Narrative:

The flight went normally until just prior to karoo. The controller had told us to descend via the rdu KAROO1 and expect runway 23R per the most recent ATIS; which I believe was M. The winds were listed as 360 @ 11 kts; which was in my mind a signal that we would eventually get a runway change unless the winds changed. Switching to raleigh durham approach; I heard ATC inform another flight that ATIS north was now out. I asked the first officer to get north and he did while checking in with approach that we were descending through 14000' via the KAROO1. The new ATIS said the winds were 360 @ 6 kts and the first officer started that the approach speed didn't change. Neither of us looked at the runway change as we had already been told by the previous controller to expect 23R...we should have checked. There was no response from the controller. The frequency was congested for a minute and the first officer tried again informing the controller that we were now descending 11000' for 10000' on the KAROO1. The controller started to call us company Y; but corrected himself and told us to 'expect 5R'. We were about halfway between argal and karoo at this point with less than a minute to get the new transition set up. The first officer set to work putting the new transition in while I looked at the STAR and waited for him to finish so we could check it. I checked that he had put in the 5R transition and was looking at the chart to get ready to check the points when a few things happened almost simultaneously. We passed through karoo and the aircraft did not change course per the new transition; I noticed that the new transition required us to stop at 8000' rather than the 6000' for runway 23R and we were starting to descend through 8000;' and the check airman said he (the first officer) put the wrong transition in. Being past karoo; heading the wrong direction and descending below 8000' I pressed the altitude hold button to stop the descent while talking to approach. I told them that we had been set up for 23R transition per the previous controller and didn't have time to switch it in the FMS and requested a vector and asked him if we should stay at our current altitude; descend to 7000' or climb back up to 8000'. He gave us a heading and said to maintain 7000'. We complied and set up and briefed the approach for 5R. This was interrupted by an ATC assignment to climb to 8000' for traffic. Then we were given a heading of 230 vectors to final. Then to slow to 210 kts; followed by 190 kts and descend to 6000'. Then a turn 20 degrees to the right and a switch to the next frequency 124.8. Approach gave 'company Y abbc' runway 5R. The first officer clarified that the call was for 'company Y abbc' and the controller apologized saying; 'sorry; I do that all the time'. He said 5R and 190 kts. He descended us to 3000 and vectored us to final in between pecit and purme telling us to maintain 3000 until established. I don't remember the final heading; but when the localizer captured we were closer to purme and well above the glide slope; so I initiated a 1500 fpm descent while completing configuration and checklists and we were stabilized on the approach before the FAF.it was gusting throughout the approach; but as the ATIS was recent I expected the winds to calm down closer to the ground. I should have called for a wind check or kept my speed high. About 800 feet above the ground; we got a +15kt gust and I had to pull the power way out to keep from over speeding the flaps. I immediately began putting the power back in anticipating that the gust would die down. As I put the power back in; the pli which wasn't there a moment before bleeped red with stick shaker activation and disappeared just as fast. I disconnected the autopilot and pitched down and added some to make sure there wasn't a second occurrence. I didn't want to add full power right away because I wasn't that familiar with the aircraft and with the gusting conditions; I didn't want to over speed the flaps and create more problems. I made sure we were safe and glanced up for situational awareness; said to myself that we were high and called for the go around. We were still above 500' at this point and had 3 whites and a red; and with the winds being so different than what the ATIS reported; and with the stick shaker blip; I wasn't comfortable continuing. We accomplished the go-around and asked ATC for a wind check. They reported 8 gusting 20. I asked the first officer to update the approach speed and reset the approach and landed the second time without further difficulty. We reported the winds to both the tower and approach. After parking; the check airman informed us that we were unsat.the transition deviation was a combination of two controllers issuing different runway transitions; the new transition coming late due to frequency congestion and the inexperience of both pilots with this FMS. I should have asked for vectors when issued the new clearance.the stick shaker event was a combination of incorrect winds on the ATIS and the tower not giving updated wind speeds on final or myself asking for a wind check so that our approach speed setting was too low.Suggestions1) do not pair two pilot who have not reached their consolidation hours.2) if the runway in use is different from the ATIS; the approach controller should inform center so that they can notify the pilots before switching frequencies.3) an FMS lab should be integrated into training to teach the oddities of how the FMS interacts with the automation and strategies for dealing with these situations.4) in rapidly changing wind conditions; the tower should always include a wind check. 5) if approach doesn't establish communication with a crew until just before a transition point; they should issue vectors or a direct to instruction. If the approach doesn't have a way of knowing what the previous controller told a crew (I.e. Excpect 23R); some form of computer or written communication of previous clearances issued would be helpful when technology allows it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier flight crew reported an unstabilized approach due to late runway change by ATC resulting in a missed approach.

