilot to ZZZ who had not experienced large westerly wind conditions. We had two passengers from ZZZ1 to ZZZ. The pilot was landing 30 at ZZZ with a westerly wind. We caught a sinker (downdraft) on final; about 50 feet up off the runway. In my opinion; a stabilized approach could have been maintained by adding slight and brief increase in throttle to arrest the effect of the downdraft. The pilot elected to go full throttle and initiate a go-around. We did not catch any downdrafts during the go-around. I was watching the winds on the approach; and winds at the surface appeared to be about 15 knots out of the west (quartering headwind for 30); and the wind socks were remaining steady. I noticed a few errors during the pilot's approach such as getting too low during the base leg and being overly aggressive on throttle adjustments to counter up and down drafts. I have operated hundreds of times in that same wind condition safely; I believed a safe approach could be made; and therefore wanted to attempt the approach. I made a stabilized approach to 30; but upon touching down; got a large wind gust that got the airplane slightly airborne again. I cushioned the landing with a little throttle and set the airplane back down again with plenty of runway remaining. I saw the far wind sock snap like a whip; and another wind gust hit and we became airborne a second time momentarily; but then quickly subsided; and the airplane settled to the ground a third time. At this point the airplane ground speed was low; but was still wanting to fly due to the increased headwind gusts I was experiencing; even at idle power. I saw the wind sock snap again as another gust came down the runway. I had a little over 1000 feet of runway remaining (out of 2;000 feet; and runway stopping distance became in doubt. I initiated a go-around. While the go-around turned out fine; if any downdrafts had occurred; the obstacles at the far end of the runway would have been too close for comfort. I recently helped develop a new company SOP; that is in the process of being codified; about not trying an approach again if a go-around was initiated due to weather conditions. I believed that the first approach could have been made; but lack of pilot experience in that particular weather condition compounded with lower time in make/model of aircraft was a contributing factor.I erred in the decision to attempt the approach again. The weather was dynamic; and conditions at the surface were worse than they had appeared on the first approach. I stand by the SOP that was made; and even if there is a more experienced pilot on board; the approach should not be made again; unless on an actual training flight. If a pilot has not experienced a particular weather condition; it is best to make a training flight for that flight; not just ride along like in an Initial Operating Experience scenario. Other contributing factors: it's been more than a month since I had flown from the right seat. Proficiency may have been a factor. Mitigations: The Company [weather briefing] was showing WSW winds from 15-19 during the time that the flight risk was assessed. [The local] forecast was showing winds up to 30kts out of the west for the day. However; we had not seen winds that strong at that point. Another weather tool was showing winds less than 20 at the surface; but in the low 20s at 300 feet. The ZZZ flight winds were risk assessed at 20-24 kts out of the west; giving a 'release approval required' in the Flight Operations Management System from the DO (Director of Operations) or CP (Chief Pilot). Release approval was granted. As a mitigation; I decided to fly with the pilot. Upon return to the home airport; after a review of the [off site weather station data]; winds were recorded as gusting into the low 30s from the west. I believe that this data would have been a better indicator of current conditions at ZZZ than the forecastmodels that we were using. In the future; I will be diligent about checking the [off site weather data] to help prevent this same scenario from occurring. Anything above 30 showing out of the west will most likely make ZZZ unsatisfactory for operations. This can be added specifically to the wind training for new hires.Other mitigation: I debriefed with the left seat pilot; who gained a better understanding of westerly wind operations at ZZZ.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.