Narrative: The flight went normally until just prior to KAROO. The controller had told us to descend via the RDU KAROO1 and expect runway 23R per the most recent ATIS; which I believe was M. The winds were listed as 360 @ 11 kts; which was in my mind a signal that we would eventually get a runway change unless the winds changed. Switching to Raleigh Durham approach; I heard ATC inform another flight that ATIS N was now out. I asked the FO to get N and he did while checking in with approach that we were descending through 14000' via the KAROO1. The new ATIS said the winds were 360 @ 6 kts and the FO started that the approach speed didn't change. Neither of us looked at the runway change as we had already been told by the previous controller to expect 23R...we should have checked. There was no response from the controller. The frequency was congested for a minute and the FO tried again informing the controller that we were now descending 11000' for 10000' on the KAROO1. The controller started to call us Company Y; but corrected himself and told us to 'expect 5R'. We were about halfway between ARGAL and KAROO at this point with less than a minute to get the new transition set up. The FO set to work putting the new transition in while I looked at the STAR and waited for him to finish so we could check it. I checked that he had put in the 5R transition and was looking at the chart to get ready to check the points when a few things happened almost simultaneously. We passed through KAROO and the aircraft did not change course per the new transition; I noticed that the new transition required us to stop at 8000' rather than the 6000' for runway 23R and we were starting to descend through 8000;' and the check airman said he (the FO) put the wrong transition in. Being past KAROO; heading the wrong direction and descending below 8000' I pressed the Altitude Hold button to stop the descent while talking to approach. I told them that we had been set up for 23R transition per the previous controller and didn't have time to switch it in the FMS and requested a vector and asked him if we should stay at our current altitude; descend to 7000' or climb back up to 8000'. He gave us a heading and said to maintain 7000'. We complied and set up and briefed the approach for 5R. This was interrupted by an ATC assignment to climb to 8000' for traffic. Then we were given a heading of 230 vectors to final. Then to slow to 210 kts; followed by 190 kts and descend to 6000'. Then a turn 20 degrees to the right and a switch to the next frequency 124.8. Approach gave 'Company Y ABBC' runway 5R. The FO clarified that the call was for 'Company Y ABBC' and the controller apologized saying; 'Sorry; I do that all the time'. He said 5R and 190 kts. He descended us to 3000 and vectored us to final in between PECIT and PURME telling us to maintain 3000 until established. I don't remember the final heading; but when the localizer captured we were closer to PURME and well above the glide slope; so I initiated a 1500 fpm descent while completing configuration and checklists and we were stabilized on the approach before the FAF.It was gusting throughout the approach; but as the ATIS was recent I expected the winds to calm down closer to the ground. I should have called for a wind check or kept my speed high. About 800 feet above the ground; we got a +15kt gust and I had to pull the power way out to keep from over speeding the flaps. I immediately began putting the power back in anticipating that the gust would die down. As I put the power back in; the PLI which wasn't there a moment before bleeped red with stick shaker activation and disappeared just as fast. I disconnected the autopilot and pitched down and added some to make sure there wasn't a second occurrence. I didn't want to add full power right away because I wasn't that familiar with the aircraft and with the gusting conditions; I didn't want to over speed the flaps and create more problems. I made sure we were safe and glanced up for situational awareness; said to myself that we were high and called for the go around. We were still above 500' at this point and had 3 whites and a red; and with the winds being so different than what the ATIS reported; and with the stick shaker blip; I wasn't comfortable continuing. We accomplished the go-around and asked ATC for a wind check. They reported 8 gusting 20. I asked the FO to update the approach speed and reset the approach and landed the second time without further difficulty. We reported the winds to both the tower and approach. After parking; the check airman informed us that we were unsat.The transition deviation was a combination of two controllers issuing different runway transitions; the new transition coming late due to frequency congestion and the inexperience of both pilots with this FMS. I should have asked for vectors when issued the new clearance.The stick shaker event was a combination of incorrect winds on the ATIS and the tower not giving updated wind speeds on final or myself asking for a wind check so that our approach speed setting was too low.Suggestions1) Do not pair two pilot who have not reached their consolidation hours.2) If the runway in use is different from the ATIS; the approach controller should inform Center so that they can notify the pilots before switching frequencies.3) An FMS lab should be integrated into training to teach the oddities of how the FMS interacts with the automation and strategies for dealing with these situations.4) In rapidly changing wind conditions; the tower should always include a wind check. 5) If approach doesn't establish communication with a crew until just before a transition point; they should issue vectors or a direct to instruction. If the approach doesn't have a way of knowing what the previous controller told a crew (I.e. excpect 23R); some form of computer or written communication of previous clearances issued would be helpful when technology allows it.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.